CASE v. DUBAJ et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2011, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants. This matter is closed. Signed by Judge Sean J. McLaughlin on 8/29/11.(jdg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK M. CASE, SR.,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ALAN DUBAJ and MARK CAUSEGROVE,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 08-347 Erie
District Judge McLaughlin

MEMORANDUM OPINION
McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., J.

This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Alan Dubaj and Mark Causegrove (“Defendants”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons which follow, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment will be granted.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Frank M. Case, Sr. (“Case”) is a resident of Erie County, Pennsylvania
and a military veteran entitled to receive veterans’ disability benefits as a result of his
prior military service.

(Amended Complaint, ¶ 4).

Defendants Dubaj and Causegrove

are employed in the Domestic Relations Section of the Erie County Court of Common
Pleas (“DRS”), Erie, Pennsylvania. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 2).

As such, Defendants

are responsible for implementing enforcement programs for child support, spousal
support and alimony on behalf of Erie County.

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(Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 4).

On December 8, 2006, the DRS’s electronic database alerted Dubaj that
Plaintiff owed spousal support arrears of approximately $2400.11 and alimony arrears
of approximately $1400.00 to his ex-wife, Mary E. Case, as a result of his failure to
make his monthly support payments.

(Defendants’ Appx., pp. 11-12).

On December

12, 2006, Dubaj prepared a proposed “freeze order” and submitted it to Judge Michael
Dunlavey for signature.

The proposed order instructed Plaintiff’s bank, 1st Choice

Community Credit Union, to set aside and “freeze” $4915.25 in assets from Plaintiff’s
account.

Following signature by Judge Dunlavey, Dubaj sent a notice of

freezing/seizing assets to Plaintiff pursuant to Pennsylvania law on December 12, 2006.
(Defendants’ Appx., pp. 12, 18).
On January 2, 2007, Plaintiff learned that his account had been frozen and
telephoned Dubaj to inform him that the funds in his 1st Choice Community account
consisted entirely of veterans’ disability benefits. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 8-10). Plaintiff
represented to Dubaj that it was a violation of federal law, specifically, 38 U.S.C. §
5301, to attempt to freeze an account containing only veterans’ disability benefits.
(Amended Complaint, ¶ 10).

Shortly thereafter, on the same date, Dubaj obtained an

order from Judge Stephanie Domitrovich releasing the freeze order on Plaintiff’s bank
account.

(Defendants’ Appx., pp. 13, 19).

On December 16, 2008, Plaintiff brought the instant action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants’ actions violated 38 U.S.C. § 5301 and seeking
actual and punitive damages. An Amended Complaint raising the same allegation was
filed on November 23, 2009. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that he
suffered “mental abuse” as a result of his frozen bank account and alleges that his
insurance was cancelled because his insurance company could not retrieve his monthly
insurance withdrawal from the frozen account.

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(Amended Complaint, ¶ 14).

II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) provides that summary judgment shall
be granted if the Apleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@ Rule 56(e) further provides that
when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, Aan opposing party may
not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must B
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule B set out specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment
should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.@
A district court may grant summary judgment for the defendant when the
plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact.

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Company, 126 F.3d 494, 500 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1997).
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of
evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930
F.2d 1056, 1061 (3rd Cir. 1990).

Further, A[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that

there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential fact >to demand at least one sworn
averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues.=@ Schoch v.
First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quoting Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Company v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458,
460-461 (3rd Cir. 1989) (the non-movant must present affirmative evidence - more than

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a scintilla but less than a preponderance - which supports each element of his claim to
defeat a properly presented motion for summary judgment). The non-moving party
must go beyond the pleadings and show specific facts by affidavit or by information
contained in the filed documents (i.e., depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions) to meet his burden of proving elements essential to his claim. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322; Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061.
A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case
under applicable law.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Although the court must resolve any doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of fact
against the party moving for summary judgment, Rule 56 Adoes not allow a party
resisting the motion to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions.@ Firemen=s Ins. Company of Newark, N.J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969
(3rd Cir. 1982).

