REIHNER et al v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA et al

Filing 41

ORDER. For the reasons stated in the Memorandum filed herewith, IT IS ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss filed by each of the Defendants (Docs. 6 , 27 , 30 ) are GRANTED. The clerk is directed to mark this case CLOSED. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 11/4/15. (jwr) ***Staff Note: A copy of this memorandum and order was mailed to the Plaintiffs at their addresses of record via First Class US Mail.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM REIHNER, JENNIFER REIHNER,
CAMERON REIHNER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 15-143
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs filed this pro se Section 1983 action alleging that Plaintiff Cameron Reihner’s
constitutional rights were violated during the course of a criminal investigation that took place in
Washington County, Pennsylvania. The Complaint was signed by Cameron’s parents, William
and Jennifer Reihner, but not by Cameron. (See Doc. 4). Since non-lawyers – such as William
and Jennifer – cannot represent another pro se party in a federal lawsuit, see, e.g., Osei-Afriye v.
The Medical Coll. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991), the Court ordered the Plaintiffs
to show cause as to why Cameron should not be dismissed from this action for failure to sign the
Complaint. (Doc. 35).
Plaintiffs filed a response to the Court’s show cause order on October 13, 2015. (Doc.
36). In their response, William and Jennifer explain that Cameron is currently incarcerated and
that the prison has made it difficult for them to visit Cameron or send him mail. (Doc. 36 at 2).
They request leniency in light of their pro se status and seek permission to correct any mistakes
that might occur, such as the missing signature. (Id. at 5). However, despite having been placed

on notice by the Court as to the signature deficiency, they failed to supplement the record with a
copy of the Complaint bearing Cameron’s signature.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[e]very pleading, written
motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name
– or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). “The court must
strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the . . .
party’s attention.” Id. Based on this requirement, courts have routinely dismissed pro se
pleadings that are not signed by each plaintiff. See, e.g., Hurt v. United States, 2014 WL
184238, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2014) (“[T]he Court notes that plaintiff lists both himself and
the Black Panther Party as plaintiffs in this matter. However, the complaint is signed only by
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Hunt is not a lawyer and may not represent other plaintiffs in this matter.”);
Keyway Leasing Trust v. United States, 1999 WL 810386, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 1999)
(“Pleadings not signed on behalf of a party or licensed attorney are . . . subject to dismissal.”);
Lawton v. Medevac Mid-America, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 586, 588 (D. Kan. 1991) (dismissing two pro
se plaintiffs because they had failed to satisfy the Rule 11 signature requirement and the
remaining plaintiff was not an attorney). Consistent with Rule 11 and the foregoing authority,
the Court will dismiss Cameron Reihner from this action and construe the Complaint as having
been brought solely by William and Jennifer Reihner.
A review of the Complaint reveals nothing to suggest that William and Jennifer’s own
constitutional rights have been violated. Their only averment is that they “have suffered
financially, which has led to emotional distress, martial [sic] problems, health issues, sleep
deprivation, and depression . . .” (Doc. 4 ¶ 29). Such claims are not cognizable under Section
1983. See, e.g., Louder v. Lower Saucon Tp., 2015 WL 1954078, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 29,

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2015) (noting that derivative claims such as loss of consortium or emotional distress caused by
injury to another are not cognizable under Section 1983, which “permits suit for the abridgement
only of one’s own constitutional rights”); Kelly v. Jones, 2015 WL 1759213, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
April 17, 2015) (same).
Where a civil rights complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must
ordinarily permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir.
2007). In the instant case, amendment would be futile. Despite having been put on notice
concerning the Rule 11 requirements, Plaintiffs have failed to produce a complaint bearing
Cameron’s signature and have suggested in their papers that they are unable to do so because of
Cameron’s incarceration. Even if they could produce a signature from Cameron, the allegations
in the Complaint clearly demonstrate that each of the Defendants is entitled to dismissal with
prejudice. Plaintiffs’ claims against Judge John DiSalle are barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See Thornton v. Hens-Greco, -- F. App’x --,
2015 WL 6437479, at *2 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he state courts and its employees and judges in
their official capacities are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because they are
part of the judicial branch of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (noting that a judge is entitled to immunity in civil actions even where “the
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . .”).
Plaintiffs’ claims against Assistant District Attorney Michael Fagella in his individual capacity
are barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976). With respect to Washington County, the Washington County District Attorney’s
Office, and Assistant District Attorney Fagella (in his official capacity), Plaintiffs have failed to

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indicate that any of the alleged violations stemmed from an official custom or policy, as is
required to establish a Section 1983 claim against a municipality. See Berg v. City of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000).

The remaining Defendants – Attorney Pete Marcoline and

the Blackwell law firm are not state actors. See Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir.
1980). 1 Each of these barriers is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims.
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss filed by each of the Defendants (Docs.
6, 27, 30) are GRANTED. The clerk is directed to mark this case CLOSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 4, 2015

s/ Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All counsel of record
cc (via First Class US Mail):
WILLIAM REIHNER
741 EAST 13TH STREET
ERIE, PA 16503
JENNIFER REIHNER
741 EAST 13TH STREET
ERIE, PA 16503

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To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that Attorney Marcoline entered into a civil conspiracy with various state actors
to deprive Cameron of his constitutional rights, they have failed to support this allegation with any particularized
factual averments. See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 366 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Only allegations of conspiracy
which are particularized, such as those addressing the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and
certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose, will be deemed sufficient.”).

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CAMERON REIHNER
741 EAST 13TH STREET
ERIE, PA 16503

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