ANDERSON v. BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF THE MILLCREEK TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Filing
232
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 220 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Judge Sean J. McLaughlin on 11/3/11. (kas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARYANN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS
OF THE MILLCREEK TOWNSHIP
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:07-cv-111-SJM
MEMORANDUM OPINION
McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., District J.,
Presently pending before the Court in this federal civil rights action is a motion by
the Plaintiff for the undersigned‟s recusal. This Court has jurisdiction over the pending
matter by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff MaryAnn Anderson is a former employee of the Millcreek Township
School District (the “School District”). In this action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Anderson has sued the School District‟s Board of Directors, its former Superintendent,
and the former Vice-President of the Board, claiming that these Defendants violated her
rights under state and federal law by retaliating against her after she made statements
that, she asserts, were in the nature of whistleblower reports. Also named as one of the
original Defendants was the School District itself; however, the School District was
dismissed from the case following argument held on July 29, 2008. At all relevant
1
times prior to and during this litigation, the School District has been represented in
various capacities by the law firm of Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett, P.C.
(hereinafter, the “Knox Firm”).
Following extensive pretrial discovery and motions practice, Plaintiff has of late
come to the view that Richard Perhacs, Esq., an attorney with Knox Firm, is a “premier
witness in Plaintiff‟s case in chief for whistleblower status and retaliation.” (Pl.‟s Mot. for
Recusal [220] at ¶ 5.) More specifically, Plaintiff contends that Perhacs was complicit in
actively concealing and/or spoliating evidence that would have materially assisted her in
presenting her case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated her intent to file a motion to add Attorney
Perhacs as an additional defendant and to request sanctions against defense counsel
and the School District‟s counsel “for concealing evidence that would have enabled
Plaintiff to adduce Attorney Perhacs‟ culpability in this case…” (Mot. for Recusal at
¶14.) As part of this motion, Plaintiff apparently plans to seek sanctions against the
entire Knox firm. Plaintiff asserts that, in addition to my having to rule on the addition of
Perhacs as a party and Perhacs‟s potential liability, the Court will “in the very near
future” be “required to address issues directly effecting Knox‟s representation of [the
School District] and compliance with rules of procedure and preservation of
electronically stored information.” (Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal [221].)
In light of these developments concerning Mr. Perhacs, Plaintiff asserts that my
recusal from this case is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) on the theory that my
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff states
the following:
2
6. Plaintiff … comprehends, for the first time, that the court‟s Chief Law
Clerk, Kathy Scibetta (K. Scibetta), has a brother, Jeffry [sic] Scibetta (J.
Scibetta), who is a shareholder at the Knox Firm in circumstances when
an influential shareholder there, Perhacs, is a key witness in Plaintiff‟s
case and possibly a newly added Defendant.
7. Perhacs is Secretary to the Board of Directors and Personnel
Chairperson, having influence over Jeffrey Scibetta.
8. K. Scibetta is the Court‟s chief law clerk, having worked for the Court
for many years, maintaining a social friendship with the Court and the full
confidence of the Court to advise it concerning the disposition of pending
cases.
9. K. Scibetta has been actively involved in advising the Court relevant to
the merits of Plaintiff‟s case, having attending the hearings conducted in
January 2011 pursuant to Plaintiff‟s F.R.C.P. 11 Motion.
10. Upon information and belief, K. Scibetta has been involved in advising
the Court concerning Plaintiff‟s case for an extended period of time, sans
the Court ever disclosing to Plaintiff that her brother is a shareholder at the
Knox Firm.
11. At no time was Plaintiff made aware of K. Scibetta‟s immediate family
relationship with the Knox Firm at the same time she was directly involved
in advising the Court about the merits of Plaintiff‟s case.
12. [….] the Court is duty bound to recuse itself form this case so Plaintiff
can move forward with her case in a forum of impartiality, as is her right.
(Mot. for Recusal at ¶¶ 6-12.)
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that my prior status as a shareholder in the
Knox firm some seventeen years ago provides further grounds for recusal.
