RILEY v. MEEKS
Filing
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OPINION & ORDER that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 8 is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 3/10/15. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTOR RILEY,
Petitioner,
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)
)
)
)
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v.
BOBBY L. MEEKS, et al.,
Respondents.
Civil Action No. 13-3 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
OPINION AND ORDER1
Pending before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, federal
prisoner Victor Riley, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He is challenging a disciplinary action taken
against him in which he lost good time credits. As relief, he seeks an order from this Court directing that
his incident report be expunged so that he may be restored the good time credit he lost as a sanction.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the petition.
I.
A.
Relevant Factual Background
On November 28, 2010, Petitioner was designated at FCI Sandstone in Sandstone, Minnesota.
On that date, an incident report was issued for misconduct alleged to have occurred at 11:25 a.m. at the
I-Unit entrance. The reporting staff, Correctional Officer David Bliss, wrote:
While opening the unit door, to allow an inmate on crutches and a food service worker
back into I-Unit, I was standing with my back to the left door frame, when I was startled
by someone trying to slide behind and past me into the unit. When I turned around I
advised the inmate, later identified as [Petitioner], that he was not going to be allowed to
go back inside since he left for lunch early with the food service workers. At that point I
advised [Petitioner] to step away from the doorway. [Petitioner] did not obey instead he
kept his hand on the door. I then repeated my order to step away from the doorway. At
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a
U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment.
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this point [Petitioner] still would not step away from the door, so I informed [Petitioner]
with two direct orders to step away from the doorway. While [Petitioner] pulled his hand
back from the door, our forearms bumped each other['s] and [Petitioner] responded "don't
put your hands on me," and repeated "don't put your hands on me," "don't ever touch
me." I then informed [Petitioner] again why I was not allowing him back in the unit at
that time. [Petitioner] then started to approach me with both fists clinched at his sides."
(Resp's Ex. 2, Discipline Hearing Officer Packet ("DHO Packet") for Incident Report at 6, ECF No. 144). This encounter was witnessed by Correctional Officer Nicholas Supinger, who wrote in a
memorandum that Petitioner acted so aggressively that the officer unzipped his jacket and prepared to
activate his body alarm. (Id. at 12-13). As a result of the incident, Petitioner was charged with Conduct
Which Disrupts or Interferes With Security, prohibited act Code 299 (most like Threatening, prohibited
act Code 203) and Refusing an Order, prohibited act Code 307.
Lieutenant Santini of FCI Sandstone investigated the incident and advised Petitioner of his
rights. He recorded that Petitioner stated to him:
"I'm an orderly on the unit and I took the trash out early and the Officer let me out early."
"I went to the 7-11 and got on the computer then I went to chow." "I think the Officer is
racial because the 2 dudes he let in the unit were white." "I had grabbed the door." "The
Officer bumped me." "I told him he was wrong for touching me." "I told him he just
needed to tell me I couldn't come in and that would have been fine."
(Id. at 7).
Petitioner did not request that video evidence of the incident be reviewed by the investigator. He
did request witnesses. The first witness told Lieutenant Santini: "Officer Bliss just put his arm out to
stop [Petitioner] from going into the unit, he never put his hands on [Petitioner]." "Bliss is a pretty good
CO[,] he['s] strait to deal with." The second witness stated: "Man I was closer to J-unit than I-unit." "The
only thing I saw was Officer Bliss put his arm out to stop [Petitioner] from sliding into the unit." "Never
saw him touch [Petitioner] just put his arm out to stop him and I walked away when [Petitioner] started
in on Bliss." (Id.)
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Lieutenant Santini referred the matter to the Unit Discipline Committee ("UDC") for disposition.
Petitioner had a hearing before the UDC on December 2, 2010. At that time, Petitioner requested, for the
first time, that video evidence of the incident be reviewed. The UDC found that Petitioner had
committed the prohibited acts as alleged, and referred the matter to the DHO. (Id. at 6-7).
