BAILEY v. SCI ALBION et al
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 2 is DENIED and a certificate of appealability is DENIED as to all claims. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 11/2/16. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL A. BAILEY,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
)
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, )
et al., )
Respondents.
)
Civil Action No. 14-267 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
OPINION1
Presently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 by Michael A. Bailey (the "Petitioner"). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied
and a certificate of appealability is denied on all claims.
I.
A.
Relevant Background
At the end of June 2010, the Petitioner stole two computers valued at about $500.00 each. He
was arrested and charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County at docket CP-25-CR-2676-2010
with two counts of theft by unlawful taking. A little more than a year later, on July 5, 2011, the
Petitioner operated, without permission, his neighbor's car. The neighbor reported the car missing and
the Petitioner was apprehended and charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County at docket CP-
1
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United
States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment.
1
25-CR-2014-2011 with criminal trespass, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and driving while his
operating privilege was suspended or revoked. Commonwealth v. Bailey, No. 1582 & 1583 WDA 2012,
slip op. at 1-2 (Pa.Super.Ct. June 20, 2013).
On July 9, 2012, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges at docket CP-25-CR-2014-2011,2
and on July 19, 2012, he entered pleas of no contest to the charges at docket CP-25-CR-2676-2010. On
September 12, 2012, he was sentenced in absentia on all charges to an aggregate term of 25-56 months
of incarceration. Id. at 2-3.
The Petitioner filed an appeal in each case, which were consolidated before the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. His direct appeal counsel (Tina M. Frying, Esq.) submitted a brief and also requested
permission to withdraw from the Petitioner's representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), noting that, in her professional judgment, there were no non-frivolous issues for review in
the case. Bailey, No. 1582 & 1583 WDA 2012, slip op. at 3, 5. Counsel explained that the sole issue
before the court was whether the Petitioner's sentence was manifestly excessive and failed to take into
account the Petitioner's belief that he would receive a probationary sentence. Id. at 5-6. The Petitioner
subsequently filed a pro se supplement to his counsel's brief in which he claimed that the plea he entered
on July 9, 2012, was to defiant trespass (graded as a misdemeanor 3) and not criminal trespass (graded
as a felony 1). Thus, he "argue[d] that the 'sentence order is illegal and inaccurate and not applicable.'"
Id. at 5 n.4 (quoting the Petitioner's pro se Response at 1).
2
The transcript for that plea proceeding establishes that count three, which charged the Petitioner with the offense of
trespass, was "amended from a felony of the third degree to a misdemeanor of the third degree." 7/9/12 Hr'g Tr. at 10. See
also id. at 9.
2
On July 20, 2013, the Superior Court issued a Memorandum in which it affirmed the Petitioner's
judgment of sentence and granted appellate counsel's petition to withdraw. It explained that the
Petitioner was challenging the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed by the trial court and its
standard or review was one of abuse of discretion. Id. at 6. The Superior Court determined that the
Petitioner's challenge to his sentence had no merit,3 explaining:
The record reflects that the trial judge was mindful of the sentencing guidelines,
the presentence report, the facts and circumstances of the crime, [the Petitioner's]
previous criminal history, his mental health problems and his need for stabilization. In
addition, the record reflects the court's consideration of "the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. The terms
of the sentence clearly rested within the discretionary power afforded to the trial court
and, on this record, there would be no basis for the Court to conclude that the sentence
was "clearly unreasonable." Moreover, we note that where, as here, "the sentencing judge
had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed that he or she
was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighted
those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors." Commonwealth v. Ventura,
975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009). See also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d
758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that "[t]he sentencing judge can satisfy the
requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that
he or she has been informed by the pre-sentencing report; thus properly considering and
weighing all relevant factors"). Lastly, [the Petitioner's] assertion that he thought he
would receive probation rather than the sentence imposed is not supported by the
certified record on appeal. Review of [the Petitioner's] plea and sentencing transcript do
not support such a contention, and [the Petitioner] does not point us to any other
documentation wherein any such promise or suggestion of leniency of sentence is
extended.
Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
3
The Superior Court in the alternative determined that the claim was waived because the Petitioner failed to preserve
it during the sentencing hearing or in a timely motion to reconsider sentence. Bailey, No. 1582 & 1583 WDA 2012, slip op.
at 7-9.
