BARKER v. COLVIN
Filing
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ORDER granting 7 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 9/3/14. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOETTA FRANCES BARKER,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 14-15E
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 7 and 9).
Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 8 and 10). After careful
consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am
granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 7) and denying Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 9).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (ACommissioner@) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed
her applications in April of 2011, alleging she had been disabled since May 29, 2010. (ECF No.
6-5, pp. 2, 6). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), David F. Brash, held a video hearing on
September 14, 2012. (ECF No. 6-2, pp. 40-66). On October 15, 2012, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 6-2, pp. 22-35).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this court.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 7 and 9). The issues
are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Additionally,
the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42
U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A district court
cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the evidence of
record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if the court would
have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court
must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.
20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a).
The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
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impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. '404.1520.
The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical
evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky, 606
F.2d at 406.
Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful activity
(step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision
with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
ASSESSMENT OF PLAINTIFF’S MENTAL IMPAIRMENTS
Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred in evaluating her mental impairments. (ECF No. 8, pp.
8-26 and No. 11, pp. 3-14). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that ALJ erred in assigning her treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Asha Prabhu, “little weight,” while assigning the non-examining state agency
psychologist, Dr. Monica Yeater, “significant weight.” Id. Consequently, Plaintiff requests that
this case be remanded.
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a
non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more
weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
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such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds
that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give
that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Third Circuit has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where . .
. the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a treating
physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medical
evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 14,
2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577 F.3d 500,
505 (3d Cir. 2009).
The ALJ must provide sufficient explanation of his or her final determination to provide a
reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the ultimate disability finding. Cotter
v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). In other words, the ALJ must provide sufficient
discussion to allow the court to determine whether any rejection of potentially pertinent, relevant
evidence was proper. Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2008). In
the present case, I find the ALJ failed to meet this standard.
The ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Prabhu’s opinions because Dr. Prabhu fails to
provide “an explanation regarding the claimant’s inconsistencies in reported symptoms,
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medication efficacy, and indications that her major depressive disorder was only of a moderate
degree. Moreover, his opinion fails to cite to specific evidence in support of his conclusions and”
fails to account for her work activity during the relevant time period.
(ECF No. 6-2, p. 32).
Additionally, the ALJ found Dr. Prabhu’s opinions to be “conclusory and the temporary disability
form simply speaks to the overall issue of disability, which it (sic) reserved to the Commissioner.”
Id.
Upon review of the record, however, I find the reasons for assigning little weight to Dr.
Prabhu are not borne out by the record. First, the form completed by Dr. Prabhu stating that
Plaintiff would not be able to maintain regular attendance, would not be able to interact
appropriately with fellow workers, and would not be able to interact appropriately with supervisors
on a sustained basis (ECF No. 6-13, p. 46), indicates that the doctor’s responses were based on
observations of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s clinical history, and a review of the Plaintiff’s treatment records,
signs and symptoms. (ECF No. 6-13, p. 46). The record contained Plaintiff’s treatment notes,
observations and clinical history. (ECF No. 6-7, pp. 2-18 and No. 6-13, pp. 47-56). This is
sufficiently specific evidence. Thus, I find this reason for assigning little weight to Dr. Prabhu’s
opinion to be specious, at best.
The ALJ additionally appears to assign little weight to Dr. Prabhu because of the doctor’s
failure to provide an explanation of Plaintiff’s inconsistencies. (ECF No. 6-2, p. 32). While it is
true that the earliest notes indicate relevant and goal-directed speech, intact memory, intact
abstract thinking, and intact insight and judgment (ECF No. 6-7, pp. 5-6) 1 , the longitudinal
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On that same initial date, Dr. Prabhu indicated that Plaintiff had a GAF score of 50-55. A GAF score is
used to report an individual's overall level of functioning with respect to psychological, social, and
occupational functioning. The GAF scale ranges from the lowest score of 1 to 100, the highest score
possible. The GAF score considers “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical
continuum of mental health-illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (“DSM–IV TR”)
34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score between 41-50 sometimes denotes “serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal
ideation…)…OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.” Id. An individual
with a GAF score in this range (41-50) may be “unable to keep a job.” Rios v. Commissioner of Social
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treatment records are consistent with the recurrent waxing and waning of mental illness
symptoms and the assessment of major depressive disorder. Just because someone improves
at times does not necessarily mean that there are inconsistencies or that Plaintiff’s work related
abilities/limitations improved or are adequate. It very well could mean that in her improved state,
Plaintiff still had serious limitations preventing Plaintiff from working on a sustained basis.
