SCHULZE v. HARRINGTON et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 4 Plaintiff's Motion for Relief of Judgment is DENIED and the 10 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to mark the case closed. Signed by Judge Sean J. McLaughlin on 1/14/2013. (rlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLAYTON SCHULZE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES HARRINGTON and
MYRTLE HARRINGTON,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-153 Erie
MEMORANDUM OPINION
McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., District Judge.
Plaintiff, Clayton Schulze, proceeding pro se, filed this action on July 5, 2012 against
Charles Harrington and Myrtle Harrington, Defendants. Presently pending before the Court is
the “Plaintiffs’ Motions (sic) for Relief from Judgment, Fraud on the Court and Extrinsic Fraud
[Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)]” [ECF No. 4], and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). [ECF No. 10].
I. Background
According to the allegations in the Complaint, and the “Plaintiffs’ Motions (sic) for
Relief from Judgment, Fraud on the Court and Extrinsic Fraud [Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)]” [ECF No.
4],1 this lawsuit centers around a boundary line dispute over real property located in Springfield
Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania. [ECF No. 4] ¶ 6. Also at issue is the Defendants use of a
residential free gas well located on the property. Id. at ¶ 18. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
previously filed a lawsuit against the Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Pennsylvania with respect to both of these claims. See Clayton Schulze v. Charles Harrington
and Myrtle Harrington, Civil Action No. 12738-2002, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie
County, Pennsylvania. [ECF No. 10-4]. On September 7, 2010, Erie County Court of Common
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Plaintiff filed this Motion on July 11, 2012. [ECF No. 4]. We have considered the statements in this document as
an amplification of the allegations set forth in his Complaint.
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Pleas Judge John Garhart entered an Order granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. [ECF No. 10-4] and [ECF No. 11] ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania was quashed on December 22, 2012. [ECF No. 10-5] and [ECF No. 11] ¶ 5.
According to the Plaintiff, Judge Garhart’s entry of the summary judgment against him in
the state court action “is the basis for [his] Federal Court filing.” [ECF No. 11] ¶ 4. In his
federal Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:
5. Plaintiff was denied a trial by jury as stated in the US and
Pennsylvania constitution thereby violating his oath of office.
6. The Court has committed judgmentally fraud and extrinsic
fraud, corruption and title fraud scam.
…
8. Plaintiff seeks a trial by jury because of the complications
involving the squatting of land and the stealing of gas from a gas
well. …
[ECF No. 3] ¶¶ 5-6, 8. In his Response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff further
elaborates on the basis for his federal action:
10. Plaintiff filed this complaint because Plaintiff believes that the
State Court(s) erred in not granting a Jury Trial because the Court
simply ignored the factual testimony that:
11.
(a) Defendant had been stealing Plaintiffs gas for twenty
(20) years before they were caught, A Material Fact of Dispute and
Cognizable Legal Claim.
(b) Defendants Deed and Tax information claim they own 4
Acres of property not 8 Acres. Defendant(s) are squatting on 4
acres owned by Plaintiff. A Material Fact of Dispute and
Cognizable Legal Claim.
12. Lying about a crime to cover a crime is Fraud and Fraud has
no time limit.
13. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint has merit.
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14. The only Malicious action continues to be taken by the
Defendant(s) by stealing gas for twenty (20) years and continually
squatting property they are trying to steal from the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s claim is for $76,000 plus legal fees.
…
16. [R]es judicata should not be an issue in this matter. The State
Court handled this matter incredibly sloppy inclusive of not
reviewing thoroughly the testimony given, for if it had it would see
plainly that not only do these issues have merit, but they certainly
deserve to be heard by a Jury. It seems that the State Court
basically washed its hands of the matter once this Pro se Plaintiff
asked for his constitutional right of a jury trial. …
[ECF No. 11] ¶¶ 10-14, 16. As relief, Plaintiff requests that this Court order a jury trial. [ECF
No. 3] ¶ 8. In his Motion for Relief from Judgment, he seeks an order adjudicating him as the
record owner of the disputed property, and an order relieving him from any and all judgments
and orders entered in the state court action. [ECF No. 4] p. 10. Defendants have moved to
dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims against them [ECF No. 10] and Plaintiff has filed a Response.
