ALSTON v. FORSYTH, et al
Filing
69
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that 64 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by STEPHEN HOUSELER, MARTY SAPKO, DEBRA FORSYTH, JAMES PERROTTI, be granted. Objections to R&R due by 11/2/2009. Signed by Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 10/14/09. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA WILLIAM HARRISON ALSTON, Plaintiff, v. DEBRA FORSYTH, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. 05-168 Erie District Judge McLaughlin Magistrate Judge Baxter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.
RECOMMENDATION It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
[Document # 64] be granted.
II.
REPORT A. Relevant Procedural History
On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff William Harrison Alston, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean ("FCI-McKean"), filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Named as Defendants are: Debra Forsyth, Chairperson of FCI-McKean's Safety and Health Committee ("Forsyth"); Marty Sapko, UNICOR/Industry Factory Manager at FCI-McKean ("Sapko"); Stephen Housler, Safety Manager at FCI-McKean ("Housler"); and James Perrotti, UNICOR/Industry Shop Foreman at FCI-McKean ("Perrotti"). In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants: (i) were deliberately indifferent to his safety and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; and (ii) violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. On September 11, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss [Document # 38] claiming that: (i) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, or, in the alternative; (ii) the identical claims raised by Plaintiff have already been litigated and finally
resolved in favor of Defendants in five substantially similar cases previously filed with this Court (hereinafter collectively referred to as "silica dust cases").1 On April 7, 2008, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted for either or both of the reasons asserted by Defendants. [Document # 45]. Plaintiff filed objections to this recommendation and, on June 5, 2008, District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin issued a Memorandum Order refusing to adopt this Court's Report and Recommendation and denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, "without prejudice to Defendants' right to contest the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims on a more fully developed record." [Document # 47]. The parties have since completed discovery and Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, once again claiming that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable twoyear statute of limitations. [Document # 64]. Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion [Document # 67], and Defendants have filed a reply brief, in which they raise the additional argument that this case must now be dismissed based upon the Third Circuit Court's recent opinion affirming Judge McLaughlin's dismissal of the five previous silica dust cases. Ward v. LaManna, 07-2024 (3d Cir. 2009). [Document # 68]. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
B.
Relevant Factual History
From early March 6, 2001 to March 22, 2002, Plaintiff was assigned to work in FCIMcKean's UNICOR factory. (See Plaintiff's Work History Report attached as Exhibit 3 to Document # 65). Plaintiff was assigned to operate the large panel saw, which was used to cut Micore board. (See William Alston deposition transcript attached as Exhibit 4 to Document # 65, at p. 4). Plaintiff has alleged that, "throughout [his] assignment to the FCI McKean Unicor,
1
T h e previous five cases finally decided by this Court were Michael Hill v. LaM a n n a , C.A. No. 03-323 (W.D. Pa.); L e s lie Kelly v. LaM a n n a , C.A. No. 03-368 (W.D. Pa.); Kevin Siggers v. LaM a n n a , C.A. No. 03-355 (W.D. Pa.); M y r o n W a r d v. LaManna, C.A. No. 04-11 (W.D. Pa.); and Kenny Hill v. LaM a n n a , C.A. No. 05-160 (W.D. Pa.).
2
defendants instructed and allowed [him] to work with and around areas where tac-boards `a.k.a' Micore and Spec-boards are cut, sawed, sanded, machined, touched, stacked, and otherwise handled by plaintiff." (Complaint at ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges further that he was "instructed and allowed to blow the floor around machines where Micore boards ha[d] been cut, sawed, sanded and otherwise machined, with air hoses," which he also used to "blow machines off." (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that the UNICOR factory's exhaust and ventilation systems were "very poor and out of compliance for the machining, sawing, sanding, blowing, sweeping, cutting and fanning of Micore boards and its dust." (Id.). Plaintiff asserts further that the only protection provided to him by Defendants was a breathe-easy dust mask, which "[did] not protect against silica, toxic or hazardous air contaminants, other toxic dust, industrial dust, or harmful vapors." (Id.). Plaintiff also claims that he "was subjected to fumes and vapors which caused him to inhale Lockweld 0861 contact adhesive," which was "seeping into the poorly ventilated atmosphere within the FCI McKean UNICOR facility." (Complaint at ¶ 15). According to Plaintiff, early in his assignment at UNICOR, he asked Defendant Perrotti if he needed a better mask or more protection from the dust and fumes in the UNICOR facility, to which Perrotti allegedly responded, "No, you're fine." (See Alston deposition attached as Exhibit 4 to Document # 65, at pp. 14-16). Plaintiff again asked Defendant Perrotti the same question at a later time during his Unicor assignment, and received the same response. (Id. at pp. 18-20). On July 3, 2001, Defendant Housler received a letter from the Area Director of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") advising him that OSHA had received a notice of safety hazards regarding the ventilation system in the UNICOR factory. (See Housler deposition transcript attached as Exhibit 6 to Document # 65, at p. 32). As a result, OSHA requested that FCI-McKean investigate the alleged conditions and make any necessary corrections or modifications. (See OSHA letter attached as Exhibit 5 to Document # 65). In response to the OSHA letter, FCI McKean contracted with Microbac Laboratories, Inc. to conduct an indoor air quality survey of the UNICOR facility. Microbac tested six different sites in the factory, including the large panel saw that was operated by Plaintiff, and 3
found that all of the sites complied with OSHA air quality standards. (See Microbac survey results attached as Exhibit 7 to Document # 65). On or about October 27, 2001, Plaintiff underwent a chest x-ray, which revealed a spot on his right lung. (See Alston deposition transcript attached as Exhibit 4 to Document # 65, at pp. 24-25 and deposition exhibit A). A subsequent CT scan conducted in March 2002, however, revealed that the lung nodule was no longer present. (Id. at p. 26 and deposition exhibit A).2 Soon after, on March 22, 2002, Plaintiff was transferred from FCI-McKean to FCIPetersburg, Virginia. (See Exhibit 2 attached to Document # 65). Plaintiff claims that, after being transferred to FCI-Petersburg, he learned, for the first time, that Micore boards contain "silica sand and mineral fiber," and create "respirable dust containing crystalline silica," which is a "potential occupational carcinogen." (Complaint at ¶ 14). Plaintiff claims further that he first began experiencing symptoms that he now alleges were caused by his exposure to Micore board dust and Lockweld fumes, in "late 2003, early 2004," well after his transfer to FCI-Petersburg. (See Alston deposition transcript attached as Exhibit 4 to Document # 65, at pp. 22-23).
C.
Standards of Review 1. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) further provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
2
I n his Complaint, Plaintiff mistakenly alleges that in or around March 2002, "a spot was found on [his] lung through a Cat Scan." (Complaint at ¶ 13).
4
a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Id. A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, "[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential fact
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