According to Plaintiff, “this Court‟s prior relationship with Knox and Perhacs may
lead the average person on the street to question the ability of the Court to
impose sanctions against the judge‟s former firm where many colleagues likely
still work or consider issues raised against a specifically named former colleague
from the firm.” (Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal [221] at p. 22.)
3
Finally, Plaintiff cites other relevant “acknowledged circumstances” which
she believes weigh in favor of my recusal. (Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal
at p. 22.) In particular, she points to the following events which, she contends,
could support the conclusion that I am biased against her:
I accepted into the record a document filed by the Defendants on
October 5, 2009 – namely, the Defendants‟ “Joint Supplement”
[109] in support of their previous motion for dismissal/ motion for
sanctions [87]; Plaintiff considers this document an “unrecognized
pleading” and objects to the fact that Defendants were permitted to
file the document after pleadings on the original motion had closed;
On October 6, 2009 I sanctioned Plaintiff‟s counsel, allegedly
“without basis,” in connection with a discovery dispute by reopening
discovery on a narrowly defined issue and charging Plaintiff‟s
counsel with the cost of the additional discovery;
On March 16, 2010 I issued a ruling relative to the parties‟
competing motions for sanctions in which, according to Plaintiff, my
treatment of her was “significantly different” (meaning less
favorable) than my treatment of the Defendants;
During a January 6, 2011 argument on Plaintiff‟s pending motion for
Rule 11 sanctions, I permitted the Defendants to address issues
raised in their October 5, 2009 Joint Supplement; however, by
contrast on May 27, 2011, after granting Plaintiff’s motion to reopen
discovery relative to her own claims of spoliation, I indicated that
discovery would be firmly limited to 60 days – conduct which
Plaintiff considers “disparate treatment”;
Rulings have not yet issued relative to Plaintiff‟s motion for
reconsideration of this Court‟s March 16, 2010 Order [157] or
Plaintiff‟s motion for Rule 11 sanctions [183];
This Court‟s Order of March 31, 2011 granting Plaintiff‟s motion to
further reopen discovery relative to the alleged spoliation of
Defendant Maynard‟s hard drive [182] did not come until 204 days
after the matter had been fully briefed. Plaintiff claims that this
delay prejudiced her ability to conduct meaningful discovery due to
witnesses‟ continually fading memories, and she finds it noteworthy
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that this particular discovery request related to possible misconduct
on the part of the Knox Firm.
Plaintiff asserts that, when all of the foregoing factors are considered, a
reasonable person could question this Court‟s impartiality and might reasonably
wonder whether Plaintiff “will have a fair chance of obtaining swift, impartial
resolution” of her (as yet unfiled) motions to add Perhacs as a Defendant, to
conduct further discovery regarding Perhacs‟s conduct, and for sanctions against
defense counsel, the School District, and the School District‟s attorneys. (Pl.‟s
Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal at p. 28.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to §455(a), a presiding federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§455(a). The test for recusal is whether a “reasonable person, with knowledge of all the
facts, would conclude that the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In
re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004).
A motion to disqualify a federal district judge is committed to the sound discretion
of the district judge. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003). In
making the determination whether to recuse, the court must consider how the facts
would appear to a “well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the
hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir.1995)). Accord In re
Sherwin-Williams Co., 607 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Holland, 519
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F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir.
1998).
Applying this standard, this Court finds that no basis has been stated by the
Plaintiff which warrants my recusal under § 455.
A.
Insofar as my law clerk‟s relationship to the Knox Firm and her involvement in
this case is concerned, numerous clarifications must be made, as Plaintiff‟s motion rests
upon a number of inaccurate factual assumptions. First, although Ms. Scibetta has
served for many years as a law clerk to this Court, she is neither the Court‟s “chief law
clerk” (a title which does not exist) nor its most senior law clerk, nor does she maintain a
“social friendship” with the undersigned outside of work.