3
The Superior Court next turned to the claim the Petitioner raised in his pro se response. It denied
that claim as well, holding:
[The Petitioner] claims that while he was charged with criminal trespass graded as a
felony of the first degree, he pled guilty to the lesser charge of deviant trespass which is a
misdemeanor three. However, he maintains that nonetheless he was sentenced on
criminal trespass as a felony one. The sentencing transcript as well as [the Petitioner's]
official sentencing order refute this claim. [The Petitioner] was clearly sentenced
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)(i), entitled "Defiant Trespasser" which is a
subcategory of "Criminal Trespass" and is graded as a misdemeanor three, pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(2). Accordingly, [the Petitioner's] claim is devoid of merit.
Id. at 13.
The Petitioner next filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which was denied on February 26, 2014. The Petitioner's judgments of sentences became
final on or around May 27, 2014,4 upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. — , 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-56 (2012) (a
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such
review); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
On or around June 19, 2014, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition under Pennsylvania's
Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 9541 et seq. The PCRA court
appointed William J. Hathaway, Esquire, to represent him. Hathaway subsequently filed a petition for
leave to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying "no-merit" letter pursuant to Commonwealth v.
4
In their answer, the Respondents contend, inter alia, that the Petitioner's claims are untimely under the applicable
statute of limitations, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). That statute requires, with a few exceptions not applicable
here, that habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be filed within one year of the date the petitioner's judgment of
sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Respondents calculate the statute of limitations using the wrong
trigger date. They contend that the Petitioner's judgments of sentences became final on July 20, 2013. As set forth above,
however, his judgments of sentences became final or around May 27, 2014, and, therefore, the Respondents are wrong in
their assertion that the Petitioner's claims are untimely.
4
Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1988) in which he
explained that, in his professional judgment, the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for PCRA
relief.
In August 2014, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition and granted
Hathaway's motion for leave to withdraw, and then on September 5, 2014, it issued an order in which it
denied the Petitioner's PCRA petition. The Petitioner filed a pro se appeal with the Superior Court,
which was docketed at 1672 WDA 2014. However, on or around November 26, 2014, he filed a motion
for an application to withdraw the appeal, which the Superior Court granted on December 5, 2014.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed with this Court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus [ECF
No. 2] and brief in support [ECF No. 3].5 He filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Under § 2254, which is the federal
habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Petitioner raises numerous claims for relief. To summarize, he argues that both his trial
counsel and his direct appeal counsel were ineffective. He also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it sentenced him and imposed an excessive sentence, that the terms of his plea deal were
5
The Petitioner refiled his petition and brief at ECF Nos. 7 and 8, respectively. Those documents are identical in all
relevant respects to the petition and brief he previously filed with the Court as ECF Nos. 2 and 3.
5
breached, that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced, and that the trial court committed additional
errors.
The Respondents filed an answer [ECF No. 11] and certain state court records. The Petitioner did
not file a reply. LCvR2254(E)(2) ("the petitioner may file a Reply … within 30 days of the date the
respondent files its Answer.").
B.
Legal Analysis
The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of his claims.6 Some of his claims are not
cognizable in a federal habeas action because they raise purely state law issues and errors of state law
are not cognizable in under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). For
6
To the extent that the Petitioner contends that his PCRA counsel, Attorney Hathaway, was ineffective, that claim is
denied. The Petitioner did not have a federal constitutional right to counsel during his PCRA proceeding, Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), and, for that reason, cannot receive habeas relief on a claim that his PCRA counsel was
ineffective. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) ("[t]he ineffectiveness of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction
proceedings shall not be ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254."). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) ("There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings....
Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings."). Moreover, it
must be pointed that since Attorney Hathaway filed a Finley/Turner no merit letter and was permitted to withdraw as the
Petitioner's counsel, the Petitioner proceeded pro se in his PCRA appeal. He cannot blame Hathaway for the fact that his
PCRA litigation was unsuccessful, or that the Petitioner decided himself to voluntarily withdraw his appeal to the Superior
Court.
To the extent that the Petitioner complains of alleged errors made during the PCRA proceeding, those claims are not
cognizable because, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
The federal courts are authorized to provide collateral relief where a petitioner is in state custody or under a
federal sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255. Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to
evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction;
what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation.
Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Lambert v.
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[A]lleged errors in collateral proceedings are not a proper basis for habeas
relief from the original conviction.").
6
example, the Petitioner repeatedly argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence or otherwise
erred when it sentenced him, but sentencing is a matter of state criminal procedure that does not fall
within the purview of federal habeas review. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465
(1991); Jones v. Superintendent of Rahway State Prison, 725 F.2d 40, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, unless
an issue of constitutional dimension is implicated in a sentencing argument, see, e.g., 3 Charles A.