Summary judgment is only precluded if the dispute about a material

fact is Agenuine,@ i.e., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-249.

III.

ANALYSIS

In this Section 1983 action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 38 U.S.C.
§ 5301 by causing Plaintiff’s bank account containing his veterans’ disability benefits to
be frozen. In relevant part, 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) states that “[p]ayments of benefits . . .
under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration . . . made to, or an account
of, a beneficiary . . . shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any
legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”
38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).1

Plaintiff, relying on this language, contends that Defendants

1
Defendants do not dispute that Section 5301(a) provides a federal right that is
enforceable under Section 1983. See Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 689-90 (3rd Cir. 2002).

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improperly caused his bank account to be seized by failing to disclose to Judge
Dunlavey that Plaintiff was a veteran and that the funds contained in the bank account
consisted of veterans’ disability benefits.

Defendants counter that the exemptions

contained in Section 5301(a) do not apply to claims for alimony, spousal support, or
child support and, as a result, Plaintiff’s bank account was not improperly frozen or
seized.
In Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987), a Tennessee state court ordered a
disabled veteran to pay $800 per month in child support following the dissolution of his
marriage despite that his only means of income consisted of veterans’ disability
payments. Id. at 623-34. The veteran objected, citing the exemption protections of
Section 5301(a)2 and arguing that only the Veterans Administration had the authority to
order him to use any portion of his disability benefits to satisfy his child support
obligation.

Id. at 624.

The state court rejected his argument and the veteran

appealed.
The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was, inter alia, whether Section
5301(a) preempted the state court’s jurisdiction to order the veteran to use his disability
benefits to satisfy his child support obligation. Id. The Court reviewed the legislative
history of Section 5301(a) and determined that the statute had two purposes: to “avoid
the possibility of the Veterans’ Administration . . . being placed in the position of a
collection agency” and to “prevent the deprivation and depletion of the means of
subsistence of veterans dependent upon these benefits as the main source of their
income.”

Id. at 630 (citing S.Rep. No. 94-1243, pp. 147-48 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News 1976, pp. 5241, 5369, 5370).

The Court concluded that “[n]either

2
Prior to renumbering by Congress on May 7, 1991, Section 5301(a) was codified at
Section 3101(a). Accordingly, cases which were decided prior to 1991 referred to Section
5301(a) by its previous numeration at Section 3101(a).

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purpose” was defeated by allowing the state court to hold the veteran in contempt for
failing to satisfy his child support obligations:
The contempt proceeding did not turn the Administrator into
a collection agency; the Administrator was not obliged to
participate in the proceeding or to pay benefits directly to
appellee. Nor did the exercise of state-court jurisdiction over
appellant's disability benefits deprive appellant of his means
of subsistence contrary to Congress' intent, for these
benefits are not provided to support appellant alone.
Veterans' disability benefits compensate for impaired earning
capacity, H.R.Rep. No. 96-1155, p. 4 (1980), U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1980, p. 3307, and are intended to
“provide reasonable and adequate compensation for
disabled veterans and their families.” S.Rep. No. 98-604, p.
24 (1984) (emphasis added), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1984, pp. 4479, 4488. Additional compensation
for dependents of disabled veterans is available under 38
U.S.C. § 315, and in this case totaled $90 per month for
appellant's two children. But the paucity of the benefits
available under § 315 belies any contention that Congress
*631 intended these amounts alone to provide for the
support of the children of disabled veterans. Moreover, . . .
Congress clearly intended veterans' disability benefits to be
used, in part, for the support of veterans' dependents. On
this basis we may distinguish several of the Court's prior
decisions which held that state law governing domestic
relations was pre-empted by federal statutes containing
prohibitions similar to § 3101(a) against attachment, levy, or
seizure of federal benefits.
*
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*
[C]ongress has not made appellant the exclusive beneficiary
of the disability benefits. As we have demonstrated, these
benefits are intended to support not only the veteran, but the
veteran’s family as well. Recognizing an exception to the
application of [§ 5301(a)]’s prohibition against attachment,
levy, or seizure in this context would further, not undermine,
the federal purpose in providing these benefits. Therefore, .
. . we conclude that [§ 5301(a)] does not extend to protect a
veteran’s disability benefits from seizure where the veteran