Petitioner's initial DHO hearing was held on December 16, 2010. The DHO inquired about the
status of the video that Petitioner requested be reviewed during the UDC hearing, and was erroneously
informed by staff that the video had not been saved. In light of that information, the DHO sent the
Incident Report back to the UDC with a recommendation that only the Refusing an Order, Code 307,
charge be handled. (Id. at 1-2). The next day, on December 17, 2010, a staff member provided the DHO
with an update concerning the video issue, informing the DHO that an error had been made. Instead of
staff failing to save the video, the staff member informed the DHO that there was never any video to
save and/or review. (Id. at 20-21). In light of that new information, the DHO elected to hear the Incident
Report as it was originally written. (Id. at 2). The DHO explained in its subsequent DHO Report:
During the [December 16, 2010] hearing, the DHO asked about the video the inmate
requested to UDC to be saved as evidence. At that time staff informed the DHO that the
video was not saved. Based on that, the DHO elected to send the report back to the UDC
with a recommendation the report be handled as a Code 307 only. A memorandum
provided by G. Villarreal cleared up the issue of the video. There was never video of the
incident. Since there was never video evidence to review, and not that the video wasn't
saved, the DHO determined it would be appropriate to hear the incident report as written.
(Id. at 2. See also id. "There was simply a miscommunication about the video evidence, which was
cleared up in a memorandum.")
Petitioner's DHO hearing was held on December 23, 2010. The DHO reviewed Petitioner's due
process rights with him and summarized the procedural history of the matter. Petitioner elected to waive
the witnesses he had previously requested and provided no further evidence. Petitioner waived his right
to a staff representative. (Id.)
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The DHO found that Petitioner committed the prohibited acts. In the DHO Report, it is explained
the decision was "based on the greater weight of the evidence, staff documented eyewitness accounts,
and staff memorandums." (Id.) Petitioner also was advised:
Although you denied the charges, two staff members documented that you did refuse to
move away from the door when ordered to do so. Both staff members also documented
that you walked towards the staff member with your fists clenched. Although not a verbal
threat, the action of approaching a staff member with your fists clenched while arguing,
was threatening in action. One staff member had actually grabbed his radio in preparation
to activate the body alarm…. The evidence does support the charges.
(Id.)
The DHO imposed the following sanctions: disallow 27 days of good conduct time, 14 days of
disciplinary segregation, and loss of commissary, telephone, and e-mail privileges for two months for
Code 299 (most like Code 203), and disallow 14 days of good conduct time, seven days of disciplinary
segregation, and loss of commissary, telephone, and e-mail privileges for one month for Code 312. (Id.
at 2-3).
After having no success in his administrative remedy appeal, Petitioner, who at the time was
incarcerated at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of
Pennsylvania, commenced habeas proceedings in this Court by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides: "The writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless … [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitutional or
laws or treaties of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Petitioner contends
that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceeding. (ECF No. 8, Petition; ECF
No. 9, Memorandum of Law). Respondent has filed his Answer (ECF No. 14), in which he contends that
the petition should be denied on the merits.
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B.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which "confers
habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the
execution of his sentence." McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)
(quoting Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) and citing Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005)). In McGee, the Third Circuit Court instructed that "the
question to be asked is whether granting the petition would 'necessarily imply' a change to the fact,
duration, or execution of the petitioner's sentence." 627 F.3d at 936. In another case, it held that "[a]
challenge, such as this one, to a disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good-time credits, is
properly brought pursuant to § 2241, as the action could affect the duration of the petitioner's sentence."
Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
C.
Discussion
1.
Petitioner Has Not Established That He Is In Custody In Violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States
This Court's analysis of Petitioner's due process claims must begin with the Supreme Court's
decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), which is the seminal case concerning the due
process rights of federal prisoners during disciplinary proceedings. In that case, the Supreme Court
noted that a prisoner's accumulation of good time credits, which can affect the length of his
incarceration, may give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-57.
However, the Supreme Court noted further that this does not entitle prisoners to the full panoply of
rights afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution when these credits are forfeited pursuant to a prison
disciplinary proceeding. Id. Instead, a prisoner is entitled only to procedures sufficient to ensure that the
protected interest (i.e., good time credit) "is not arbitrarily abrogated." Id. at 557.
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In Wolff, the Supreme Court enumerated several procedural safeguards that are required in a
prison disciplinary proceeding. It stated that an inmate subject to a prison disciplinary proceeding must
be afforded the following due process safeguards: (1) the right to appear before an impartial decisionmaking body; (2) written notice of the charges 24 hours in advance of the disciplinary hearing; (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided the presentation of such does
not threaten institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative if the
charged inmate is illiterate or if complex issues are involved; and (5) a written decision by the fact finder
as to the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary action. Id. at 563-72.
