LAWSON v. BIGGINS

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION that Defendant's motion for summary judgment 19 will be granted, and Plaintiff's counter-motion for summary judgment 25 will be denied. An appropriate Order to follow. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 3/9/17. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TYREE LAWSON,
Plaintiff
v
DOCTOR BIGGINS,
Defendant

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C.A. No. 15-178 Erie
Magistrate Judge Baxter

OPINION AND ORDER1
United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Relevant Procedural History

On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff Tyree Lawson, an inmate incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Forest"), filed this pro se
civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Doctor Biggins, a dentist at
SCI-Forest [ECF No. 3]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to provide medical treatment
for an abscess on the upper gum line of his mouth that "would erupt throughout the day causing a
yellowish-white liquid matter to discharge into his mouth and involuntarily swallowed." (ECF
No. 3, Complaint, at ¶ 6). As a result, Plaintiff claims that Defendant was deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs in violation of his rights under the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution. As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

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The parties have consented to having a United States Magistrate Judge exercise jurisdiction over this matter. [ECF
Nos.4, 14).

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Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on December 11, 2015, and the parties
completed discovery on March 31, 2016. On August 2, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment [ECF No. 19] arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment
claim as a matter of law. In response, Plaintiff has filed an "objection" to Defendant's motion and
a counter-motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 25], as well as a brief in opposition to
Defendant's motion and in support of Plaintiff's counter-motion [ECF No. 26]. This matter is
now ripe for consideration.
B.

Relevant Factual History2

On January 11, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant for a sick call, complaining that a
root canal he had done in 2004 was acting up. (ECF No. 21, Defendant's Concise Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶ 5). Defendant conducted an oral examination and took x-rays,
which revealed that the former root canal on "tooth #13" was failing "due to appearance of apical
abscess and a fistulous tract relieving that abscess." (Id. at ¶ 6). Defendant recommended
extraction of the tooth, but Plaintiff insisted that he wanted to keep it, so Defendant offered to
redo the root canal in an effort to resolve the abscess. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Plaintiff agreed to have the
root canal redone, and the procedure was performed on January 31, 2012. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 22).
On September 10, 2013, x-rays of Plaintiff's teeth were taken, which revealed that tooth
#13 had a small fistula remaining from the axillary canal laterally to the back of the root; thus, a

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The factual history set forth herein has been gleaned from Defendant's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts [ECF No. 21], to the extent Defendant's factual statements are admitted or unopposed by Plaintiff, and/or are
adequately supported by the medical evidence of record.

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curette of the area was recommended. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 29-30). On September 23, 2013, the small
fistula of tooth #13 was curetted and Plaintiff was advised by Defendant that if pain symptoms
persisted, extraction of the tooth was recommended. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34). Plaintiff had a follow-up
visit with Defendant on October 9, 2013, at which time the fistula was gone and was not
symptomatic. (Id. at ¶ 36).
On October 11, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a sick call request stating that he had been
suffering from irritating pain and a "puss [sic] bump which constantly drain[ed] into [his] mouth
from [his] upper left gum line…." (ECF No. 28-2 at p. 2). Plaintiff was seen by Defendant on
October 16, 2014, at which time Plaintiff reported "a bump above root canal had pus and now it
is gone." (ECF No. 21, at ¶ 38). Defendant ordered an x-ray of tooth #13 which showed good
resolution; tooth #13 was found asymptomatic and the fistulous tract was healed and did not
exist. (Id. at ¶¶ 39-40). Defendant advised Plaintiff that extraction of the tooth was the next
course of action if Plaintiff experienced problems in the future, and Plaintiff reiterated that he did
not want to lose the tooth. (Id. at ¶ 41). Although Plaintiff claims that he continued to experience
pain and symptoms from the abscess through March 2015, he never submitted another sick call
request for dental care after his appointment on October 16, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 46).
C.

Standards of Review
1.

Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary

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judgment against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment may be granted
when no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (19896). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of
evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. See also Andreoli
v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). When a non-moving party would have the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party has no burden to negate the opponent’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The moving party need not produce any evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 325. “Instead, … the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the
nonmoving party must provide facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid
summary judgment. Id. at 324. “Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be
opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere

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pleadings themselves.” Id. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001);
Garcia v. Kimmell, 2010 WL 2089639, at * 1 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (the non-moving party “must present more than just bare
assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.”).
In considering these evidentiary materials, “courts are required to view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment
motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). See also Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001) (when applying
this standard, the court must examine the factual record and make reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh
the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are
any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson., 477
U.S. at 248, 255 (“only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). In determining whether the dispute is genuine,
the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only
to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. The court may consider any evidence that would be
admissible at trial in deciding the merits of a motion for summary judgment. Horta v. Sullivan, 4
F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).

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2.

Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the
court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969) ("petition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read
'with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir.
1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a
complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997) (overruled on
other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d
Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make
inferences where it is appropriate.
II.

DISCUSSION
In the medical context, a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs

only when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "In order to establish a violation of [the] constitutional
right to adequate medical care, evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or
omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need." Rouse v. Plantier,

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182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need3 involves the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S at 104. Such indifference is manifested by an intentional
refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed
medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of
injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of
resultant pain and risk of permanent injury" White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir.
1990).
Mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment
claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
"Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of
prisoners." Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Any attempt to second-guess the propriety
or adequacy of a particular course of treatment is disavowed by courts since such determinations
remain a question of sound professional judgment. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979), quoting Bowring v. Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
Furthermore, deliberate indifference is generally not found when some level of medical care has
been offered to the inmate. Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)
("courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received
some level of medical care").
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A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County
Correction Institute Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

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Here, Plaintiff makes clear that his deliberate indifference claim rests solely upon
Defendant's alleged denial of treatment in response to Plaintiff's complaints in October 2014.
(ECF No. 26, Plaintiff's opposition brief, at pp. 1-2, 5). Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s dental
records show that Plaintiff was not denied treatment, nor were his complaints ignored by
Defendant, on and after October 16, 2014, as Plaintiff alleges. Rather, the dental records reflect
that Defendant examined Plaintiff on October 16, 2014, and took x-rays of tooth #13, which
revealed that the tooth was not symptomatic, and that the fistulous tract was healed and no longer
existed. (ECF No. 22-1, Plaintiff's dental records, at p. 21). In fact, Plaintiff indicated at such
time that the bump above his root canal was no longer evident (Id.), and later admitted that he
was not experiencing pain at the time he was seen by Defendant (ECF No. 22-1, Plaintiff's
Grievance #533411, at p. 2). Nonetheless, Plaintiff complains that he was refused antibiotics or
pain medication.
It is apparent from the foregoing that Plaintiff received prompt dental care in response to
his complaints in October 2014 and is simply disagreeing with Defendants’ medical judgment,
which is not actionable. White, 897 F.2d at 110 ("mere disagreements over medical judgment" do
not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation). Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations that he
continued to suffer from dental pain and drainage from the alleged abscess for approximately six
months after his appointment of October 16, 2014, are unsupported by the dental records. In fact,
the record establishes that Plaintiff never submitted another sick call request for dental care after
October 16, 2014. (ECF No. 22-1, Defendant's Declaration, at p. 15, ¶ 49; ECF No, 28-1,
Plaintiff's Declaration, at p. 5, ¶ 24). Plainly, Defendant could not have been deliberately

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indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs after October 16, 2014, since he was not made aware of
any further difficulties. Thus, Defendant is entitled to the entry of summary judgment in his favor
and against Plaintiff.
An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: March 9, 2017

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