JACKSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
100
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that 79 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ERIC ASP, ROBERT PIOTROWSKI, VIOLET GEZA, JUDY GLENN, be granted. Objections to R&R due by 10/27/2008. Signed by Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 10/9/08. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA GRADY JACKSON, ) ) ) v. ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., ) Defendants. ) Plaintiff
C.A. No. 06-88 Erie District Judge McLaughlin Magistrate Judge Baxter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.
RECOMMENDATION It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment
[Document # 79], be granted.
II.
REPORT A. Procedural History
On April 18, 2006, Plaintiff Grady Jackson, an inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean, Pennsylvania ("FCI-McKean"), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq, against the following Defendants: United States of America ("United States"); Eric Asp, a Physician's Assistant at FCI-McKean ("Asp"); Robert Piotrowski, a Physician's Assistant at FCI-McKean ("Piotrowski"); Judy Glenn, a nurse at FCI-McKean ("Glenn"); and Violet Geza, a pharmacist at FCI-McKean ("Geza"). Plaintiff subsequently amended his Complaint on or about August 29, 2006. [Document # 38]. On May 31, 2007, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending, inter alia, the dismissal of Plaintiff's FTCA claims against the United States, and Plaintiff's Bivens claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. [Document # 47]. By Memorandum Order dated July 12, 2007, District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin adopted this
Court's recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff's FTCA claims and Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. [Document # 53]. In addition, Defendant United States was dismissed from this case. (Id.).1 As a result, the only claim remaining in this case is Plaintiff's allegation that his rights under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution were violated as a result of the individual Defendants' deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (Amended Complaint at ¶ 22). As relief for this claim, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After completing discovery, Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment [Document # 79], arguing that: (i) Defendants Glenn and Geza are Public Health Service employees and are, therefore, immune from this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a); and (ii) the undisputed evidence of record shows that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion [Document # 82], arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment. Defendants have since filed a reply to Plaintiff's opposition brief, and Plaintiff has filed a reply to Defendants' reply. [Document ## 87 and 90). This matter is now ripe for consideration.
B.
Factual History
On May 9, 2005, Plaintiff was placed in FCI-McKean's Special Housing Unit ("SHU") while he was being investigated for a disciplinary infraction. (Amended Complaint at Section IV, ¶1). He was assigned to the upper bunk of the bunk bed in his SHU cell. (Id. at Section IV, ¶ 2). The bunk bed was not equipped with a ladder to access the upper bunk. (Id. at Section IV, ¶ 3). On May 14, 2005, while attempting to access the upper bunk, Plaintiff fell and hit his back and hip on a metal stool, which was attached to a metal desk located in the cell. (Id. at
1
J u d g e McLaughlin recently denied Plaintiff's motion to reopen his FTCA claims in this case, by Order dated A u g u s t 29, 2008. [Document # 98].
2
Section IV, ¶ 4). As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he "sustained injuries to his back and hip, which is causing severe pain and suffering," and allegedly appear to be permanent. (Id. at Section IV, ¶ 5). Plaintiff claims that he spoke with Defendant Asp on May 15, 2005, about the incident that took place the day before, at which time Defendant Asp allegedly informed Plaintiff that no doctors were on duty, because it was Sunday, and that Plaintiff should seek medical attention the next day. (Id. at Section IV, ¶ 7). Plaintiff then claims that he spoke about the incident to Defendant Glenn on May 16, 2005, at which time Defendant Glenn ordered a prescription of Motrin for Plaintiff. (Id. at Section IV, ¶ 8). Defendant Glenn then delivered Plaintiff's medical file, which included the prescription, to the pharmacy. (See Declaration of Judy Glenn attached as Exhibit C to Document # 80 ("Glenn Declaration"), at ¶ 5). On May 18, 2005, Defendant Asp worked the night shift and was instructed to examine Plaintiff and complete an Injury Assessment Form. (See Declaration of Eric Asp attached as Exhibit E to Document # 80 ("Asp Declaration"), at ¶ 2). Accordingly, Defendant Asp retrieved Plaintiff's medical file from the "pharmacy shelf" in the medical records department, where medical records containing unfilled prescriptions are kept overnight. (Id at ¶ 3). Upon reviewing Plaintiff's medical file, Defendant Asp found that it contained Defendant Glenn's written prescription for Motrin. (Id. at ¶ 5). Defendant Asp then examined Plaintiff and completed an Injury Assessment form, noting that Plaintiff ambulated well, with no gait disturbance and full range of motion. (Document # 80, Exhibit F). Defendant Asp assessed Plaintiff with "back pain [with] no apparent injuries," and recommended that Plaintiff use the Motrin prescribed by Defendant Glenn and to apply a warm compress to the injured area. (Id.). After the examination, Defendant Asp returned Plaintiff's medical file, including the written prescription for Motrin, "to a shelf where information is left for Dr. Olson's review." (Asp Declaration at ¶ 8).2 At that time, Defendant Asp believed that Dr. Olson would review the
2
D e n n is Olson, M.D. is the Clinical Director at FCI-McKean. (See Declaration of Dennis Olson, M.D., attached as E x h ib it H to Document # 80 ("Olson Declaration"), at ¶ 1).
3
Injury Assessment Form the next day and return the medical file, including the prescription, to the pharmacy. (Id. at 11). On May 19, 2005, Dr. Olson reviewed and signed the Injury Assessment Form prepared by Defendant Asp. (Olson Declaration at ¶ 5). Because there was no indication on the form that Plaintiff's prescription for Motrin had not been filled, Dr. Olson delivered the entire medical file, including the unfilled prescription, to the medical records department to be filed. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6). Dr. Olson declares that, had he known the Motrin prescription had not been filled, he would have delivered the medical file to the pharmacy, so the pharmacist could fill the prescription. (Id. at ¶ 7). On or about May 23, 2005, Defendant Geza learned that Plaintiff had asked about the status of his Motrin prescription. (See Declaration of Violette Geza attached as Exhibit G to Document # 80 ("Geza Declaration"), at ¶ 5). Because she did not possess or fill a Motrin prescription for Plaintiff, Defendant Geza retrieved Plaintiff's medical file from the medical records department and found the unfilled prescription that was written by Defendant Glenn. (Id. at ¶ 7). Defendant Geza then promptly filled the prescription and had it delivered to the SHU, where Plaintiff had been housed. (Id. at ¶ 9). However, Plaintiff had already been released from the SHU, so the prescription was sent back to the pharmacy. (See Declaration of Robert Piotrowski attached as Exhibit I to Document # 80, at ¶ 3). On May 24, 2005, Plaintiff went to the pharmacy seeking his prescription for Motrin, at which time Defendant Piotrowski found the prescription and issued it to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 4).
C.
Standards of Review 1. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) further provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the 4
mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Id. A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, "[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential fact
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?