YODER v. COLVIN

Filing 15

OPINION re 8 MOTION for Summary Judgment and 10 Amended MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by TERRY LYNN YODER, 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by CAROLYN W. COLVIN. Signed by Judge Maurice B. Cohill on 6/18/14. (rtw)

ssstarIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRY LYNN YODER,
Plaintiff,

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

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Civ. 13-107 Erie

OPINION

I. Introduction
This case is before us on appeal from a final decision by the defendant, Commissioner of
Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Terry Lynn Yoder's claim for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social
Security Act. The parties have submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons
stated below, we will deny the Plaintiffs motion and grant the Defendant's motion.
II. Procedural History
Terry Lynn Yoder applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383fon July
6,2009, alleging a disability due to chronic diarrhea, irritable bowel syndrome, tumors on
adrenal gland, and cysts on ovaries, uterus and lungs, with an alleged onset date of July 27, 2005.
Plaintiffs claim was initially denied on September 17,2009. A timely request for a hearing was
filed by Plaintiff on November 16, 2009. A video hearing was held before an Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") on May 11, 2011, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and
testified. R. at 60-80. A vocational expert also testified at the hearing.

By decision dated July 25, 2011, the ALJ detennined that Plaintiff is not disabled under
§§ 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. R. at 21-29. The ALJ found
that Plaintiff has the following severe impainnents: irritable bowel syndrome; adrenal gland
adenoma; ovarian cysts; and depression. R. 23. The ALJ also detennined that none of the
impainnents or combination of impainnents meets or medically equals one of the listed
impainnents in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 24-25.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perfonn light
work, except that she is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks not perfonned in a fast paced
production environment with few workplace changes and only occasional interaction with
others; and she requires access to a bathroom for five minutes every hour. R.25-27.
In making this detennination the ALJ made the following credibility determination:
I find that the claimant's medically detenninable impainnents could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional
capacity assessment.
R.26.
Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
the ALJ concluded that she is "capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy," and therefore she is "not disabled." R.

28.
Plaintiff filed a timely review of the ALJ's detennination, which was denied by the
Appeals Council on February 22, 2013. R. 1-6. Having exhausted her administrative remedies,

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Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying her application.
III. Standard of Review

The Congress of the United States provides for judicial review of the Commissioner's
denial ofa claimant's benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(2012). This court must determine
whether or not there is substantial evidence which supports the findings of the Commissioner.
See id. "Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.'" Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir.
1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971). This deferential standard has
been referred to as "less than a preponderance of evidence but more than a scintilla." Bums v.
Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). This standard, however, does not permit the court to
substitute its own conclusions for that of the fact-finder. See id.; Fargnoli v. Massonari, 247
F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing whether the administrative law judge's findings "are
supported by substantial evidence" regardless of whether the court would have differently
decided the factual inquiry). So long as the ALl's decision is supported by substantial evidence
and decided according to the correct legal standards, the decision will not be reversed. Id. To
determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court
must review the record as a whole. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1 )(F)(2012).
IV. Discussion

Under the SSA, the term "disability" is defined as the:
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ...
42 U.S.c. § 423. A person is unable to engage in substantial activity when he:

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is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired ifhe applied for work. ...
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled under the SSA, a sequential evaluation
process must be applied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). See McCrea v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). The evaluation process proceeds as follows. At step
one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity for the relevant time periods; if not, the process proceeds to step two. 20 C.F .R. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At step two, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant has a
severe impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

If

the Commissioner determines that the claimant has a severe impairment, he must then determine
whether that impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F .R., part
404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
The ALl must also determine the claimant's residual functional capacity; that is, the
claimant's ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite
limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the claimant does not have an
impairment which meets or equals the criteria, at step four the Commissioner must determine
whether the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing his past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). Ifso, the Commissioner must determine, at step five,
whether the claimant can perform other work which exists in the national economy, considering

