JONES v. YOLINSKI

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 15 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by LARRY JONES, 24 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by YOLINSKI. Order to follow. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 3/24/16. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LARRY JONES,
Plaintiff,

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v.
SGT. YOLINSKI,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-99Erie

Magistrate Judge Baxter

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
M.J. Susan Paradise Baxter

I.

Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action in this Court on April 9, 2015. The sole Defendant

named in this action is Sgt. Yolinski, an employee of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in Administrative Custody for 192 days at SCI
Forest in retaliation for a lawsuit he had filed against Defendant Yolinski many years before.
Plaintiff brings both a retaliation claim and a due process claim against Yolinski.
Presently pending before this Court are cross motions for summary judgment. ECF No.
15; ECF No. 24. These motions are fully briefed and are ripe for disposition by this Court.

II. Standards of Review
A. Pro Se Litigants

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily
consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including
the entry of a final judgment.
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Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If
the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail,
it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor
syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read
“with a measure of tolerance”); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992);
Freeman v. Dep’t of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading
rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a
complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g.,
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard);
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a
pro se litigant, this Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.

B. Motion for summary judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted
if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary
judgment against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, the court
must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all

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reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009).
There is no genuine issue for trial only when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. History
In 2004, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against seven named defendants who were all employed
by the Department of Corrections at the SCI Pittsburgh. Defendant Yolinski was named as a
defendant in that action. See C.A. No. 04-1413Pitts.
In March of 2014, Plaintiff transferred into SCI Forest from another state institution.
Shortly after becoming aware that Plaintiff was transferring into SCI Forest, Defendant Yolinski,
who was now working at SCI Forest, submitted an “Incident Report” informing the institution of
alleged threats that Plaintiff had previously made against him at SCI Pittsburgh. The Incident
Report explains that Yolinski believed there was a Separation Order on file with the Department
of Corrections between him and Plaintiff arising out of an incident (upon which the 2004 lawsuit
was at least partially based) that occurred at SCI Pittsburgh. Yolinski’s Incident Report indicates
that he has no bad feelings toward Plaintiff, but he believed there was a Separation Order in
place.
On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff was removed from general population and placed in
Administrative Custody per a DC-141 Other Report (numbered B051952) that stated Plaintiff
was being separated from staff pending an administrative transfer to another prison. ECF No. 274. Defendant did not draft this report nor did he sign it.

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On May 29, 2014, the Program Review Committee conducted an administrative review
and it was determined that Plaintiff would remain housed in Administrative Custody pending a
transfer to a new institution due to the separation from Defendant Yolinski. The Committee
consisted of prison staff Oberlander, Cole, Horton, and Mongelluzzo. ECF No. 27-5.
On August 22, 2014, a Program Review Committee conducted a 90-day review of
Plaintiff’s situation. The PRC determined that Plaintiff would remain on Administrative Custody
pending the transfer. This Committee consisted of prison staff Oberlander, Horton, Ennis, and
Sheesley. ECF No. 27-6.
On November 13, 2014, another 90-day review was conducted by a Program Review
Committee and it was once again decided that Plaintiff would remain in Administrative Custody.
This Committee was made up of Cole, Horton, and Ennis. ECF No. 27-7.
On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff was released from Administrative Custody to general
population, having never been transferred.

IV. Personal Involvement
In order for an individual defendant to be found liable in a civil rights action, the
individual “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353
(3d Cir. 2005). See also Rizzo v. Goode, 42 U.S. 362 (1976); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Thomas v. Independence Twp.,
463 F.3d 285, 298 (3d Cir. 2006) quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

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The record before this Court reflects that Defendant Yolinski’s involvement is very
limited. Yolinski’s sole act was to submit the Incident Report informing the institution of his
prior history with Plaintiff, as well as his belief that a Separation Order was in place. The record
evidence demonstrates that Yolinski did not issue the DC-141 Other Report that placed Plaintiff
in Administrative Custody pending a transfer and he did not participate in any of the PRC
reviews. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to support Yolinski’s personal involvement in
his placement in Administrative Custody, as he must in order to survive summary judgment.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

An appropriate Order follows.

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