SCUTELLA v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PA
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that Defendants motion to dismiss 30 be GRANTED. The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 9/17/14. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JHEN SCUTELLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL, et al,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 12-165Erie
Magistrate Judge Baxter
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
M.J. Susan Paradise Baxter
Relevant Procedural History
This civil action was filed in this Court on July 24, 2012. Plaintiff, formerly an inmate
incarcerated at SCI Albion, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging
his conviction under Pennsylvania’s criminal statute outlawing “Possession with the Intent to
Deliver 100-1000 grams of Cocaine.”2 ECF No. 5. The only named Defendant was
“Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Attorney General of Pennsylvania (Linda Kelly).”
In response to the Original Complaint, Defendant moved to dismiss this action. ECF No.
11. Plaintiff filed an opposition brief in which he clarified his intent to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, instead of the conviction itself.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily
consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including
the entry of a final judgment.
1
Petitioner entered a guilty plea on July 6, 2005, and was sentenced on September 7, 2005, to a
term of imprisonment of 4 ½ to 10 years. See Scutella v. D.M. Chamberlain, C.A. No. 09-82E.
2
1
ECF No. 16, page 1. Plaintiff further explained that he made an error in the relief he sought in his
complaint.
This Court dismissed the pending motion to dismiss and directed Plaintiff to file an
Amended Complaint to more fully state his claim. ECF No. 17. The Amended Complaint was
filed on April 30, 2013. ECF No. 18. Defendant again moved to dismiss this action. ECF No. 19.
In opposition, Plaintiff filed a one-page brief explaining that he had not been able to research his
legal arguments due to his placement at “Erie CCC.” ECF No. 24. Given the vague nature of the
allegations of the Amended Complaint, it was impossible for this Court to determine whether
Plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff was directed to file a
Second Amended Complaint3and the pending motion to dismiss was dismissed. ECF No. 26.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint challenging the
constitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508, the statute detailing the mandatory minimum sentence for
“Possession with the Intent to Deliver 100-1000 Grams of Cocaine.” ECF No. 27. As Defendants
to this action, Plaintiff names the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because “it is legally
responsible for enforcing the statute” and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania because she “is
legally responsible for the use of these statues and is allowed to intervene.” Id. at pages 1-2. As
relief, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court “rule[] this statute unconstitutional has [sic] it caused the
plaintiff and other irreparable harm and the state must be forced to change it. I only ask for the
relief of the federal courts to rule this statute unconstitutional and force the state to make
changes.” Id. at ¶ 22.
This Court directed that “Plaintiff must fully set forth is constitutional challenges to either or
both of the statues. Plaintiff must fully identify the specific relief he seeks from this Court. This
will be Plaintiff’s final opportunity to set forth his claim.” ECF No. 26, page 5.
3
2
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 30. Despite being given the
opportunity to do so, Plaintiff has failed to file a brief in opposition to the pending motion to
dismiss.
Standards of Review
1) Pro se litigants
Pro se pleadings, Ahowever inartfully pleaded,@ must be held to Aless stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.@ Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the
court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or litigant=s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969)(A[W]e should recognize that a habeas corpus petition prepared by a prisoner
without the aid of counsel may be inartfully drawn and should therefore be read >with a measure
of tolerance.=@); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v.
Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules,
during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint
in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver,
82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v.
Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se
litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
3
2) Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A defendant’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may be
treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Gould
Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n., 549 F.3d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In reviewing a facial attack, which addresses
a deficiency in the pleadings, the court must only consider the allegations on the face of the
complaint, taken as true, and any documents referenced in the complaint, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.; Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293,
300 (3d Cir. 2002). “The plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that
the pleader has the right he claims (here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are
merely consistent with such a right.” Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521
(8th Cir. 2007) citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
But when a 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, the
Court is “not confined to the allegations in the complaint and can look beyond the pleadings to
decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction.” Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 754 (3d
Cir. 2000). In reviewing a factual attack, “the Court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy
itself whether it has power to hear the case.” Carpet Group Int’l. v. Oriental Rug Importers
Ass’n., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. The Third Circuit has
explained:
Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction its
very-power to hear the case there is substantial authority that the trial court is free
to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the
case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and
the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from
evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will
have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.
4
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
In his Original Complaint, Plaintiff challenged his conviction under Pennsylvania’s
criminal statute outlawing “Possession with the Intent to Deliver 100-1000 grams of Cocaine.”
As relief, Plaintiff sought an order from this Court that “the conviction is void and the [Plaintiff]
is entitled to discharge and dismissal without delay.” ECF No. 5, page 7.
In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that a Pennsylvania statute was
unconstitutional for several reasons and requested as relief that the statute be declared
unconstitutional. However, because Plaintiff complained about two statutes (both the statute
upon which he was convicted and the statute under which he was sentenced), and given the
vague nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff was directed to file a Second Amended
Complaint “more fully stating his constitutional challenge and the pending motion to dismiss
shall be dismissed. Plaintiff must fully set forth his constitutional challenges to either or both of
the statutes. Plaintiff must fully identify the specific relief he seeks from this Court.” ECF No.
26.
The Second Amended Complaint challenges § 7508, the statute detailing the mandatory
minimum sentences for “Possession with Intent to Deliver 100-1000 grams of Cocaine.” Plaintiff
claims that the statute violates due process, is too severe for a nonviolent offender, and should be
declared void for vagueness. As relief, Plaintiff seeks only declaratory judgment.4
To the extent that any of Plaintiff’s allegations can be liberally construed as raising a civil rights
violation based upon his conviction, such a claim is barred by the favorable termination
requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (holding that if success of a 1983
damages suit brought by a prisoner “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence, the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated.”).
4
5
Standing
Defendants move to dismiss this action based upon Plaintiff’s lack of standing.
The question of standing is a threshold inquiry. City of Pittsburgh v. West Pennsylvania
Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 1998). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Standing is not merely a “pleading requirement but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s
case [.]” Id. (“each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.”).
To maintain an action in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate constitutional
standing by satisfying several requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution. See Toll
Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2009).5 The Third Circuit has
summarized the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III’s standing requirements as
consisting of three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact,
which must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
that injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court. Third, the plaintiff must establish that a favorable decision likely would
redress the injury.
The standing inquiry “involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Plaintiffs
must demonstrate prudential standing by meeting certain judge-made requirements designed to
limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Without these additional prudential considerations, “the
courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though
other governmental institutions may be more competent ... and judicial intervention may be
unnecessary to protect individual rights.” Id. at 500.
5
6
Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Further, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they have standing to bring each and every claim against each and every
defendant. Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 139 n.5 (a plaintiff “must demonstrate standing for each claim
it seeks to press” and “must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)
(internal citation omitted).
“A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has
an adverse impact on his own rights.” United States v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 952, 960 n.7 (3d Cir.
2011) quoting County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979). In
their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff:
… was not sentenced under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508, which he acknowledges. Scutella
was sentenced to more than the mandatory minimum sentence provided by the
statute and without apparent regard to it, in relation to a negotiated plea bargain.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(c). Since the statute had no application to his sentence,
Scutella has no standing to challenge it.
ECF No. 31, page 4.
Despite being given the time and opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff has filed no opposition thereto. “On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing, and each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”
Ballentine v. U.S., 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has not established that he suffered
an injury traceable to § 7508, and therefore, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality
of that statute. The motion to dismiss will be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JHEN SCUTELLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL, et al,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 12-165Erie
Magistrate Judge Baxter
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of September, 2014;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 30] be
GRANTED. The Clerk of Courts should be directed to close this case.
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?