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim. § 550, Constitutional Limits on the Sentencing
Decision, available on WestlawNext (4th ed. last updated Apr. 2016), this Court is without power to
grant habeas relief. Because the Petitioner's challenge to the sentences the trial court imposed does not
raise an issue that implicates his federal constitutional rights, it must be denied because it is not
cognizable.
In addition, all of the Petitioner's claims aside from the two claims that were reviewed on direct
appeal by the Superior Court in its June 20, 2013, Memorandum, must be denied because the Petitioner
failed to exhaust them and, as a result, they are procedurally defaulted. A federal habeas court may not
grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless he has first presented his federal
constitutional claims to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The "exhaustion" requirement is
"grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to
address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731. See
also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-49 (1999).7 Importantly, in order to exhaust a claim,
7
The exhaustion doctrine became all the more important after the enactment of AEDPA, which, as discussed infra,
put into place highly deferential standards of review that a federal court must apply to a state court's adjudication of a
petitioner's federal constitutional claims and to its findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) & 2254(e). If the petitioner failed to
provide the state court with the opportunity to review his claim on the merits, he is not entitled to de novo review in his
federal habeas proceeding. Rather, for the reasons set forth below, the claim is unreviewable in federal court (unless he can
Footnote continued on next page
7
"state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S.
at 845 (emphasis added). In Pennsylvania, this requirement means that a petitioner in a non-capital case
must have presented every federal constitutional claim raised in his habeas petition to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania either on direct or PCRA appeal. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210,
233-34 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Petitioner carries the burden of proving he exhausted his state court remedies with respect to
his claims. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). He cannot meet that
burden with respect to any claim except for the two claims that the Superior Court reviewed in his direct
appeal and, as a result, all of his claims aside from those two claims are procedurally defaulted. Like the
exhaustion doctrine, the "procedural default" doctrine is "grounded in concerns of comity and
federalism," Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, and it provides that a federal habeas claim may not be addressed
by the federal court if the petitioner either: (a) failed to present it to the state court and the state court
would now decline to address it on the merits because state procedural rules bar such consideration; or
(b) failed to comply with a state procedural rule when he presented the claim to the state court, and for
that reason the state court declined to address the federal claim on the merits. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 851-56 (1999) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (describing the history of the procedural default doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977); Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 162-69 (3d Cir. 2000).
overcome his default) and, when there is no longer any available mechanism for the petitioner to exhaust the claim in state
court, it is procedurally defaulted.
8
A petitioner who has defaulted a federal habeas claim can overcome the default, thereby
allowing federal court review, if he can demonstrate "cause" for the default, i.e., that some objective
factor "external to the defense" impeded efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule, and "actual
prejudice." See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 494
(1986).8 An attorney's misconduct that is so severe that it fell below the constitutional standards of
effective assistance of counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) can
establish "cause," but before a petitioner may rely upon it he typically must have first exhausted that
claim of ineffective assistance with the state court. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
[W]e think that the exhaustion doctrine, which is "principally designed to protect the state
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial
proceedings," Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982), generally requires that a claim
of ineffective assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it
may be used to establish cause for a procedural default. . . . [I]f a petitioner could raise
his ineffective assistance claim for the first time on federal habeas in order to show cause
for a procedural default, the federal habeas court would find itself in the anomalous
position of adjudicating an unexhausted constitutional claim for which state court review
might still be available. The principle of comity that underlies the exhaustion doctrine
would be ill served by a rule that allowed a federal district court "to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,"
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950), and that holds true whether an ineffective
assistance claim is asserted as cause for a procedural default or denominated as an
independent ground for habeas relief.
8
A petitioner may also overcome a procedural default of a claim if he can demonstrate a "miscarriage of justice." This
means that a procedural default may be excused if the petitioner presents evidence of "actual innocence" that is "so strong
that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of
nonharmless constitutional error[.]" Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995). Where the petitioner pleaded guilty, he also
must establish his actual innocence not only of the count to which he pleaded guilty, but also the other charges the
government excused in the plea bargaining process. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998). The "miscarriage
of justice" exception only applies in extraordinary cases where the petitioner demonstrates that a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schulp, 513 U.S. at 316. There is no question that this is
not the type of extraordinary case in which the Petitioner can overcome the default of his claims by way of the miscarriage of
justice exception.
9
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89 (emphasis added, parallel citations omitted).
To the extent that the Petitioner relies on his direct appeal counsel's ineffectiveness9 for failing to
raise any claim, that allegation is rejected because he did not litigate claims of ineffective assistance of
direct appeal counsel to the Superior Court in his PCRA proceeding, where such claims must be
litigated. To the extent that the Petitioner blames Attorney Hathaway, his court-appointed PCRA
counsel, for failing to raise any claim, that argument likewise has no merit. In Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S.