Second, while it is true that Ms. Scibetta attended the hearings relative to
Plaintiff‟s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, it is not true that she has worked on this case
“throughout the litigation,” as Plaintiff assumes. In fact, Ms. Scibetta did not become
involved in this case until approximately March of 2010, long after the School District
had been dismissed as a party to the litigation. Apart from her input concerning the
instant recusal motion, she has had no real involvement in any of the Court‟s
substantive rulings to date. To the extent she has assisted the Court relative to
Plaintiff‟s pending Rule 11 motion, it should be noted that that particular motion involves
a pointed dispute between Plaintiff‟s counsel and Defense counsel; it is not directed at
the conduct of the School District or its attorneys. Ms. Scibetta also attended a May 27,
2011 argument pertaining to the School District‟s motion to quash to subpoenas [203]
and the Plaintiff‟s motion for an extension of time to complete discovery [208], but her
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involvement was essentially limited to attending the argument and docketing the Court‟s
minutes and the order issued verbally by me in open court.
Third, to the extent Plaintiff is complaining that I failed to disclose to her my law
clerk‟s familial relationship to a shareholder in the Knox Firm, there was neither a need
nor any reasonable opportunity for me to do so prior to the time that Plaintiff filed her
recusal motion. As I have noted, Ms. Scibetta had no involvement in this case prior to
March of 2010, at which point the School District was no longer a named Defendant.
Thereafter, the Knox Firm‟s only involvement has been in the context of coordinating
third party discovery. At no time has Ms. Scibetta‟s brother (a trusts and estates lawyer)
ever been involved in any aspect of this litigation. Moreover, the specter of a possible
motion for sanctions against the School District and/or its counsel was not formally
raised by Plaintiff until July 29, 2011 at the earliest, when Plaintiff filed her “Motion for
Permission to Brief Entitlement to Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence” [214].1 Just one
month later, Plaintiff filed the instant motion in which she now complains that this Court
didn‟t disclose to her Ms. Scibetta‟s relationship to a Knox Firm shareholder. In that
brief interim, Ms. Scibetta had had no involvement with the Plaintiff‟s July 29, 2011
motion, and the Court‟s only action relative to that motion was an order directing a
response from the Defendants.
Thus, to put it quite simply, the Court did not inform Plaintiff of Ms. Scibetta‟s
status during the one month period between July 29 and August 30, 2011 because
1
In fact, Plaintiff represents in her motion for recusal that “[a]ny interest which Perhacs or Knox would
have in the outcome of the instant case” are “just now apparent to Plaintiff…” (Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot.
for Recusal [122] at p. 22.) Plaintiff may rest assured that, if the purported interests of Perhacs and Knox
in the outcome of this litigation were not previously known to her, they certainly were not known to the
Court.
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there was no need to do so; the Plaintiff‟s putative sanctions claims against the School
District and its counsel were as yet inchoate and no substantive action was being
undertaken by the Court at that point. In addition, the subject of my law clerk‟s familial
relation to a Knox Firm shareholder and its theoretical bearing on some future motion in
this case were not the issues foremost on the Court‟s agenda during the month of
August 2011, as this Court was engaged with other pressing matters unrelated to this
litigation.
Even so, Plaintiff claims that a reasonable person going forward would wonder
whether any improper influence had been exerted upon my law clerk and/or whether the
law clerk could be impartial in performing her professional duties for this Court. The
implication is that, by extension, my own impartiality might reasonably be questioned
insofar as I might be called upon to decide Plaintiff‟s future motions for sanctions
against Perhacs and/or the Knox Firm.
The short response to this is that Plaintiff fails to distinguish the role of law clerks
from that of the judge. “Both bench and bar recognize … that judges, not law clerks,
make the decisions,” In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1989), and “[t]he
statute itself [i.e, § 455] speaks of „justice[s], judge[s], or magistrate[s],‟ not clerks.” Id.
