BENSON v. COLVIN
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 11/4/2014. (nk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VALERIE JEANNE BENSON
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Civil Case No. 14-76-JFM
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Valerie Jeanne Benson ("Plaintiff'), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking judicial review of the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").
The Parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.9)
will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, the Commissioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) will be DENIED, and the case will be REMANDED to the
Commissioner for further proceedings.
II. Procedural History
On April 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for SSL 1 R. 163-69. The application
was denied on July 5, 2011. R. 81-93. Plaintiff filed a timely request for an administrative
hearing. R. 106-08. Administrative Law Judge James J. Pileggi ("AU") held a hearing on
August 30, 2012. R. 24-46. Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified on her own behalf. R.
24-42. An impartial vocational expert ("VE") also testified at the hearing. R. 42-45.
I The record also contains information about and references to prior applications for benefits filed by
Plaintiff. See, e.g R. 47-64 (hearing transcript relating to prior application); R. 65-80 (ALl decision
dated February 14,2011 from prior application).
III. Statement of the Case
In a decision dated September 10, 2012, the AU made the following findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 1, 20 II, the
alleged onset date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c».
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant
has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but
with the following nonexertional limitations:
she is limited to the performance of simple,
repetitive tasks; routine work processes and settings; no high stress defined as no high quotas or
close attention to quality production standards; no interaction with the public; no crowds; and no
teamwork.
5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on May 29, 1962 and was 48 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR
416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not
disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
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Appendix 2).
9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
1O. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
since April 1,2011, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g».
IV. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the file to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is
"supported by substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Adorno v. Shalala, 40
F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court does not conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's
decision, and does not re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler,
806 F.2d 1185, 1190-1191(3d Cir. 1986). Congress expressly intended that "[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive." 42 U.S.c. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined not as "a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Undenvood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A decision supported by substantial evidence must be upheld even if
this Court "would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F .3d
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). "Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of
review." Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,503 (3d Cir. 2004).
To establish disability, a claimant must prove a "medically determinable basis for an
impairment that prevents him from engaging in any 'substantial gainful activity' for a statutory
twelve-month period." Stunkard v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d
Cir. 1988) (citing Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§
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423(d)(l)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is unable to perform substantial gainful activity "only
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any
oth~r
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
An AU is required to make specific findings of fact to support his conclusions. See
Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The ALJ must
consider the entire record and must provide adequate explanations for disregarding or rejecting
certain evidence. See Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984)
(citing Cotterv. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).
The Social Security Administration ("SSA"), acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated
rule making authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose
of determining whether a claimant is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. The United
States Supreme Court has summarized this process as follows:
If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will
not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability
unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a "substantial gainful
activity." [20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find
non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a "severe impairment,"
defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." §§
404. I 520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the
impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant
qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairment is not on the
list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the
claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is
determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth,
and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called "vocational factors" (the
claimant's age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether
the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. §§ 404. I 520(f), 404.1 560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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Where a claimant seeks review of an administrative determination, the Agency's decision
cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the Agency in making its
decision. The Supreme Court has explained:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with
a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized
to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more
adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see also Fargnoli v.
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the same principles in the Social
Security disability context).
V. Discussion
Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of her appeal. First, she contends that the
inaudible portions of the hearing transcript preclude effective review. Second, she submits that
the AU provided an insufficient explanation of his evaluation of the medical record. Both of
Plaintiff's arguments are meritorious.
Plaintiff correctly notes that the transcript of the VE's testimony is rife with notations that
the recording of the hearing was "inaudible." R. 42-45. In fact, it is impossible, using this
transcript, for the Court to assess whether the hypothetical question posed to the VE matched the
RFC assessment determined by the AU, or to assess whether the AU found Plaintiff able to
perform representative positions based on the VE's testimony. The Commissioner contends that,
because Plaintiffs counsel was at the hearing and did not raise any issues with the VE's
testimony, this Court can assume that there is no substantive error. Def. Mot. 7-8. However, this
Court has authority to remand a case where an incomplete administrative record lacks ample
evidence to permit meaningful review. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 594
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(1980). The mUltiple "inaudible" notations in Plaintiffs transcript leave this Court with no
ability to decipher the questions asked or the responses given.
Accordingly, remand is
warranted.
Remand is further appropriate as a result of the sparse analysis provided by the AU in his
RFC assessment. As noted, the Court is constrained to assess whether the AU's decision is
supported by substantial evidence. In this case, the AU's decision does not provide a sufficient
explanation as to how the AU considered certain medical evidence.
The AU's opinion contains mostly boilerplate language with no supporting factual
statements or references to the medical record.
For example, the AU makes the general
assertion (which could, if it were appropriate, be alleged in every case) that "the claimant's
financial interest in the outcome ... detract(s) from reliance on the claimant's representations as
a basis for decisionmaking." R. 17. The AU further asserts, "When evaluated, claimant's
subjective complaints are found to be exaggerated and inconsistent with the other evidence,
including the clinical and objective findings of record and are not a sound basis for
decisionmaking."
Jd.
subjective complaints."
However, the AU provides no specific examples of "exaggerated
The ALl's one-paragraph review of Plaintiffs treatment records
contains both evidence that would support a finding of disability and evidence that would refute
such a finding. Jd. What is lacking is any explanation of how those facts relate to the RFC
assessment determ ined by the AU.
The AU's assessment of the medical opinions is similarly deficient. For example, the
AU states, "The opinions of the consultative examiner and the state agency psychologist have
be.en considered and are ascribed great weight as they are supported by the preponderance of the
evidence as a whole and are not incongruous with the residual functional capacity assessment
adopted herein." R. 17. Presumably, from the record cites in the opinion, the AU meant to refer
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to Dr. Barac when he referred to the "consultative examiner."
Dr. Barac suggests, in his
conclusion, that Plaintiff "would benefit from congitive therapy and counseling in addition to
medication therapy with a goal of getting over her fear of public places and being around
people." R. 298. The AU does not explain how Dr. Barac's opinion aligns with the RFC
assessment, which would require Plaintiff to work outside her home and would not preclude her
from working around co-workers. R. 16 (RFC assessment prohibiting only "interaction with the
public," "crowds," and "teamwork"). Remand is therefore appropriate for the AU to fulfill his
duty of explanation and to provide evidence-based analysis of the various medical opinions in
the record.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED.
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED with respect to the motion to
vacate the Commissioner's decision and to remand for further administrative proceedings, and
DENIED with respect to the request for an award for benefits. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: November 4,2014
IslJ. Frederick Motz
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge
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