BLADES v. BRUSHAW et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 15 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 11/10/2011. (ndf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AMANDA BLADES,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
SERGEANT BRUSHAW, CORRECTIONS )
OFFICER ("CO"), CO MILLER,
)
CO McKUIN
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SECRETARY JEFFREY BEARD,
)
SUPERINTENDENT WINSTEAD, NURSE )
FOR, NURSE WILSON,
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Defendants.
)
Civil Action No. 11-26 E
Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
OPINION AND ORDER
KELLY, Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court is Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‟s Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”). ECF No. 15.
Through the Motion, Defendants seek to dismiss the action filed by Plaintiff Amanda Blades
against eight employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections who are alleged to have
violated Plaintiff‟s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by delaying necessary medical
treatment to a woman in labor and keeping or requiring Plaintiff to be kept in handcuffs and
shackles while she gave birth to her son in an ambulance while being transported to the hospital.
Plaintiff‟s claims for declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages are brought
pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants contend that Plaintiff‟s claims are barred by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the reasons set forth herein, the
Motion is DENIED.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to Plaintiff‟s Complaint, at the time of her incarceration for a nonviolent
crime, she was four months pregnant. When she was approximately in her eighth month of
pregnancy, Plaintiff began to experience labor pains and was having contractions that were four
minutes apart. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff sought immediate medical treatment but, after a long period
of needless delay, Plaintiff began to bleed heavily. Plaintiff then was shackled and handcuffed,
with a restrictive “black box” attached to the handcuffs, and was transported to the hospital. On
the way to the hospital, the baby started to crown. Plaintiff asked for the handcuffs and shackles
to be removed; this request was refused, and Plaintiff gave birth to her son. ECF No. 3.
Upon her return to SCI Cambridge Springs, Plaintiff filed two timely written grievances
about her treatment during labor and delivery of her son while handcuffed and shackled. ECF
No. 16-1, p.4. She did not complete the grievance appeal process in a timely fashion, and her
grievances were denied. ECF No. 16-1, pp. 2-13. Plaintiff was subsequently released from SCI
Cambridge and filed this action while no longer in DOC custody. ECF No. 3.
Without regard to Plaintiff‟s status as a released prisoner at the time of filing the
Complaint at issue, Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss is predicated upon the PLRA‟s requirement
that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies. Defendants recite the applicable legal
standard requiring exhaustion, explain the DOC appeal process through finality, and attach as
exhibits to the motion documents establishing that Plaintiff did not timely appeal the denial of
her grievance while an inmate at SCI Cambridge. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff opposes Defendants‟
Motion to Dismiss averring that the PLRA does not apply to her because, at the time the instant
action was filed, she was no longer a prisoner. ECF No. 18.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
examines the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). In
determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the complaint
liberally, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725
F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.1984). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff
has not pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), meaning enough factual allegations “„to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of‟” each necessary element, Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a „probability requirement,‟ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
The requirement that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies is applicable to all
inmate suits relating to prison life-including those that involve general circumstances as well as
particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). Federal courts are barred from
hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies. There
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is, parenthetically, no “futility” exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement. Ahmed
v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). The PLRA also requires “proper exhaustion,”
meaning that a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the
applicable procedural rules, including deadlines. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, ___, 126 S.Ct.
2378, 2384-88 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and
other critical procedural rules ...”). This is the functional equivalent of the procedural default
requirement in the habeas context. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004).
If the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to Plaintiff, then clearly she would have
defaulted her claim by failing to file a timely appeal from her initial grievances. However, in the
context presented here, the issue is whether the PLRA places a burden to exhaust administrative
remedies on a released prisoner, i.e., was Plaintiff a “prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility” on the date of the filing of the Complaint thereby making her subject to the
exhaustion requirements of the PLRA?
The Court recognizes initially that “[i]t is the plaintiff's status at the time he files suit that
determines whether § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision applies.” Norton v. City Of Marietta, 432
F.3d 1145, 1150, (10th Cir.2005) (citing Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir.2005);
Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 210. That said, the relevant inquiry here is answered by reference to the
statute itself which expressly applies only to “prisoners.” Further, the term “prisoner” is defined
as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of
parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff‟s Complaint alleges that as of the time of the filing of the lawsuit, she was a
resident Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff further avers that at the time she filed the
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lawsuit, she was no longer incarcerated. ECF No. 18-1. Defendants have not challenged this
averment. Consequently, the PLRA is inapplicable to this case. See Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 210 n.
10 (“[E]very court of appeals to have considered the issue has held that the PLRA does not apply
to actions filed by former prisoners.”). In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Ahmed “expressly adopt[ed]” the view that prisoners who have been released from custody on
the date their lawsuit is filed are not barred from filing suit by the provisions of the PLRA. Id.
Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is denied. An appropriate Order
follows:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of November, 2011, Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
15) is HEREBY DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
All counsel of record via CM/ECF
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