Moreover, most reasonable people would understand that judges are able to ferret out
and set aside the potential biases of their law clerks. See id. (“[J]udges are fully
capable (and believed by reasonable members of the public to be fully capable) of
taking account of whatever „bias‟ having a brother in a plaintiff's law firm might bring to a
clerk.”). Thus, even where a colorable conflict exists on the part of a law clerk, the
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proper remedy is sequestration of the law clerk from future involvement in the litigation,2
not recusal of the judge. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig.,
153 Fed. Appx. 819, 826 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]solation of [conflicted] law clerks usually
ameliorates the appearance of impropriety”). Accord In re Allied-Signal Inc., supra, at
972 (“If a clerk has a possible conflict of interest, it is the clerk, not the judge, who must
be disqualified.”) (quoting Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff has submitted no authority, and this Court is not independently aware of
any, which would require the undersigned‟s recusal in the present circumstances. I
therefore find that none of the factors cited by Plaintiff as supposedly establishing a
conflict on the part of my law clerk provides grounds for my own recusal.
B.
Plaintiff also contends that my own prior relationship with the Knox Firm “may
lead the average person on the street to question the ability of the Court to impose
sanctions against the judge‟s former firm where many colleagues likely still work or
consider issues raised against a specifically named former colleague from the firm.”
(Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal [221] at p. 22.) However, no reasonable person,
“with knowledge of all the facts,” In re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d at 301, would
harbor such concerns.
To clarify the record, this Court‟s relationship with the Knox Firm as one of its
former shareholders ended some seventeen years ago when I assumed the bench.
2
If and when it becomes necessary to do so based upon Plaintiff‟s prospective filings, this Court will
make a determination at some future point whether such sequestration is appropriate.
9
Since 1994 when I terminated my employment with the Knox Firm, significant turnover
has occurred with respect to the Firm‟s attorneys, such that many of my former
colleagues are no longer employed there. With respect to those former colleagues who
remain, my contacts with those individuals have been either infrequent and incidental or
(for those who practice in federal court) limited to a strictly professional setting. In sum,
over the last seventeen years, I have not maintained a close personal or social
relationship with any of the attorneys presently employed at the Knox Firm, including
Mr. Perhacs.3 Considering these facts, my prior association with the Knox Firm years
ago would not lead a reasonable person to question my ability to preside impartially
over a request for sanctions against Mr. Perhacs or the Knox Firm, if and when such a
request is made in this case.
C.
Plaintiff‟s remaining grounds for my disqualification involve about a half-dozen
incidents in which she perceives that, in presiding over the instant litigation, I treated
her, or her attorney, less favorably than I treated the Defendants and/or their counsel.
The short answer to this line of argument is that these matters, which are intrinsic to the
judicial proceedings at hand, do not constitute valid grounds for my recusal under
§455(a).
It is by now well established that “beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must
involve an extrajudicial factor.” Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d
155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the
3
To the best of the Court‟s recollection, the only contact I have had with Mr. Perhacs in the seventeen
years since I left the Knox Firm was in May of 2005 when he testified in a jury trial in Figaski v. Storten,
Case No. 1:03-cv-352-SJM.
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record could not support a finding of an extrajudicial factor causing impartiality.
Notwithstanding the Plaintiff‟s consternation about my law clerk‟s relationship to another
lawyer at the Knox Firm (who has never been involved in this case), this Court has
never received any extrajudicial information pertaining to this case as a result of that
relationship. Moreover, reasonable persons would not assume that this Court had
obtained – much less utilized -- extrajudicial knowledge about the case simply by virtue
of my law clerk‟s familial relation to a Knox firm lawyer. See In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891
F.2d at 971 (“Assuming the family relationship [between law clerks and lawyers
representing plaintiffs in mass tort litigation] raises a slight cloud, few knowledgeable
people would expect that it would ordinarily cause most law clerks to actually commit
the serious ethical breach of seeking to influence a judge improperly.”).
Absent the existence of an extrajudicial factor, the record must evince a “deepseated favoritism or antagonism [on the part of the judge] that would make fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Here, the record cannot
support such a finding. To the extent Plaintiff has cited examples of supposedly
“disparate treatment,” several observations must be made in order to set the record
straight.
