THOMAS v. ASTRUE

Filing 14

ORDER denying 9 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 11 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 1/2/2014. (kmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KENNETH ROBERT THOMAS,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action No. 13-53-E

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE ,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of January, 2014, upon consideration
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon
review of the Commissioner of Social security's final decision, denying
plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under
Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1381, et seq.,
finds that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
v. Secretary of U.S.

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g)

Departme_~~Health &

114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995)

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Jesurum

Human Services, 48 F.3d

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182

(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993)
Bowen, 845 F. 2d 1211, 1213 Od Cir. 1988).
738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

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Brown v.

See also Berry v. Sullivan,

(if supported by substantial

evidence, the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
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court may neither reweigh the evidence

nor reverse

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merely because

it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v.
642 F.2d 700

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Harri~1

705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ )IS finding that Plaintiff is not
disabled. While the Court does not reach all of Plaintiff/s
contentions it does note that the record falls far short of
demonstrating that Plaintiff is an individual whose impairments
completely preclude him from working. First the Court finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ/s RFC determination. As
explained by the ALJ the record shows that during the time Plaintiff
claimed to be disabled he was performing labor intensive work which
well exceeded the limitations ultimately found by the ALJ 1 thereby
demonstrating his ability to perform work which was more demanding
than the type of work the ALJ restricted him to in his Residual
Functional Capacity ("RFCIf) determination. Contrary to Plaintiff/s
arguments the Court finds that in making his RFC finding the ALJ
properly evaluated the medical evidence addressed the relevant and
contradictory evidence which existed in the record adequately
explained why certain limitations were not adopted, and properly
explained the basis for his assignment of weight to the medical opinions
in the record. See Cotter v. HarEis, 642 F. 2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) .
Indeed, the ALJ explained that his rationale for not adopting the
limitation to sedentary work found by consultative examiner Dr. Kalata
was because he found that Dr. Kalata relied too heavily on Plaintiff's
subjective complaints which the ALJ found to be unsupported by the
objective medical evidence and contradictory to Plaintiff/s ongoing
work activity, which both demonstrated an ability to perform light
work. See (R. 25).
Furthermore, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff's assertion
that the ALJ improperly assigned weight to the findings of a
single-decision maker ("SDW'). See PI. S Brief (Doc. No. 10 at 15) .
In his decision, the ALJ noted that the "State agency found that
[Plaintiff] has the physical capacity to perform medium-exertional
work, and that he has the mental abilities to perform basic work
activities and then cited to Exhibit 4A. (R. 25). First, Exhibit 4A
is a Disability Determination Explanation which contains a mental RFC
assessment as well as a notation that Plaintiff could perform medium
work; this document was completed on December 21, 2010 by Dr. Roger
Glover Ph.D, a state agency psychologist whose opinion clearly is
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entitled to the assignment of evidentiary weight. See Exhibit 4A (R.
42-49) i 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.913, 416.927.
Second, while the record does
contain a Physical RFC assessment by John Hollenbach, an SDM, Mr.
Hollenbach did not find that Plaintiff was capable of performing medium
work. See (R. 35-41). Indeed, the regulations define "medium work"
as the ability to lift no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of obj ects weighing up to 25 pounds. See 20 C. F. R
§ 416.967(c).
Mr. Hollenbach, however, found that Plaintiff could
only occasionally lift up to 20 pounds and could frequently lift and/or
carry objects weighing up to 10 pounds. See (R. 36). These limitations
are consistent with light work, which is defined as the ability to
lift no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying
of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. See 20 C.F.R § 416.967(b).
Additionally, Mr. Hollenbach's findings are contained in Exhibit 3A,
which the ALJ does not cite to in his decision. See (R. 18-27).
Regardless, even assuming that the ALJ improperly assigned weight to
Mr. Hollenbach's assessment, this is not a situation where the ALJ
chose to credit the SDM's finding over any treating source opinions
(because none existed in the record) and Plaintiff therefore cannot
demonstrate how the outcome of the case would differ had the ALJ ignored
the SDM's finding.
Finally, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in relying on
Social Security Rulings ("SSR") 85 -15 and 83 -10 in lieu of a vocational
expert given (i) his RFC assessment limiting Plaintiff to "jobs
requiring simple, little, or no judgment, working with things rather
than people," i.e unskill
work, and (ii) the fact that the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grids") specifically contemplate
the ability to perform unskilled work which is defined as "work which
needs little or no judgment to do simple duties . . . and [requires]
little specific vocational preparation and judgment." 20 C.F.R. §
416.968(a). SSR 83-10 states that "the occupational base considered
in each rule consists of those unskilled occupations identified at
the exertional level in question" and it defines "unskilled work" as
"work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties . . . . "
1983 WL 31251, at *3, 7 (S.S.A.). SSR 85-15 explains that unskilled
jobs "ordinarily involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than
data or people." 1985 WL 56857, at *4 (S.S.A.). In light of the fact
that Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations were merely limitations
to unskilled work, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations did
not significantly erode the occupational base and accordingly finds
that the ALJ did not err in relying on the Social Security Rulings
and the Grids in finding that Plaintiff could perform other work.

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Therefore

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment (document No.9) is DENIED and defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (document No. II) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

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