RUNFOLA v. MARMAXX OPERATING CORP. et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 25 Marmaxx Operating Corp. and TJX Companies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 20 Millcreek Plaza Company Limited Partnership and PA-Eastway, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Sean J. McLaughlin on 07/01/2013. (ten)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOROTHY J. RUNFOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARMAXX OPERATING CORP.,
d/b/a T.J. Maxx, TJX COMPANIES,
INC., PA-EASTWAY, INC. and
MILLCREEK PLAZA COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 11-0052 Erie
OPINION
July 1, 2013
SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN,
Chief United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Dorothy J. Runfola (“Mrs. Runfola”), of Fredonia, New York, has filed a
personal injury lawsuit against defendants Marmaxx Operating Corporation and Millcreek Plaza
Company Limited Partnership (“Defendants”), alleging that their negligent installation of a
handrail in a handicap bathroom stall caused her to fall and sustain debilitating physical and
emotional injuries. [ECF No. 1.] Mrs. Runfola seeks money damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
This court’s jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Before the court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 20, 25.]
For the reasons explained below, the motions will be granted.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 23, 2010, Mrs. Runfola and her daughter, Sara Runfola (“Sara”), went
shopping at the T.J. Maxx store operated by Marmaxx and located in the shopping plaza owned
by Millcreek in Erie, Pennsylvania. (Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 29, at ¶ 1.) T.J. Maxx
has been Millcreek’s tenant in the Erie, PA location since 1986. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4, 16.) At the time
of her visit to the store, Mrs. Runfola was 84 years-old and walked with the assistance of a cane.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2, 14.) While Mrs. Runfola and her daughter were shopping in the store, they stopped
to use the restroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2.) Mrs. Runfola entered the handicap stall and her daughter
entered the adjoining non-handicap stall. (Id. at ¶ 2; Dep. Sara Runfola, ECF No. 28-3, pp.54-56
and 63-64.) The stalls are separated by a shared metal wall. (Id.)
The handicap stall is equipped with a handrail, which the parties refer to as a “grab bar,”
that attaches to the concrete walls adjacent to and behind the toilet. (See Def. Millcreek’s Apx. to
Mot., ECF No. 28-8.) From the perspective of one sitting on the toilet seat, the grab bar snakes
around the right side of the toilet and extends behind where the toilet attaches to the concrete
wall, such that the grab bar is “L” shaped, with the toilet positioned in the center of the vertical
extension of the “L,” facing outward. The bar is not attached to the shared metal wall to the left
of the toilet seat, although the shared wall is equipped with a plastic toilet paper dispenser.
Sara testified that she escorted her mother into the handicap stall and wiped the toilet seat
with an antibacterial wipe. (Dep. Sara Runfola at p.51.) Having done so, Sara exited the stall to
allow her mother to use the toilet.
(Id.)
Mrs. Runfola, who was standing by the toilet
unbuttoning and “fussing with” her pants when Sara left, then took “a couple of steps” from the
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toilet to the door of the stall to lock it. (Id. at pp. 16, 52.) At the time Mrs. Runfola did so, her
cane was propped up against the concrete wall. (Id. at 53.)
Shortly after she entered the adjoining stall and began to use the facility, Sara heard her
mother fall against what she believed to be the shared metal wall. (Id. at pp. 52, 54.) Sara
immediately crawled beneath the shared wall and discovered her mother sitting on the floor of
the stall, upright against the wall. (Id.) When she was interviewed by the emergency medical
services personnel called to the scene, Mrs. Runfola stated that she was “attempting to sit on
[the] toilet, when she fell on the floor” because she “lost her balance.” (ECF No. 29-6, at p.1.)
At her deposition, Mrs. Runfola testified that she lost her balance “[p]robably reaching for a bar
or toilet paper or something like that.” (Dep. Dorothy Runfola, ECF No. 28-2, p.14.)(Emphasis
added.) Mrs. Runfola claimed that her fall occurred before she had the chance to use the
bathroom. (Dep. Sara Runfola at p.19.)1 Sara contended in her deposition that her mother’s fall
was caused by the rightmost section of the grab bar being installed too far from the reach of the
toilet, which led to Mrs. Runfola’s losing her balance as she attempted to lower herself onto the
seat. (Id. at pp.56-57.)