First, the fact that I accepted into the record the Defendants‟ “Joint Supplement”
(in which Defendants‟ raised additional allegations of alleged discovery-related
misconduct on the part of Plaintiff and/or her counsel) and discussed its allegations
during an October 6, 2009 argument (the day after it was filed) cannot rationally support
an inference of bias. The record here will reflect that this Court has consistently been
generous toward both sides in allowing them to file whatever documents they have
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deemed necessary in order to fulfill their respective obligations of zealous
representation in this case. This has included extensive motions practice on the part of
both Plaintiff and Defendants concerning collateral matters having to do more with
alleged discovery violations than the merits of the Plaintiff‟s whistleblower claims.
Although Plaintiff may have felt unprepared to fully discuss the Defendants‟ allegations
as of October 6, 2009, no ruling was made on the matter that day, and Plaintiff has
since been given ample opportunity to respond to the allegations in the Joint
Supplement. Plaintiff has also been given leave to litigate, at length, her entitlement to
Rule 11 sanctions stemming from the allegations contained in the Joint Supplement.
Second, the fact that, during the October 6, 2009 argument, “in discussing the
allegations of the Joint Supplement [Docket No. 109] the Court adopted the language
presented by Defense Counsel in their written pleading” (Pl.‟s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for
Recusal at p. 23), means nothing. I routinely quote the language of parties when
summarizing their allegations.
Plaintiff also takes issue with my ruling of October 6, 2009 in which I faulted her
counsel for failing to timely produce in discovery the Plaintiff‟s self-styled “chronology” of
events relevant to her claims. As to this particular discovery dispute I specifically
declined to grant the Defendants‟ request for a dismissal of the action, finding that to be
too draconian. Instead, I allowed the Defendants a brief (10 day) period in which to redepose the Plaintiff concerning issues limited to the chronology, and I required Plaintiff‟s
counsel to pay the reasonable attorney fees associated therewith. Although Plaintiff
clearly takes issue with this ruling imposing very limited sanctions upon her counsel,
she fails to mention that the other aspects of the Defendants‟ motion for dismissal
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and/or sanctions were denied by me and thereby decided favorably to her.4 Overall, the
record of that proceeding fails to evidence any deep-seated antagonism toward her or
her attorney as could support a motion for recusal.
Plaintiff further complains about my March 16, 2010 in-court ruling5 in which, as
she sees it, the Court was addressing competing motions for sanctions by both sides
but treated the parties disparately. Rather than rehash the particulars of the parties‟
respective motions, the Court will simply allow the record to speak for itself. Suffice to
say that, despite Plaintiff‟s objections to the Court‟s ruling of March 16, 2010 – which
remains the subject of a pending motion for reconsideration, the record will not support
a finding of deep-seated favoritism toward Defendants or antagonism toward the
Plaintiff as would cause a reasonable and informed person to question this Court‟s
impartiality.
Plaintiff perceives that I again treated her less favorably vis-à-vis the Defendants
during arguments held on January 6, 2011 and May 27, 2011. She complains that I
somehow “invited the Defendants to renew their arguments originally presented in their
Joint Supplement” some nine months after Defendants had been allowed to conduct the
limited discovery permitted by the Court in its March 16, 2010 order. (Pl.‟s Br. [221] at
p. 26.) To set the record straight, the Court did not “invite” Defendants to renew their
joint supplement allegations at the January 6, 2011 argument. Rather, the record will
reflect that the Court was merely inquiring whether Defendants were still standing by the
4
Plaintiff also fails to mention that this Court later imposed costs on the Defendants relative to the
appointment of a third-party expert in connection with Plaintiff‟s concerns over the integrity of Defendant
Maynard‟s hard drive.
5
It should be noted that Ms. Scibetta was not involved in either the October 6, 2009 or March 16, 2010
rulings.
