PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ENERGY COMPANY, LLC v. GRANT TOWNSHIP

Filing 172

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that 119 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by GRANT TOWNSHIP is denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 2/5/16. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ENERGY
COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff

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vs.
GRANT TOWNSHIP,
Defendant.

C.A.No. 14-209ERIE

Magistrate Judge Baxter

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
M.J. Susan Paradise Baxter
I.

Relevant Procedural History
Presently before this Court is Defendant’s motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule

60(b)(6), or alternatively Rule 59(e), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 119.
Defendant seeks reconsideration of this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order denying its
motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 113; ECF No. 114.
Plaintiff Pennsylvania General Energy Company, LLC, (“PGE”) filed this action
challenging the constitutionality, validity and enforceability of an ordinance adopted by Grant
Township that established a so-called Community Bill of Rights Ordinance. Defendant Grant
Township has filed a counterclaim alleging that by challenging the Ordinance, PGE is violating
the inalienable rights of the people of its Township to “local community self-government.”

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including the entry of a
final judgment.
1

The parties filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. By Opinion and Order
filed October 14, 2015, this Court denied Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion. ECF No. 113; ECF No. 114.
Thereafter, Defendant Grant Township filed the instant motion for reconsideration. ECF
No. 119. Plaintiff filed an opposition (ECF No. 129), as did Plaintiff Intervenor PIOGA (ECF
No. 130). Grant Township also filed Supplement to its Motion, along with fifty pages of
attachments. ECF No. 150. Plaintiff filed Response to Supplement. ECF No. 151.

II.

Standard of Review
Motions for reconsideration are not explicitly recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999).
However, a motion for reconsideration may be treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment
under Federal Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule 60(b). Id.
See also Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1352 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a
motion for reconsideration is usually the “functional equivalent” of a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Rule 59(e)).
“‘Because federal courts have a strong interest in finality of judgments,’” “[m]otions for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are granted sparingly.”
Jacobs v. Bayha, 2011 WL 1044638, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2011) quoting Continental Cas.
Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D.Pa.1995). Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(6)
provides “extraordinary relief” that is only available in “exceptional circumstances.” Coltec
Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002).

2

The moving party bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that an order should be
reconsidered and the Court will only grant such a motion if the moving party shows: (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence which was not
available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or
to prevent a manifest injustice. Lazardis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting
Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 678 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, Defendant’s motion is based on “the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or
to prevent a manifest injustice.” Defendant’s burden is especially heavy in this regard. “[A] mere
disagreement with the court does not translate into a clear error of law.” Mpala v. Smith, 2007
WL 136750, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2007).
It follows from the remedial purpose of a motion for reconsideration that the standard of
review relates back to the standard applicable in the underlying decision. United States v.
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, when a motion for reconsideration
challenges a court's decision to grant or deny judgment on the pleadings, the standard set forth in
Federal Rule 12 guides the analysis. So then, it is through the lens of Rule 12 that this Court
must address the motion for reconsideration.2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “after the pleadings are closed-but early
enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate only when the movant “‘clearly establishes that no material issue of fact
remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Minnesota
Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ahrens, 432 Fed. App’x 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Rosenau v.
Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). “The standard for deciding a motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is not
materially different from the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Zion v. Nassan, 283 F.R.D. 247, 254 (W.D. Pa. 2012). Either
motion may be used to seek the dismissal of a complaint based on a plaintiff's “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), (h)(2)(B). The only difference
between the two motions is that a Rule 12(b) motion must be made before a “responsive
pleading” is filed, whereas a Rule 12(c) motion can be made “[a]fter the pleadings are closed.” A
2

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III.

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant seeks reconsideration of the decision denying its motion for judgment on the

pleadings claiming that the Court erred (1) in failing to expressly rule on whether the people of
Grant Township have an inalienable right of local community self-government, and (2) by
omitting consideration of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment as
an independent legal basis for the Community Bill of Rights Ordinance. ECF No. 119, pages 1-2.
This Court carefully and painstakingly reviewed all of the voluminous filings before
ruling on the cross motions for judgment on the pleadings. Based upon those filings and the
record before it, and based upon the principle that a motion for judgment on the pleadings must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, this Court denied Defendant’s motion
holding:
Defendant claims the right to local community self-government is deeply rooted
in our nation’s history and tradition. In support of its alleged right to local
community self-government, Defendant undertakes a lengthy examination of
historical documents such as the Mayflower Compact, the Exeter Compact of
1639, the Articles of Confederation for the United Colonies of 1643, and the
Declaration of Independence, and analyzes historical events leading up to the
American Revolution, such as the Second Continental Congress, the British
Parliament’s enactment of the Currency Acts in 1764, the Stamp Act Riots in
1765, and the Boston Tea Party.

