GOLLMER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER GRANTING 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DENYING 8 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by ANTHONY GOLLMER; the Clerk is directed to close this case ; and final judgment of this Court is netered pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 12/4/2014. (nk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY THOMAS GOLLMER
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
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Civil Case No. 14-CV-99-JFM
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket
Nos. 8 and 12). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (Docket Nos. 9 and
13). After careful consideration of each of those submissions, I am granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) and denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Docket No. 8).
I. BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). (R. 144-52). In his application, he
alleged a disability onset date of August 8, 2011. Id. His application was denied on February
21, 2013. (R. 94-98). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on August 15,
2013. (R. 35-81). Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel and testified on his own behalf.
Id. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing, in response to hypothetical questions
posed by the ALJ. (R. 76-81). In a decision dated August 28, 2013, the ALJ found that jobs
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and that
Plaintiff was therefore not disabled under the Act. (R. 14-31). The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, (R. 1-7), making the ALJ’s opinion the final, reviewable decision
of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then filed this action. (Docket No. 1).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Social Security appeals, this Court determines whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
This Court cannot conduct a de
novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. See Palmer v.
Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). If the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence, this Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision, even if this Court would have
decided the factual inquiry differently. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
This Court must review the record as a whole in determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for Social Security benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he or she
cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
Each ALJ employs a five-step sequential analysis when evaluating a claim of disability.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if the impairment does not satisfy one of the
impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments prevent him from performing his past
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relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work, whether
he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age,
education, work experience and residual functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
The
claimant carries the burden through the first four steps of the sequential evaluation, including the
burden of establishing an inability to perform past relevant work. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). If the claimant fulfills this burden, the Commissioner bears the
burden of proof at step five to show that the claimant is capable of other substantial gainful
activity. Id.
After reviewing the entire record, this Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the ALJ’s
decision. See Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B. WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPAIRMENTS
IN
ASSESSING
PLAINTIFF’S
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that he was limited to
occasionally climbing ramps and stairs only; occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, and crawling; cannot operate foot controls with his lower left extremity, must have
ready access to a restroom, and is “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not performed in a
fast-paced production environment, involving only simple, work-related decisions, and in
general, relatively few workplace changes. Furthermore, he must avoid interaction with the
general public and can tolerate no more than superficial interaction with supervisors and coworkers.” (R. 21).
Despite the relatively significant mental health-related limitations in the RFC assessment,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not sufficiently consider his mental health impairments. Pl.’s
Br. 19-28. Specifically, Plaintiff argues (1) that the ALJ should have found that Plaintiff met or
medically equaled a mental health listing and (2) that Plaintiff is incapable, from a mental health
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perspective, of performing the tasks listed in the RFC assessment. Both arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff does not identify the Listing he contends has been met. Essentially, however,
Plaintiff contends that he has marked limitations in the requisite “paragraph B criteria” applying
to many of the mental health listings, including Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.09, which were
expressly considered by the ALJ. However, in assessing Plaintiff to have mild restriction in
activities of daily living, and moderate difficulties in the areas of social functioning and
concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ cited extensively to Plaintiff’s testimony and to the
opinion of the state agency psychologist, whose findings matched the ALJ’s. (R. 19-20, 85-86,
89-90). Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not required any intensive outpatient or
inpatient mental health treatment, and was able to live independently. (R. 20). While Plaintiff
has compiled excerpts from his mental health records that might suggest a more serious problem,
when viewed in totality, the records can be read to support the position espoused by the state
agency psychologist and the ALJ.1 Accordingly, substantial evidence supports that position and
remand is unwarranted.
With respect to Plaintiff’s ability to perform the tasks described in the ALJ’s RFC
assessment, the ALJ’s proposed restrictions address the various areas of impairment found by the
ALJ and the state agency physician.
For example, the relatively extreme limitations on
interaction with others (no interaction with the general public and no more than superficial
interaction with supervisors and co-workers) address Plaintiff’s impaired social functioning. As
the ALJ noted, the record reflects an ability to go shopping and run errands outside the home,
relationships with friends and a girlfriend, and participation in some work activity. Accordingly,
the limitations imposed by the ALJ reasonably address the concerns.
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For example, Plaintiff repeatedly suggests that the fact that his physicians monitored him for suicide risk
is indicative of more serious symptoms. Pl.’s Br. 20-22. However, there is no evidence of a suicide
attempt in the record.