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allegations raised in their Joint Supplement, and this was done in an attempt to
ascertain what issues still remained in dispute. Since the January 6 argument
concerned the Plaintiff‟s motions for Rule 11 sanctions based upon the allegations
Defendants had raised in their Joint Supplement, and since the Court had never passed
upon the merits of the Defendants allegations of spoliation and alteration of evidence as
contained in their Joint Supplement, it was both logical and necessary for this Court to
ascertain whether it was receiving evidence for the sole purpose of assessing the
Plaintiff‟s Rule 11 motion or whether, in addition, the Defendants were still seeking a
ruling based upon the discovery violations alleged in their Joint Supplement.
Plaintiff perceives, however, that this Court engaged in “apparently disparate
treatment” when, on May 27, 2011, after this case had been pending a full four years
and with discovery disputes still on-going, it attempted to bring some finality to the
pretrial discovery phase. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court granted her
motion to reopen discovery, she apparently takes offense to this Court‟s observation
that “any case can go down a million rabbit holes, but sometimes you[„ve] got to stop,
we are about to stop … There‟s not going to be any extensions of discovery, that 60
days is a firm date.” Notwithstanding the Courts‟ fairly generous grant of 60 days‟
additional discovery – and the fact that it has since extended Plaintiff‟s opportunity to
engage in discovery even beyond this 60-day deadline, Plaintiff views the Court‟s
actions as evincing “a predisposition to not look favorably upon any motions from
Plaintiff seeking remedies for any spoliation evidence that she was able to confirm
during discovery or any extensions of discovery that might have proven necessary given
the nature of the issues being investigated.” (Pl.‟s Br. [221] at p. 26.) Again, it is
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sufficient simply to rest on the record here, which will not support any reasonable
perception of a deep-seated antagonism on the part of this Court. Plaintiff was given
ample leave to explore the issues she raised relative to the May 27, 2001 hearing, and
any reasonable observer would understand that the Court‟s comments were borne not
of judicial bias but merely of its desire to bring some finality to these extensive pretrial
proceedings.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that a reasonable person would infer bias on the part
of this Court based on its “fail[ure] to issue timely orders on several outstanding issues
in the instant case.” (Pl.‟s Br. [221] at p. 26.) However, to the extent this litigation has
become unduly protracted, the record will quickly dispel any notion that the delays have
resulted from judicial inattention, apathy, or lack of impartiality. Instead, what the record
would demonstrate to the well-informed and reasonable observer is that this otherwise
unremarkable employment discrimination case has occasioned an unusually high
number of pretrial filings and court hearings, most of which have been directed toward
discovery-related, rather than merits-related, disputes. The record will further reflect
that the parties‟ pretrial practice has, from the start, been unusually aggressive and
contentious. In the process, both sides have sought, and received, leave to argue and
re-argue their respective points, with the result that a substantial amount of this Court‟s
limited judicial resources have been consumed on the most detailed and mundane of
allegations.
The pending motion for recusal illustrates this point well. Upon the filing of this
motion, it became incumbent for this Court to forestall work on other matters in order to
consider the propriety of its continued management of this case. After receiving lengthy
15
responses to the instant motion from all other interested parties, including the
production of new information by the School District, the Plaintiff filed a seven-page
motion for an extension of time in which to file her reply brief, based on numerous
complaints about the manner in which she had received the new information. After
being granted this extension, Plaintiff filed a 47-page reply brief [229], accompanied by
250 pages of supporting materials on October 7, 2011. This was followed by a joint
motion by the Defense [230] to file a 25-page sur-reply brief to Plaintiff‟s Reply Brief, in
order to address the arguments raised by the Plaintiff based on the recently provided
documents. This in turn was followed by the Plaintiff‟s 5-page response [231],
requesting that the Defendants be denied the opportunity to file their sur-reply or, in the
alternative, be limited to only a 15-page sur-reply to be followed by a 7-page sur-surreply by the Plaintiff. In addressing Plaintiff‟s various arguments for recusal, this Court
has had to invest substantial time reviewing the lengthy and convoluted docket in this
case merely to place the Plaintiff‟s allegations in proper factual context.