Following her mother’s accident, Sara returned to the T.J. Maxx store to measure the
distance between the toilet seat and the grab bar attached to the adjacent-right wall, which she
determined to be approximately 30 inches. (Dep. Sara Runfola at pp.27-28; Pl.’s Resp. to
Interrogs., ECF No. 29-8, ¶ 1.) Mrs. Runfola alleges that this distance violates the design
standard set forth by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), which requires public
toilet seats “to be positioned at 18 [inches] from the surface of the wall of the slab with the side
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As a result of the fall, Mrs. Runfola sustained a complex fracture to her left femur, which required surgery
and several months of intense physical therapy. (Compl. at ¶ 15; Dep. Sara Runfola at pp.33-38.)
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grab bar installed on it.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Interrogs. at ¶ 1.) She further alleges that municipalities
in Pennsylvania had adopted this requirement at the time the facility was jointly designed and
constructed by Defendants in 1986, and that it was subsequently incorporated into the
International Building Code, which Pennsylvania adopted in 2004. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4.) Mrs. Runfola
contends that the Defendants’ failure to install the grab bar in compliance with the applicable
standards was the cause of her fall.2
Mrs. Runfola filed this personal injury action in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie
County, Pennsylvania on February 7, 2011. Defendants timely removed to this court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). In evaluating the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations, and it must draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The mere existence of a factual
dispute will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary judgment. Only a dispute over a
material fact – that is, a fact that would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law – will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
Even then, the dispute over the material fact must be genuine, such that a reasonable jury could
resolve it in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. at 248-49.
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Defendants do not dispute that the placement of the grab bar did not comply with the requirements of the
ANSI. (ECF No. 48, Hearing Tr. at 4:19-22.)
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A defendant who moves for summary judgment is not required to refute every essential
element of the plaintiff’s claim. Rather, the defendant must only point out the absence or
insufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence offered in support of one or more those elements. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the movant meets that burden, the
party opposing summary judgment must present sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is
indeed a genuine and material factual dispute for a jury to decide. Id. at 323-25. If the evidence
the non-movant produces is “merely colorable,” “not significantly probative,” or speculative, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249.
III. DISCUSSION
Mrs. Runfola claims that had the Defendants installed the grab bar properly, she would
have been able to grab it and thereby avoid her fall. The Defendants counter that Mrs. Runfola
has failed to provide sufficient evidence, from which a reasonable jury could find, without pure
speculation, that the placement of the grab bar was a causative factor in her fall.
To establish a prima facie claim of negligence under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must
show: (1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the defendant to conform to a
certain standard of conduct; (2) the defendant’s failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a
causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage resulting from the defendant’s conduct. Monea v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d
680, 682 n.5 (Pa. 1983)(citing Prosser, Law of Torts, § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971)).3 The plaintiff
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As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court must apply the substantive law of the state in which the
cause of action arose. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938). The parties do not dispute that
Pennsylvania law applies to this case.
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must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Hamil v. Bashline, 392
A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 1978).
The duty of care that a possessor of land owes to an entrant depends upon whether the
entrant is a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa.
1983). Consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Pennsylvania law recognizes two
forms of invitees: (1) public invitees, who are persons “invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public,” and (2)
business invitees, or those invited onto the premises “for a purpose directly connected with
business dealings with the possessor of the land.” Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332
(1965). The possessor must use reasonable care to make the premises safe for the invitee’s use
and provide the invitee with adequate and timely warnings of dangers known to the possessor but
that are unlikely to be discovered by the invitee. Crane v. I.T.E. Circuit Breaker Co., 278 A.2d
362, 363-64 (Pa. 1971)(citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343). However, there may
also be a duty to protect an invitee against known dangers where, depending on the
circumstances, the possessor should anticipate harm to the invitee notwithstanding any
knowledge the invitee might otherwise possess. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, Comment
(b). The parties here agree that Mrs. Runfola was a business invitee and that she was owed this
heightened duty of care.
Pennsylvania law is clear that “[t]he mere happening of an accident is no evidence of
negligence.” Lanni v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 88 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1952). Thus, regardless of
whether “the defendant breached some duty of care owed to the plaintiff, it is still incumbent on
a plaintiff” to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury. Hamil, 392 A.2d
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at 1284. This is required even where the plaintiff invokes the doctrine of negligence per se,
which will establish both duty and breach if it can be shown that the defendant violated a statute,
ordinance, or regulation that is designed to prevent public harm and the plaintiff is within the
class of persons whom the legislature sought to protect. Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 A.2d 1078,
1079 (Pa.Super. 2001).