[ECF No. 11]. This matter is now ripe for determination.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants have moved for dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Section § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a federal district court to dismiss any case if the
court determines that the action is, among other things, frivolous or malicious.2 A complaint is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may
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Section 1915(e) states, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that –
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(B) the action nor appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a
“clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28;
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his complaint must be “liberally construed” and
“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Brown v. City of
Long Branch, 380 Fed. Appx. 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007)).
III. Discussion
Liberally construing the documents filed by the Plaintiff collectively, this Court
concludes that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3
This doctrine provides that federal district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review a state
court’s final decision in certain instances. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159,165 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1798 (2011). The
doctrine is not limited to decisions by a state’s highest court, but also encompasses orders issued
by lower state courts. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police
Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1992). It is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161
L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). In essence, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an
action in the nature of an appeal seeking to reverse a state court decision. Id. The doctrine bars
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed. 206 (1983). Because the doctrine divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction, it may be
raised at any time by the court sua sponte. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is
incumbent upon federal courts to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction exists if such is in question.”); In re Madera,
586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding sua sponte determination of bankruptcy court that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman); Untracht v. Weimann, 141 Fed. Appx. 46, 48 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Briksza
v. Moloney, 2009 WL 1767594 at *3 (D.N.J. 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine sua sponte even though defendants had not moved for dismissal on that basis); see also Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3)(“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”).
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a federal claim when: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the
federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the
state judgments.” Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff lost in state court when summary judgment was
entered against him, and that this judgment was entered before he filed the instant suit. Plaintiff
acknowledges that the source of his injury is Judge Garhart’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of Defendants, noting that this adverse ruling is, in fact, the basis for his
federal Complaint because he believes Judge Garhart ignored “factual testimony” and erred in
not “granting a [j]ury [t]rial.” [ECF No. 11] ¶¶ 4, 10. In support, Plaintiff sets forth a myriad of
“existing material issues of fact surrounding [the] boundary dispute” that allegedly rendered the
granting of summary judgment “inappropriate.” [ECF No. 4] ¶ 5. Finally, Plaintiff requests that
this Court grant him a jury trial on the issues decided adversely to him, and/or adjudicate him the
record owner of the property and relieve him from the state court judgment. Granting Plaintiff
the requested relief however, would require this Court to conduct a de novo review of the state
court proceedings and make a determination that Judge Garhart’s adjudication was incorrect.
Such a result is prohibited by Rooker-Feldman. See Great Western, 615 F.3d at 169 (prohibited
appellate review “consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the lower tribunal
to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.”) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims, his Complaint will be
dismissed as legally frivolous. See Slewion v. Venema, 418 Fed. Appx. 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2011)
(dismissing complaint as legally frivolous since it was barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine);
Turner v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 378 Fed. Appx. 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2010) (same). In
light of our finding, it follows that his Motion for Relief from Judgment will be denied.
Generally, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would
be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, because further amendment would be futile in light of the Rooker-Feldman bar, Plaintiff’s
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claims will be dismissed with prejudice. See Ajjahnon v. New Jersey, 238 Fed. Appx. 769, 771
(3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of action barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine
since further amendment would have been futile); McGeachy v. Doe, 2011 WL 2455876 at *5
(W.D.Pa.) (“Dismissal on the basis of Rooker-Feldman is recognized as a situation where
amendment of the Plaintiff’s complaint would be futile.”), report and recommendation adopted,
2011 WL 2447099 (W.D.Pa.), aff’d, 444 Fed. Appx. 510 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. Conclusion
An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLAYTON SCHULZE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES HARRINGTON and
MYRTLE HARRINGTON,
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 12-153 Erie
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of January, 2013;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the “Plaintiffs’ Motions (sic) for Relief from Judgment,
Fraud on the Court and Extrinsic Fraud [Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)]” [ECF No. 4] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
The clerk is directed to mark the case closed.
s/ Sean J. McLaughlin
United States District Judge
cm:
All parties of record
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