court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings must consider the plaintiff's
complaint, the defendant's answer, and any written instruments or exhibits attached to the
pleadings. Perelman v. Perelman, 919 F.Supp.2d 512, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2013). See also 2 James
Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice–Civil ¶ 12.38 (2010); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196–97 (3d Cir.1993) (court should consider the
allegations in the pleadings, the attached exhibits, matters of public record, and “undisputedly
authentic” documents if plaintiff's claims are based on such documents). A motion to dismiss
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted
as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
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Defendant seeks judgment upholding its Ordinance based solely upon these
historical events. Defendant provides no precedential statute or constitutional
provision authorizing its action other than its assertion that Plaintiff has no rights
– from contracting to do business in Grant Township to bringing a lawsuit to
complain about an ordinance – because it is not a person. This view is contrary to
over one hundred years of Supreme Court precedent that established that
corporations are considered “persons” under the United States Constitution. […]
Defendant has provided no legal precedent to the contrary. Without a legal basis
for its actions, as opposed to historical documents and events, this Court cannot
provide the relief Grant Township seeks.3 Defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings will be denied.

ECF No. 113 (internal citations omitted), pages 5-8.
Defendant argues that this Court’s analysis falls short because it does not specifically
address some of the assertions made in Defendant’s briefing. In particular, Defendant faults this
Court for not specifically examining the claimed right to local community self-government as
arising out of: 1) Article 1, § 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution4; 2) the Preamble to the United
States Constitution; 3) the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution; or 4)
Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment.
3

The relief requested by Defendant was: a declaration that the Ordinance is a constitutional and
valid assertion of the right of the people of Grant Township to local, community selfgovernment; a declaration that certain preemptive provisions of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas
Act are unconstitutional and invalid; a declaration that PGE is liable to Grant Township for
seeking to violate the secured right of local, community self-government; a declaration that PGE
is not a “person” and does not possess any other legal rights, privileges or protections – or the
power to assert federal or state preemptive or conflicting law – which would interfere with the
rights or prohibitions enumerated by the Ordinance; a declaration, as provided by § 5(b) of the
Ordinance, that: all laws adopted by the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, and rules
adopted by any State agency, shall be the law of Grant Township only to the extent that they do
not violate the rights or prohibitions of the Ordinance; preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief enjoining PGE from violating the right of the people of Grant Township to local,
community self-government; and fees. ECF No. 52, pages 8-9.
Article I, § 2 reads: “All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of
these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish
their government in such manner as they may think proper.”
4

5

Grant Township fundamentally misunderstands the standard for judgment on the
pleadings. Judgment on the pleadings is only appropriate when the movant “clearly established
… that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ahrens, 432 Fed.App’x at 147. Grant
Township failed to meet its burden in this regard. None of Defendant’s cited sources provides
definitive authority for Defendant’s claimed right so as to provide the legal basis for the granting
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The lack of clear legal precedent in support of
Defendant’s claimed right to self-government precludes the granting of judgment on the
pleadings. Grant Township’s motion for reconsideration is nothing more than an attempt to
relitigate its motion for judgment on the pleadings, and accordingly, the motion will be denied.
See In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litig., 2011 WL 4945713, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Oct.14, 2011) (reconsideration is not permitted to reargue matters the court already
resolved or relitigate points of disagreement between the court and the moving party); Kennedy
Indus., Inc. v. Aparo, 2006 WL 1892685, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2006) (a litigant who “fails in its
first attempt to persuade a court to adopt its position may not use a motion for reconsideration
either to attempt a new approach or correct mistakes it made in its previous one.”); Ogden v.
Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (“A motion for reconsideration is
not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to
relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant”).

An appropriate Order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ENERGY
COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
GRANT TOWNSHIP,
Defendant.

C.A.No. 14-209ERIE

Magistrate Judge Baxter

ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 2016;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for reconsideration [ECF No. 119]
is denied.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge

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