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his residual functional capacity and age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g).
See also McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360; Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff argues that the ALl failed to properly develop the medical record and therefore
the ALl's residual functional capacity finding is unsupported by the evidence. Plaintiff also
argues that the ALl erred in his credibility determination. Finally, as a result of the above errors,
Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was not a complete and
accurate assessment of Plaintiffs limitations and abilities.
In response to Plaintiffs arguments, Defendant argues that the ALl complied with his
duty to develop the record, properly rendered his credibility determination, and properly relied
on the vocational expert's testimony. Finally, Defendant argues that substantial evidence
supports the ALl's conclusion that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work, with certain limitations.
We agree with Defendant that the ALl complied with his duty to develop the record.
Specifically, we find that the ALl upheld his duty to develop the record by inquiring of
Plaintiffs counsel at the hearing whether the record was complete, r. 63, and in permitting
counsel to submit additional medical records at a later time, r. 21, 220. Since Plaintiff was
represented by counsel and her counsel made no further requests to supplement the record, the
ALl was entitled to assume the record was complete. Lofland v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3927695, * 17
(D.Del. 2013)

C" [wJhen an applicant for social security benefits is represented by counsel the

administrative law judge is entitled to assume that the applicant is making his strongest case for
benefits."') quoting Glenn v Secretary of Health and Human Services, 814 F.2d 387, 391
Cir. 1987).

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(7th

We also agree that the ALl's credibility assessment properly took into consideration
Plaintiffs daily activities and need to frequently use the bathroom. The ALl found that Plaintiff
had mild restrictions in her daily activities, noting that she lives alone, has a pet dog, pays her
bills, cooks, and cares for her horne without assistance, that she does not have a driver's license
and uses public transportation on a regular basis. R.24. In his residual functional capacity
determination, the ALl accounted for the need for bathroom breaks by including a requirement
that she have access to a bathroom for five minutes every hour. R. 25.
All of Plaintiff s arguments concern, in part, Plaintiff s concern that the ALl failed to
adequately and properly consider and account for Plaintiffs need for frequent bathroom breaks
due to bowel problems. However, the ALl did consider and account for Plaintiffs need for
bathroom breaks, albeit not to the extent of the number of breaks that Plaintiff testified she
required.
Plaintiff testified that her Irritable Bowel Syndrome caused her to need to use the
bathroom for diarrhea "10 to 15 times a day," and that she would be in the bathroom from 10
minutes to half an hour. R. 71; see also ALl's Opinion, R. 26. The ALl reviewed the medical
evidence of record and determined that although Plaintiff indeed does suffer from abdominal
pain and diarrhea, the medical evidence does not support the severity of Plaintiffs reported
symptoms. R. 26. The ALl supported his conclusion in part by citing to the medical record to
show that relevant tests and procedures Plaintiff underwent in 2009, 2010, and 2011, were
normal. R.26.

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The ALJ also supported his credibility finding by noting that Plaintiff reported an
unintentional weight loss of 20 to 25 pounds, but that medical records from March 2009 through
May 2011 demonstrate that Plaintiff actually gained weight. R.26. The ALJ found that with
diarrhea episodes as frequent as alleged by Plaintiff one would expect a weight loss, instead of a
weight gain, and thus the ALJ only partially credited Plaintiff's testimony as to the amount of
bathroom breaks she would need. Specifically, he found that she would require access to a
bathroom for five minutes every hour, which translates to 8 bathroom breaks in an 8 hour
workday. R.25.
We therefore find that the ALJ complied with his duty to properly develop the record,
and applied the proper legal standard in assessing Plaintiff's credibility. As the finder of fact, the
ALJ is required to review, properly consider and weigh all of the medical records provided
concerning the claimant's claims of disability. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42 (citing Dobrowolsky v.
Califano, 606 F.2d 403,406-07 (3d Cir.1979)). The ALJ's residual functional capacity finding
was detailed and credited Plaintiff with numerous limitations. The ALJ also comprehensively
reviewed and accounted for Plaintiff's medical evidence in rendering his opinion. Accordingly,
the ALJ was entitled to rely on the vocational expert's testimony based on the ALl's finding of
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity.
Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Plummer, 186
F.3d at 427. We find that the Commissioner's decision is based on substantial evidence.

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V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, and based upon our review of the record as a whole, we hold
that the decision of the Commissioner that Ms. Yoder was not disabled is supported by
substantial evidence and, accordingly, an appropriate order will be entered granting the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment and denying Ms. Yoder's motion for summary
judgment.

~J.~l~.

Maunce B. Cohill, Jr.

Senior United States District Court Judge

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