— , 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court held that in states like Pennsylvania, where state law
requires that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be raised in an initial-review collateral
proceeding (such as the PCRA), a petitioner may be able to establish "cause" sufficient to overcome a
procedural default of "a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective [under the
standards of Strickland]." 132 S.Ct. at 1320.10 Martinez does not provide the Petitioner with an avenue
to establish "cause" for the default of any of his claims. Hathaway was charged with exercising his
professional judgment in deciding whether the Petitioner had any colorable claim for PCRA relief. He
also had an obligation under Rule 3.1 of Pennsylvania's Rules of Professional Conduct not to raise
frivolous claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1190-91 (Pa. 2011). But even
more importantly, Hathaway was permitted to withdraw as his PCRA attorney and, therefore, the failure
9
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant pursuing a first appeal as of right certain "minimum
safeguards necessary to make that appeal 'adequate and effective,'" Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392 (1985) (quoting
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)), including the right to the effective assistance of counsel, id. at 396.
10
The Supreme Court based its decision on what it determined to be an equitable right to seek relief from a procedural
default in a federal habeas matter. It did not hold that a petitioner has a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review
collateral proceedings such as the PCRA. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1313-21.
10
to litigate his claims in the appeal to the Superior Court when his case was on PCRA appeal is
attributable solely to the Petitioner since he was acting pro se.
Finally, for the reasons set forth above, the only claims that the Petitioner could possibly present
to this Court that are not procedurally defaulted are the two claims the Superior Court adjudicated in his
direct appeal. This Court has already explained that one of those claims – the one in which the Petitioner
contends that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed an excessive sentence – is not cognizable
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because it raises only a state law issue. That leaves the Petitioner's claim in
which he alleges that he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of deviant trespass, but the trial court
nonetheless sentenced him on criminal trespass. To the extent that that claim implicates the Petitioner's
federal constitutional rights, it is denied because the Superior Court adjudicated it on the merits and its
decision withstands the applicable standard of review, which was enacted by AEDPA and which with
provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"The test for § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause is whether the state court decision 'applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts
that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court but reaches a different
11
result.'" Rountree v. Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,
141 (2005), which cited Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537
U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)). Few adjudications by state courts fall within § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause.
Most state court's adjudications must be evaluated under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable
application" clause. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of federal law" if the state
court "identifies the correct governing legal principle," Williams, 429 U.S. at 413, but "'unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The Supreme Court advised:
It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's
contrary conclusion was unreasonable. See [Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75
(2003)].
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal
court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (discussing AEDPA's "modified res judicata rule" under § 2244). It
preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents.
It goes no farther…. As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a
state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Finally, the test for § 2254(d)(2)'s "unreasonable determination of facts" clause:
is whether the petitioner has demonstrated by "clear and convincing evidence,"
§ 2254(e)(1), that the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable in light of
the record. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-339 (2006) ("State-court factual
findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the
presumption by 'clear and convincing evidence.''') (quoting § 2254(e)(1)) (citing MillerEl v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005)); see also Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231
(3d Cir. 2009) ("Under the § 2254 standard, a district court is bound to presume that the
12
state court's factual findings are correct, with the burden on the petitioner to rebut those
findings by clear and convincing evidence."). Importantly, the evidence against which a
federal court measures the reasonableness of the state court's factual findings is the record
evidence at the time of the state court's adjudication. Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. — [ ],
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401-03 (2011).
Rountree, 640 F.3d at 537-38 (parallel citations omitted).
The Court cannot conclude that the Superior Court's decision to deny the claim at issue was
"contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States" or that it was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Because
the Petitioner has not overcome AEDPA's standard of review, this claim must also be denied.
C.
Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate
review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. As codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, it provides
that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right." "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability]
should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, "[t]he
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. Applying those standards here, jurists of reason would not
13
find it debatable whether each of the Petitioner's claims should be denied. Accordingly, a certificate of
appealability is denied.
II.
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and a certificate
of appealability is denied on all claims.
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: November 2, 2016
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL A. BAILEY,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
)
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, )
et al., )
Respondents.
)
Civil Action No. 14-267 Erie
Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of November, 2016, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and a certificate of appealability is DENIED as to all claims. The
Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED.
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. mail the Petitioner at his address of record11
11
At the beginning of this litigation, the Court issued an order [ECF No. 5] in which it advised the Petitioner that he is
under a continuing obligation to notify the Court of any change of address.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?