The BOP also has established regulations that set forth the procedures for disciplinary actions.
These regulations track the requirements set forth in Wolff, and in some respects exceed the required
process set forth in that case. See Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units, See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 541.10-22 (2010). Pursuant to these regulations, staff prepare an Incident Report when they
reasonably believe an inmate has committed a violation of BOP regulations. 28 C.F.R. § 541.14. The
incident is then referred to the UDC for an initial hearing. Id. § 541.15. If the alleged violation is serious
and warrants consideration for more than minor sanctions, or involves a prohibited act listed in the
greatest severity category, the UDC must refer the matter to the DHO for a hearing. An inmate's rights
during a DHO hearing are set forth at § 541.17 (2010). These procedures require the following: (1) 24hour advance written notice of charge before the inmate's initial appearance before the DHO; (2) An
inmate shall be provided a staff representative at the DHO hearing, if so desired; (3) An inmate is
entitled to make a statement and to present documentary evidence at the DHO hearing; (4) the inmate
may also call witnesses to testify on his behalf, but may not himself question the witnesses (although he
may submit questions for requested witnesses in writing to the DHO); (5) the inmate is entitled to be
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present throughout the hearing, except during a period of deliberation or when institutional security
would be jeopardized.
Petitioner has failed to establish that he was denied any process due to him under the Due
Process Clause or applicable BOP regulations. He argues that the alleged belated notice that no
surveillance video footage was available violated his due process rights because it impeded his ability to
present a defense. This argument has no merit. Petitioner was aware at his December 23, 2010, DHO
hearing that no video footage was available of the incident, and had the opportunity at that hearing to
present his defense after learning that information. Also without merit is Petitioner's argument that the
DHO's decision to conduct the December 23, 2010, hearing violated BOP regulations. The regulation
upon which Petitioner relies explains that the "DHO may refer the case back to the UDC for further
information or disposition" or "may postpone or, at any time prior to making a decision as to whether or
not a prohibited act was committed, may continue the hearing until a later date whenever further
investigation or more evidence is needed." 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(e) (2010). The language of the regulation
to which Petitioner refers is clearly permissive, not mandatory. He has not demonstrated that this
regulation was violated because the DHO decided, after learning that there was never video evidence to
review, to conduct a hearing on December 23, 2010.
2.
The DHO's Determination Was Supported By the Requisite Degree of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the DHO's decision to find him in violation of Refusing an Order,
prohibited act Code 307 "was not based on the greater weight of the evidence." (ECF No. 9 at 3). In
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), the Supreme Court held that "revocation of good time does
not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison
disciplinary [officer] are supported by some evidence in the record." 472 U.S. at 454 (internal quotation
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marks and citation omitted). The Hill standard is minimal and does not require examination of the entire
record, an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of the evidence.
Brown v. Recktenwald, 550 F.App'x 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500,
502 (3d Cir. 1989)). The relevant inquiry is whether "there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that "the 'some evidence' standard is
a standard of appellate review to be applied by the district court rather than a burden of proof in a prison
disciplinary proceeding." Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Brown v. Fauver,
819 F.2d 395, 399 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Petitioner has failed to establish that there was not "some evidence" to support the DHO's
findings. In the present case, the DHO relied upon the reporting officer's eye witness account of the
incident. Specifically, the officer reported that Petitioner attempted to slide past him into the housing
unit on the date in question and that the officer stopped him. When ordered repeatedly to leave the area,
Petitioner refused to comply. Instead, Petitioner approached the officer with his hands in fists and in an
aggressive manner. This account was witnessed and corroborated by another officer. Moreover, the
other inmates identified by Petitioner as witnesses in the investigation also offered statements that
corroborated the officers' summaries.
D.
Certificate of Appealability
28 U.S.C. § 2253 codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for
appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. Federal prisoner appeals from the
denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement.
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by
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Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). As such, this Court makes no
certificate of appealability determination in this matter.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied. An appropriate
order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VICTOR RILEY,
Petitioner,
v.
BOBBY L. MEEKS, et al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 13-3 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of March, 2015;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk
of Court is directed to close this case.
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. mail to Petitioner at his address of record
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