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Similarly, while Plaintiff alleges difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace, he
acknowledges the mental ability to participate in a landscaping business (including work on the
billing/financial side) and to perform motorcycle repair, to drive a motorcycle and a car, and to
complete household chores. (R. 20, 28). The ALJ limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive
tasks, not performed in a fast-paced production environment, involving only simple, workrelated decisions, and in general, relatively few workplace changes. In light of the analysis
provided by the ALJ, the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and
reasonably accounted for the moderate impairment reflected in the record. There is therefore no
basis for remand.
C. WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN ASSESSING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL
IMPAIRMENTS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding him physically capable of a restricted
range of light work. First, Plaintiff contends that his impairment meets or equals Listing 1.04
(disorders of the spine). Pl.’s Br. 28-31. Specifically, Plaintiff cites to a lumbar spine MRI from
March 2011, and the reports from his medical examination in March 2012, as evidence that he
meets or equals the Listing. Id. In his opinion, the ALJ specifically identified and considered
Listing 1.04. (R. 17-18). The ALJ noted that while one MRI in March 2011 had positive
findings, Plaintiff had a later MRI and earlier X-rays, both with negative findings. Id. The ALJ
also cited to “essentially unremarkable” examination notes, and to the fact that Plaintiff is
capable of occasional landscaping work and regularly rides a motorcycle, as evidence that
Plaintiff’s back impairment does not meet or equal a listing. Moreover, each subsection of
Listing 1.04 requires proof of a specific criteria that is not evidenced in Plaintiff’s record. See,
Listing 1.04(A) (requiring positive straight-leg raising test); Listing 1.04(B) (requiring spinal
arachnoiditis confirmed by operative note, biopsy, or medically acceptable imaging); Listing
1.04(C) (requiring “inability to ambulate effectively” defined as use of “hand-held assistive
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device(s) that limits the functioning of both upper extremities”). While Plaintiff’s impairments
clearly do not equal the criteria of any of those listings, medical equivalence can be found when
a claimant has: (1) a listed impairment with medical findings that are at least of equal
significance to the required criteria; (2) an impairment closely analogous to a listed impairment;
or (3) a combination of impairments with medical findings of equal significance to the criteria of
an analogous listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b). However, nothing cited by Plaintiff,
or evident from the record, suggests that Plaintiff’s impairments are of equivalent severity to the
criteria required by the listings.
A finding of medical equivalence would therefore be
inappropriate.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment, and the corresponding
hypothetical presented to the VE, did not adequately account for Plaintiff’s physical restrictions
and limitations. However, the ALJ cited to substantial evidence to support the RFC assessment
providing for a restricted range of light work. The ALJ noted that, with respect to several of
Plaintiff’s alleged physical conditions such as recurrent diarrhea and daily headaches, Plaintiff
either had not sought medical care or had not followed through with doctors’ recommendations.
(R. 22-23, 25). With respect to Plaintiff’s most serious physical impairment, his back pain, the
ALJ cited to repeated notes in the medical records that Plaintiff was participating in a
landscaping business, either as a landscaper or in the business office, repeated notes that Plaintiff
was working on and “flipping” motorbikes, a normal MRI in July 2012 and normal x-rays from
May 2012, in addition to normal diagnostic testing of the cervical spine and an EMG showing
only “very mild” radiculopathy, relatively normal findings on physical examination, Plaintiff’s
decision not to pursue chiropractic intervention or objections, Plaintiff’s ability to ride a
motorcycle approximately every other day, and Plaintiff’s refusal to meet with vocational
rehabilitation counselors for fear of losing his disability payments. (R. 21-25). Although there
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might be some evidence in the record that could be marshaled to support a finding of a more
restrictive RFC assessment, the ALJ cited to substantial evidence in his extensive analysis to
support his determination. Because this Court cannot re-weigh the evidence of record, the ALJ’s
opinion must be affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 4, 2014
/s/ J. Frederick Motz
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY THOMAS GOLLMER
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v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Civil Case No. 14-CV-99-JFM
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ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is, this 4th day of
December, 2014 ORDERED that
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 8) is DENIED;
(2) the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) is GRANTED;
(3) the Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case; and
(4) final judgment of this Court is entered pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
/s/J. Frederick Motz
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge
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