A plaintiff may prove that the defendant’s conduct was the factual and proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s injuries by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Lanni, 88 A.2d at 888
(“[n]egligence need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from attendant
circumstances if the facts and circumstances are sufficient to reasonably and legitimately impute
negligence.”). When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove causation, “such
evidence, in order to prevail, must be adequate to establish the conclusion sought and must so
preponderate in favor of that conclusion as to outweigh . . . any other evidence and reasonable
inferences” that could otherwise be drawn. Flagiello v. Crilly, 187 A.2d 298, 290 (Pa. 1963).
Whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient circumstantial evidence of causation is
normally a question of fact for a jury to decide. However, the question must be removed from
the jury’s consideration when the circumstantial evidence adduced would force the jury to
speculate or guess as to whether a particular act by the defendant was the physical cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1284 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434); Smith
v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 153 A.2d 477, 479-80 (Pa. 1959). That is to say, the plaintiff must offer
affirmative proof – that is, some quantum of evidence in the record that rises above “conjecture,
guess, or speculation” – that would enable a reasonable person to conclude that the plaintiff’s
injuries were more likely than not caused by the defendant’s conduct. Id.; Galullo v. Federal
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Express Corp., 937 F.Supp. 392, 397 (E.D.Pa. 1996)(citing W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 39 (5th ed. 1984)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (9th ed.
2009)(defining “affirmative proof” as evidence establishing the fact in dispute by a
preponderance of the evidence).
In Erb v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., the plaintiff fell while traversing a ramp on the
defendant’s property and identified the lack of a handrail as the cause of her fall. In her
deposition, the plaintiff could not recall what initiated her fall, and testified only that the lack of
a handrail to stop her fall led to her injuries. 2009 WL 9097261 at *3 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Mar. 26,
2009). The court held that this quantum of evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove
causation. Id. at *5. Similarly, in Noiles v. MacDonald, the plaintiff fell as she was descending
a flight of stairs in the defendant’s home where the handrail attached to the adjacent wall
extended only halfway across the second step from the bottom. 1988 WL 21836 at *1 (E.D.Pa.
Mar. 7, 1988). As proof of causation, the plaintiff averred that “as she was descending the stairs,
she slipped near the bottom and grabbed for the railing which was non-existent at that point,”
and that the railing’s nonexistence “was a substantial factor in her fall.”
Id.
Applying
Pennsylvania law, the court held that the plaintiff’s explanation that “the lack of a graspable
handrail was a substantial factor in causing the fall” was insufficient circumstantial proof of
causation.
Id. at *2; see also Martinowski v. Com. Dept. of Transp., 916 A.2d 717, 721
(Pa.Cmwlth. 2007)(a motorist who had no memory of why she lost control of her vehicle and
injured herself when she hit a guardrail failed to circumstantially prove causation); Saylor v.
Green, 645 A.2d 318, 320 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006)(motorist who provided no reason or evidence as to
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why his vehicle left the road and struck a tree provided insufficient evidence to justify an
inference of causation).
Here, as in the cases discussed above, the evidence of record would require the jury to
speculate about what caused Mrs. Runfola’s fall and whether the placement of the grab bar was a
causative factor. To reiterate, there were no eyewitnesses to the fall, and Mrs. Runfola cannot
say with any certainty whether she lost her balance reaching for a grab bar, a piece of toilet
paper, or whether she became unsteady on her feet as a result of “fussing with her pants.” In
sum, Mrs. Runfola’s case fails on the causation prong, and Defendants are thus entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOROTHY J. RUNFOLA,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MARMAXX OPERATING CORP.,
d/b/a T.J. Maxx, TJX COMPANIES,
INC., PA-EASTWAY, INC. and
MILLCREEK PLAZA COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 11-0052 Erie
SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN,
Chief Judge United States District Judge.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of July, 2013, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying
Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [ECF
Nos. 20 and 25] are GRANTED.
Defendants’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment are
DENIED AS MOOT. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Marmaxx Operating Corp. and
Millcreek Plaza Company Limited Partnership and against plaintiff Dorothy J. Runfola. The
Clerk of Court is directed to mark this case CLOSED.
s/ Sean J. McLaughlin
Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania
cm:
All parties of record
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