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invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid order of
child support.
Id. at 630-31, 635 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted).
Although Rose did not involve an order to freeze a veteran’s bank account, the
majority of courts that have considered the issue have agreed with Rose that veterans’
disability benefits are not exempt from claims for alimony, spousal support and child
support.

See 52 A.L.R.5th 221 §28[a] (“With few exceptions, the cases hold that

payments arising from service in the Armed Forces . . ., though exempt as to the claims
of ordinary creditors, are not exempt from a claim for alimony, support, or maintenance .
. .”).

For example, in Commonwealth ex. rel. Caler v. Caler, 1981 WL 207422 (Pa.

Com. Pl. 1981), a Pennsylvania court considered whether a veteran’s disability
payments were subject to attachment to satisfy a support order.

The court concluded

that exemption statutes such as § 5301(a) “are generally held to apply only to claims
arising from the debtor-creditor relation and have no application to claims for family
support absent clear statutory language to the contrary.”

Id. at **6.

After finding no

express statutory authorization in Section 5301(a) making it applicable to support
judgments, the court held that § 5301(a) “[did] not apply to such judgments.”

Id. at **8.

As in Rose, the court noted that:
The very purpose of such exemptions is to assure the flow of
funds for family support, unimpeded by creditors’ collection
proceedings, and that purpose would be defeated if the
beneficiary of the funds could exclude his dependents from
access thereto by attachment.
Id. (citing, e.g., Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Com. ex rel.
Mangrini v. Mangrini, 398 A. 2d 179 (Pa. Sup. 1979)).

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Similarly, in In re Marriage of Dora Pope-Clifton, 823 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App.
2005), a case involving nearly identical facts to those presented here, an Illinois court
considered whether a veteran’s bank account could be frozen to satisfy his support
obligations despite that the proceeds in the account consisted of veterans’ disability
funds.

The veteran argued, as Plaintiff does here, that allowing the seizure of his bank

account would deprive him of his sole means of subsistence. Id. at 610.

The court

disagreed, noting that “veterans’ benefits are not for the sole benefit of disabled
veterans,” but rather, “[are] intended to benefit both veterans and their families.”

Id. at

610 (citing Rose, 481 U.S. at 630). Relying on Rose, the court determined that the
veteran’s funds “[were] clearly not exempt from seizure under federal law” because
Section 5301(a) “does not extend to protect a veteran’s disability benefits from seizure
where the veteran invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid [support] order.”
Id.

See also Gerold v. Gerold, 488 P.2d 294, 295 (Ore. App. 1971) (holding that a

veteran’s disability benefits were not exempted from a support order by Section 5301(a)
because “the purpose of the federal exemption statute is to serve as a shield for the
veteran and his dependents, not to serve as a sword to be used by the veteran against
his dependents.”).
Consistent with the foregoing caselaw, I conclude that Section 5301(a) does not
bar the seizure of Plaintiff’s bank account to satisfy his family support obligations. See
Rose, 481 U.S. at 635 (“[W]e conclude that [§ 5301(a)] does not extend to protect a
veteran’s disability benefits from seizure where the veteran invokes that provision to
avoid an otherwise valid order of child support.”).

Consequently, Defendants did not

violate federal law by freezing Plaintiff’s bank account, and, as such, their conduct is not
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted and this action is dismissed.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK M. CASE, SR.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
ALAN DUBAJ and MARK CAUSEGROVE,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 08-347 Erie
District Judge McLaughlin

ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2011, and for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.

Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants.

This matter is closed.

/s/ Sean J. McLaughlin
United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. ___

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