Plaintiff suggests, for example, that a neutral observer would infer bias from the
fact that Plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration of my March 16, 2010 order is still
pending. However, a person knowledgeable of all the facts would understand that the
pendency of this particular motion has in no way prevented the Plaintiff from pursuing
(and obtaining) relevant discovery in support of her case, including the very electronic
information which Plaintiff claims was withheld from her in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45
and which was among the subjects discussed in this Court‟s March 16 order.
Plaintiff also cites her Rule 11 sanctions motion as an example of this Court‟s
failure to act sufficiently expeditiously. However, a hypothetical reasonable and well16
informed observer would understand that the issues raised in Plaintiff‟s Rule 11 motion
are not run-of-the-mill allegations of misconduct; instead, they revolve around highly
technical information requiring the testimony of computer forensics experts. Such an
observer would also understand that this Court fully indulged the Plaintiff‟s efforts to
litigate her Rule 11 allegations by affording her a 3-day evidentiary hearing, in addition
to the lengthy supporting and reply briefs that were accepted into the record. Due to the
duration of the evidentiary hearing and the complexity of the subject matter, the Court
requested and received from the parties extensive proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Substantial time has been invested by the Court toward resolving
Plaintiff‟s Rule 11 motion, despite a busy court docket involving other time-consuming
matters, including criminal cases which, due to speedy trial concerns, took precedence
over this case.6 This notwithstanding, the Court‟s work on the Rule 11 motion was
essentially put on hold once the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for recusal challenging
the propriety of this Court‟s further involvement in the case.
Plaintiff also suggests that this Court took too long (204 days) to rule upon her
motion to reopen discovery relative to the potential spoliation of Defendant Maynard‟s
hard drive7; this “lengthy delay,” she complains, “resulted in more significant faded
memories of the relevant witnesses,” and she finds it “notable that this request for
discovery related specifically to possible misconduct on the part of Knox.” (Pl.‟s Br.
[221] at p. 27.) What Plaintiff fails to mention, however, and what a well-informed
6
Not the least of these were United States v. Marjorie-Diehl Armstrong, Case No. 1:07-cr-26-SJM-1 and
United States v. Jeremy Noyes, Case No. 1:08-cr-55-SJM-1.
7
Although Plaintiff does not specify the motion she is referring to, we assume she means her Motion for
Extension of Time Within Which to Complete Discovery Relevant to the Electronically Stored Information
[182], which was granted via text order on March 31, 2011.
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observer would understand, is that in the midst of this motion being briefed up, the
Plaintiff filed her Rule 11 motion which – for all the reasons previously discussed – gave
rise to a totally new, lengthy, and time-consuming collateral dispute. Thus, when
considered in proper context, the incidents cited by the Plaintiff do not give rise to any
reasonable inference of judicial bias, much the type of “deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism … that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
III.
CONCLUSION
In sum, no grounds exist for my disqualification from this four and a-half year-old
civil action based upon my law clerk‟s relation to a Knox lawyer, my former employment
at that firm some seventeen years ago, and my various rulings (or failure to yet rule) on
matters arising in this litigation. To reiterate, the relevant standard requires that the
recusal motion be evaluated from the viewpoint of a “well-informed, thoughtful and
objective observer” rather than from the perspective of a “hypersensitive, cynical and
suspicious person.” Sensley, 385 F.3d at 599. Applying that standard, Plaintiff has
failed to state any basis that would require my recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Where issues of recusal arise, “a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified
which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified.” Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (Per Mr. Justice Rehnquist, on motion to recuse). See also
Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1179; Sensley, 385 F.3d at 598-99; Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347,
351 (10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the Plaintiff‟s motion to recuse will be denied.
18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARYANN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS
OF THE MILLCREEK TOWNSHIP
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:07-cv-111-SJM
ORDER
AND, now, to wit, this 3rd Day of November, 2011, for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff‟s Motion [220] for Recusal shall be, and
hereby is, DENIED.
s/
Sean J. McLaughlin
Sean J. McLaughlin
United States District Judge
cc:
All counsel of record.
19
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