CHILCOTT v. CITY OF ERIE et al
Filing
15
OPINION AND ORDER dismissing as moot 7 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by SHAN CHILCOTT, 11 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by SHAN CHILCOTT, and 12 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by SHAN CHILCOTT. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 04/19/2012. (fcf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAN CHILCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF ERIE, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 12-4 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
OPINION AND ORDER1
Presently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Shan Chilcott. [ECF
No. 7]. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be summarily dismissed and a certificate of
appealability will be denied. Additionally, Petitioner's motions for a preliminary injunction [ECF Nos.
11 and 12] are denied.
I.
A.
Relevant Background
On January 31, 2012, Petitioner commenced the present action by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. [ECF No. 7]. According to him, he was at the time being detained at the Erie County
Prison pursuant to a civil contempt order. He named as Respondents the City of Erie, the Erie Police
Department, Judge Brabender of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, the "Court House," and
Gaudenzia, which is a facility that provides, inter alia, care for substance abuse and mental health
services.
1
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has voluntarily consented to have a
U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment.
Petitioner claims that in July of 2010, the Erie Police Department unlawfully detained him
outside his home and took his firearms without a warrant. [ECF No. 7 at 1]. He also claims that in
December of 2011 he was detained in the Erie County Prison for failure to pay $1,500 in child support.
He contends that "$1,500 is not a reasonable amount for me to come up with." [ECF No. 7 at 1].
Petitioner also makes allegations against Gaudenzia. He claims that he learned of purported misconduct
that has occurred there when he "visited a friend there[,] Sharon Fitzpatrick." [ECF No. 7 at 2].
As relief, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court directing that: (1) his guns/rifles/shotguns be
returned to him; (2) he be released from his confinement or, in the alternative, that the $1,500 payment
requirement be reduced; and, (3) "Sharon Fitzpatrick get her mail and visits" from him and that the
discrimination against her stop. He also seeks "punitive damages" from the city for alleged harassment.
[ECF No. 7 at 2].
Also pending before the Court are two motions for a preliminary injunction that Petitioner
recently filed. [ECF Nos. 11, 12]. In those motions, he requests that this Court intervene in a Protection
From Abuse ("PFA") proceeding that Sharon Fitzpatrick recently initiated against him in the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County.
Petitioner's recent filings establish that he has been released from the Erie County Prison. [ECF
Nos. 9-14].
B.
Discussion
Respondents have not yet filed an Answer. However, because it plainly appears that Petitioner is
not entitled to relief in habeas, the petition will be summarily dismissed and a certificate of appealability
will be denied.
To extent that Petitioner was seeking relief from his confinement in the Erie County Prison, that
claim is moot because he has been released. It is a well-established principle that federal courts do not
have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy as required by Article III
of the Constitution. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142,
147 (3d Cir. 2009). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings, trial and appellate ... the parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of
the lawsuit." Id., quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). Thus, if
developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a petitioner's personal stake in the
outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant effective relief, the case must be dismissed
as moot. Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147, citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.2
The purpose of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority
under which a prisoner is being held in custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, § 2241. Because Petitioner has been
released from the Erie County Prison, he has obtained the only relief that this Court could have provided
to him in habeas. He therefore no longer has the requisite "personal stake" in the outcome of the
litigation. Id.; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Accordingly, there is no case or controversy for this Court to
consider, and for that reason any claims Petitioner makes challenging the legality of his detention are
moot.
2
When the injury that a complaining party seeks to remedy through litigation is no longer existent, there still may be
a case or controversy before the court if there is: (1) a collateral injury; (2) that is "likely" to be redressed by the court's
decision. See, e.g., Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-8, quoting Lewis, 464 U.S. at 477; Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147-51. Courts often will
presume that a wrongful conviction has collateral consequences that likely can be remedied by a favorable decision from a
habeas court. Id. However, in cases such as the instant case, where a petitioner is not challenging the lawfulness of a state
felony conviction, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that he has sustained a collateral injury that can be
effectively remedied by the court in order to avoid having his case dismissed on mootness grounds. Id.; Burkey, 556 F.3d at
148 ("Where…the appellant is attacking a sentence that has already been served, collateral consequences will not be
presumed, but must be proven.").
None of the other claims raised in the petition are cognizable in habeas and they will be
dismissed for that reason. As noted above, the purpose of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to
challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is being held in custody, and neither of the federal
habeas statutes (28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2241) give this Court the authority to direct that Petitioner's
guns/rifles/shotguns be returned to him, or that the amount he owes in child support be reduced. Nor do
they give Petitioner the ability to seek any type of relief on Sharon Fitzpatrick's behalf. Additionally,
because money damages are not available in a habeas corpus action, Petitioner's request for punitive
damages must be denied as well. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (explaining
that "if a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than immediate or more
speedy release – the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus
is not an appropriate or available federal remedy."); Marine v. Quintana, 347 F.App'x 736 (3d Cir. 2009)
(affirming that money damages are not available in a habeas action).
As for Petitioner's motions for preliminary injunction, those are denied. In determining whether
to grant a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider whether the party seeking the injunction has
satisfied four factors: "1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm
if the injunction is denied; 3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party;
and 4) the public interest favors such relief." Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109
(3d Cir. 2010), quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). A preliminary injunction is
"an extraordinary remedy," and the party seeking it must show, at a minimum, a likelihood of success on
the merits and that they likely face irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction. Adams v. Case
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000). As these elements suggest, "there must be 'a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'"
See Ball v. Famiglio, 396 F.App'x 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010), quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251
(10th Cir. 2010). Here, there is no relationship between the injury claimed in Petitioner's motions for
injunctive relief and the conduct complained of in the petition. Moreover, as set forth above, Petitioner
cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits on the claims he raises in the petition. Nor can he
show a likelihood of success on the claims he raises in the motions, because the challenges he raises
concerning the PFA proceedings are not cognizable in habeas.
Finally, the claims that Petitioner raises in the motions for injunctive relief, and the request he
made in the petition for this Court to reduce his child support payments, implicate ongoing state legal
proceedings over which this Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
C.
Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate
review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 provides that "[a]
certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, "[t]he
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. Applying those standards here, jurists of reason would
not find it debatable whether the petition should be dismissed. Accordingly, a certificate of
appealability will be denied.
II.
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner's motions for a preliminary injunction are denied, his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed, and a certificate of appealability is denied. An
appropriate Order follows.
Dated: April 19, 2012
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAN CHILCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF ERIE, et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 12-4 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2012;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED and a
certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for a preliminary injunction [ECF Nos. 11, 12] are
DENIED.
The Clerk of Courts is directed to close this case.
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
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