DASH v. WINNECOUR
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER: AND NOW, to wit, this 2nd Day of December, 2011, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint 6 shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and the above-captioned matter shall be marked "closed." Signed by Judge Sean J. McLaughlin on 12/2/2011. (kas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS DASH,
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Plaintiff,
v.
RONDA J. WINNECOUR,
Standing Trustee,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:10-cv-256-SJM
MEMORANDUM OPINION
McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., District J.,
Presently pending before the Court in the above-captioned matter is a motion by
the Defendant Ronda J. Winnecour, the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, to dismiss the case for failure to state a cognizable legal claim
or, alternatively, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or improper venue. For the
reasons that follow, the motion will be granted and the case will be dismissed.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Thomas Dash, a resident of Erie County, filed for protection under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 13, 2005. Defendant Winnecour was
appointed as the Chapter 13 Trustee. Upon successfully completing his Chapter 13
Plan, Dash received a discharge from the Bankruptcy Court on September 14, 2010.
See In re Thomas Michael Dash, Case No. 05-11619-TPA (Bankr. W.D. Pa.), Order
dated Sept. 14, 2010 [58].
On October 22, 2010, Dash commenced the instant action against Winnecour.
The complaint alleges that, as part of his Chapter 13 plan, Dash was required to make
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monthly payments to Winnecour so that Winnecour, in turn, could make monthly
payments on Dash‟s behalf to PNC Bank and Washington Mutual Bank (later Chase
Bank), his secured mortgage creditors. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Dash claims he learned in
2008 that the required payments were not being made on a monthly basis by
Winnecour, resulting in his accounts being assessed additional late fees, per diems,
and recomputed interest. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Dash further contends that his secured mortgage
creditors have told him that the additional charges are his responsibility to pay, as the
underlying mortgage and home equity loans are in his name. (Id. at ¶ 7.) According to
the complaint, Dash “is looking for the defendant to take responsibility and pay all
penalties, late fees, per diems and accrued interest that were the result of the payments
not being made in accordance with the Chapter 13 plan.” (Id. at ¶ 8.)
Winnecour has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and/or this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Dash was directed to respond to the motion
on or before May 4, 2011. Since then, he has filed a letter response [8] as well as
various documents [9] and other supplemental material [10] which he believes support
his claim against Winnecour.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Winncour contends that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we are required to accept as
true all allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant (Dash).
Pocono Mountain Charter School v. Pocono Mountain School Dist., No. 10-4478, 2011
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WL 3737443 at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2011) (slip copy) (citing Rocks v. City of
Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1989)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
Winnecour also claims that the complaint, on its face, fails to establish a basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. When evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “we review only
whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.‟” Common Cause of
Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Taliaferro v.
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir.2006)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Upon review of the pending motion and Dash‟s response thereto, this Court
concludes the instant case should be dismissed inasmuch as Dash has asserted his
claim in the wrong forum. Dash‟s claim against Winnecour is related to his Chapter 13
case which was commenced, and administered, in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to the District Court‟s standing Order of
Reference dated October 16, 1984. The reference of Dash‟s case to the Bankruptcy
Court has never been withdrawn by this Court, nor should it be now. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §157(d), a district court “may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or
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proceeding referred under this section … for cause shown.” Relevant factors include
“‟the goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum
shopping and confusion, fostering the economical use of the debtors' and creditors'
resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.‟” In re Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1168
(3d Cir.1990) (quoting Holland America Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992,
999 (5th Cir. 1985)).
No cause for withdrawal of the reference exists here based on the foregoing
considerations and, in fact, present circumstances counsel against it. As Winnecour
points out, the determination as to whether Winnecour properly performed her duties as
Trustee in Dash‟s Chapter 13 case is made by the Bankruptcy Judge upon the filing of
the Trustee‟s final account. In Dash‟s Chapter 13 case, Winnecour filed her final report
and account on July 27, 2010, and the Bankruptcy Court approved it as part of its
September 14, 2010 Order Discharging Debtor, which also discharged Winnecour from
her duties as Trustee. See In re Thomas Michael Dash, supra, Document Nos. [52] and
[58]. Were this Court to now entertain Dash‟s claim against Winnecour, which runs
counter to the Bankruptcy Court‟s previous ruling, it would frustrate the aforementioned
goals of promoting uniformity in bankruptcy administration, reducing forum shopping
and confusion, fostering the economical use of resources, and expediting the
bankruptcy process. Accordingly, there is no basis for withdrawing our prior reference
to the Bankruptcy Court.1
1
Nor does this case involve a challenge to a final judgment, order, or decree issued by the Bankruptcy
Court over which we could exercise our appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
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Instead, to the extent Dash‟s complaint asserts misconduct on the part of
Winnecour in connection with her duties as the Chapter 13 Trustee, the claim should be
directed to the Bankruptcy Court. This is especially true given the fact that Dash is
asserting conduct on the part of his secured mortgage creditors which may potentially
run counter to the Bankruptcy Court‟s Order of Discharge. Specifically, the Bankruptcy
Court‟s September 14, 2010 Order states, in relevant part, that:
… Each and every creditor is bound by the provisions of the completed
plan, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for in the Plan,
and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted or had
rejected the plan. All mortgage and other secured debts provided for by
the Plan are hereby found to be cured of any and all monetary defaults as
of the payment date for which the Trustee last made a distribution, and no
additional interest, late fees or penalties may be assessed for time periods
or payments due prior to that date.
See In re Dash, supra, Order of 9/14/10 [58] at ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
To the extent Dash is seeking indemnity from Winnecour relative to debts that
may have been discharged in his Chapter 13 proceedings, this implicates the
Bankruptcy Court‟s inherent power to ensure compliance with, and execution of, its
lawful orders. See In re Protarga, Inc., 329 B.R. 451, 479 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)
(bankruptcy court had the right and power to enforce the Plan‟s discharge and
discharge injunction separate and apart from the plan and confirmation order) (citing
Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998) and In re Beck, 283 B.R.
163, 166–67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002)). See also In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 236 B.R. 318,
325–26 (Bankr. D. Del.1999) (“It is axiomatic that a court possesses the inherent
authority to enforce its own orders.”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 279 F.3d 226 (3d
Cir.2002); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3020(d) (“Notwithstanding the entry of the order of
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confirmation, the court may issue any other order necessary to administer the estate.”);
11 U.S.C. §105(a) (providing that a bankruptcy court is authorized to “issue any order,
process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the
Bankruptcy Code]” ).
In sum, then, the instant action is integrally related to Dash‟s prior Chapter 13
proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court. The jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court extends
to “core” proceedings (i.e, cases under title 11, proceedings arising under title 11, and
proceedings arising in a case under title 11) as well as to non-core proceedings (i.e,
matters “related to a case under title 11”). In re Resorts Intern., Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 162
(3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Dash‟s claims should be raised in the Bankruptcy Court,
not in this Court.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Defendant‟s motion to dismiss will be
granted. An appropriate order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS DASH,
Plaintiff,
v.
RONDA J. WINNECOUR,
Standing Trustee,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:10-cv-256-SJM
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 2nd Day of December, 2011, for the reasons set forth in
the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss the complaint [6] shall be,
and hereby is, GRANTED, and the above-captioned matter shall be marked “closed.”
s/
Sean J. McLaughlin
Sean J. McLaughlin
United States District Judge
c:
All parties of record.
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