JOHNSON v. ROTH et al
Filing
24
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that 5 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by T. MOWERY, be granted in part and denied in part. The motion to dismiss should be granted, while the motion for more definit e statement should be denied as moot. Additionally, 9 MOTION to Remand to State Court filed by TARIQ JOHNSON, should be denied; and 15 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint filed by DELANEY, BECK, D. CAMPBELL, GARLIE, ROBINSON, HARMON, ROTH, SZELEWSKI, J. WHITE, should be granted. The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case. Objections to R&R due by 9/14/2009. Signed by Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 8/28/09. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ JOHNSON, aka WILLIAM JAMES, Plaintiff vs. C.O. ROTH, et al, Defendants
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
C.A.No. 08-331 Erie District Judge McLaughlin Magistrate Judge Baxter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I RECOMMENDATION It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion to remand [document # 9] be DENIED. It is further recommended that the motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement filed by Defendant Mowry [Document # 5] be granted in part and denied in part. The motion to dismiss should be GRANTED, while the motion for more definite statement should be DENIED as moot. It is further recommended that the motion to dismiss filed by the Commonwealth Defendants [Document # 15] be GRANTED. The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case.
II
REPORT A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated within the state correctional system, brought this civil
1
rights action alleging that his federal constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth1 Amendments, as well as his state constitutional rights, have been violated by Defendants. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County and Defendants removed the action to this federal district court. Plaintiff's claims arise out of an alleged physical assault by Defendant Correctional Officer Roth in November of 2006. Plaintiff alleges that the other Defendants conspired to cover-up the physical assault2 and that following his submission of a grievance on the matter, he was retaliated against. Named as Defendants are: Correctional Officer Roth, Correctional Officer Campbell, Captain White, Sergeant Delaney, Lt. Harmon, Correctional Officer Garlie, Correctional Officer Beck, Lt. Robinson, Lt. Szelewski, and Physician's Assistant Mowry. Defendant Mowry has filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement. Document # 5. All other Defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the Commonwealth Defendants") are represented by the Attorney General and have filed a motion to dismiss accompanied by exhibits in support thereof. Document # 15. Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand this case back to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (document # 9), as well as a Brief in Opposition to the pending motions to dismiss (document # 23). Additionally, Plaintiff has requested and received additional time in which to file an amended complaint. However, as of today's date, no amended complaint has been filed. The pending motions are ripe for disposition by this Court.
B.
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, in a later filing, Plaintiff acknowledges that the actions complained of do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Document # 23, page 12. In his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff clarifies that this alleged conspiracy involves Commonwealth Defendants Roth, Campbell, Delaney, Beck, White and Garlie. Document # 23, page 9. 2
2
1
Shortly after the removal of this action Plaintiff filed a motion to remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. Document # 9. In opposition to the motion to remand, Defendants argue that, inasmuch as Plaintiff's allegations allege violations of his civil rights and are premised on federal statutes, this matter was properly removed and should remain in the federal courts. Documents # 11, 12. The Court agrees. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Comp. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 376 (1994). See also Dickler v. Cigna Property and Casualty Comp.,48 Fed.Appx. 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2002). It is well established that federal courts are to presume that a cause of action lies outside this limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376, citing Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799). "On a motion to remand, the defendant [the removing party] bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction." Crackau v. Lucent Technologies, 2003 WL 21665135, at * 1 (D.N.J.,2003), citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). See also Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Comp., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 "should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1262 (3d Cir. 1994); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Comp., 770 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1985). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides the district courts with "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," while 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that "[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable ...." It is beyond dispute in this case that Plaintiff is alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is, thus, asserting a claim arising under the Constitution 3
of the United States. As a result, Defendants have met their burden of proving that this Court has original jurisdiction of this action and the motion to remand should be denied.
C.
Standards of Review as to the Pending Dispositive Motions 1. Pro se Litigants
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance"); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
2.
Motion for More Definite Statement
Rule 12(e) provides: "If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) motions, however, "are highly disfavored since the overall scheme of the federal rules calls for relatively skeletal pleadings and places the burden of unearthing factual details on the discovery process." 4
Hughes v. Smith, 2005 WL 435226, at * 4 (E.D.Pa., Feb. 24, 2005) (internal citation omitted). "The basis for granting a 12(e) motion is unintelligibility, not lack of detail." Id.
3.
Motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 95 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)(rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act). The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a `showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 22, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. 5
Recently, the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal/Phillips line of cases: To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. *** After Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The district court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief. This plausibility requirement will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, ___ F.3d. ___, ___, 2009 WL 2501662, at * 4-5 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2009).
4.
Motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56
The Commonwealth Defendants have attached several exhibits to their motion to dismiss. Therefore, this Court will convert that motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Burns v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir.1998). ("When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the district court, the district court must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment."); Greer v. Smith, 2003 WL 1090708, *1 (3d Cir. (Pa.) 2003) ("the District Court considered material outside of the pleadings and, therefore, should have converted the motion for dismissal to a summary judgment motion, allowing the plaintiff an opportunity for appropriate discovery and a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to the motion."). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 6
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) further provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Id. A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Company, 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, "[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential fact
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?