Finally, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the treatment records of Dr. Prabhu
acknowledge the attempted work activity by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 6-7, p. 13, 15). Thus, based on
the above, I find that the ALJ has erred in this regard and remand is required.
Plaintiff also argues, for various reasons, that ALJ erred in assigning the May 17, 2011
opinion of the non-examining state agency consultant, Dr. Yeater, “significant weight.” (ECF No.
8, pp. 9-13; ECF No. 11, and ECF No. 6-2, pp. 31-32). State agency opinions merit significant
consideration. See SSR 96–6p (“Because State agency medical and psychological consultants ...
are experts in the Social Security disability programs, ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f)
require [ALJs] ... to consider their findings of fact about the nature and severity of an individual's
impairment(s)....”). Moreover, an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the findings of an agency evaluator
even if there is a lapse of time between the report and the hearing. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2012).
After a review of the record, however, I cannot say that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Yeater’s
opinion (ECF No. 6-3, pp. 14-24) was proper in light of the following facts: 1) the ALJ fails to give
Sec., 444 Fed.Appx. 532, 535, 2011 WL 4059780, *2, n.3 (3d Cir. 2011). A GAF scores of 51-60 indicate
moderate symptoms (e.g. flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate
difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).
See, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM-IV-TR”).
While I acknowledge that GAF scores do not have a “direct correlation to the severity requirements” of the
Social Security mental disorder listings, they are medical evidence that informs a Commissioner's judgment
in assessing whether an individual is disabled. Rios v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 444 Fed.Appx. 532,
535, 2011 WL 4059780, *2 (3d Cir. 2011), citing, 65 Fed.Reg. 50746–01, 50764–65 (2000). Thus, Dr.
Prabhu found Plaintiff’s condition to be between serious and moderate on September 1, 2010. (ECF No.
6-7, p. 6).
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any explanation or reason for giving Dr. Yeater’s opinion significant weight other than to
summarily conclude that it is consistent with the overall record; 2) Dr. Yeater’s opinion indicates
that Plaintiff had no periods of work determined to be an unsuccessful work attempt, yet Plaintiff’s
part time employment that ended in April of 2011 was found to be an unsuccessful work attempt in
the Social Security report (ECF No. 6-6, pp. 4, 13-14); and 3) Dr. Yeater’s opinion was dated May
17, 2011, and does not reflect that he considered treatment record of April 28, 2011 (a record that
indicates that Plaintiff no longer is working because of her depression and that Dr. Prabhu
changed her medication). If Dr. Yeater were to have considered all of the records that were
available at the time of the report, Dr. Yeater’s opinion may be altered. The ALJ did not note
these crucial factors. I also note that there has been well over a years’ lapse in time with ups and
downs in Plaintiff’s condition, perhaps an updated additional review is warranted. Therefore, I
am remanding for full and proper analysis.
C.
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT
Finally, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred in assessing the credibility of Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 8, pp. 26-28). To be clear, an ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining credibility.
Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). The ALJ must consider “the entire case record” in
determining the credibility of an individual’s statement. SSR 96-7p. The ALJ’s decision “must
contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent
reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reason for that
weight.” Id. I must defer to the ALJ=s credibility determinations, unless they are not supported
by substantial evidence.
Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v.
Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
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In this case, the ALJ attempts to use certain testimony to discredit Plaintiff. (ECF No. 6-2,
pp. 22-35). Since I have found that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to Dr. Prabhu’s opinions
and treatment notes while giving significant weight to Dr. Yeater’s opinions, his finding regarding
Plaintiff’s credibility simply cannot stand. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1056, 1068 (3d Cir. 1993).
Thus, I find remand is warranted on this issue.
An appropriate order shall follow.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOETTA FRANCES BARKER,
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Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-15E
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 3rd day of September, 2014, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 7) is granted and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 9) is denied.
It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby
vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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