PETOFF v. YEANEY

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that Plaintiffs request for preliminary injunctive relief 36 is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 10/18/16. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS PETOFF,
Plaintiff,

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v.
EDWARD YEANEY, et al,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-79ERIE

Magistrate Judge Baxter

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff, acting pro se1, initiated the instant action on April 11, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that
he was the victim of excessive force and he alleges that he received inadequate medical
treatment. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff raises three legal claims: violation of due process,
deliberate indifference, and retaliation. Since the filing of this action, Plaintiff has filed a
“Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s motion for Preliminary Injunction.” This brief is not
accompanied by a motion, but requests preliminary injunctive relief by way of an order from this

Pro se pleadings, however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the
court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read
“with a measure of tolerance”); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992);
Freeman v. Dep’t of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading
rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a
complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g.,
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard);
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a
pro se litigant, this Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
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Court directing Defendants to move him into general population at the Erie County Prison. ECF
No. 36.

B. The Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Preliminary or temporary injunctive relief is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is
not to be routinely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568
(Fed.Cir.1993); see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Company. Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 189
(3d Cir. 1990). The four factors that must be shown for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order are the same as those required to issue a preliminary injunction. Fink v. Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 646 F.Supp. 569, 570 (M.D.Pa. 1986).
In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court must consider whether
the party seeking the injunction has satisfied four factors: “1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; 2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; 3) granting relief will
not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) the public interest favors such
relief.” Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Miller
v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 65.
As a court sitting in equity, the district court must weigh the four factors, but it is not
incumbent on the movant to prevail on all four factors, only on the overall need for an injunction.
Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Intern., Inc., 69 Fed.App’x 550, 554 (3d Cir. 2003). A
sufficiently strong showing on either the likelihood of success or irreparable harm may justify an
injunction, even if a movant’s showing on the other two factors is lacking. Id. Because a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must show, at a minimum,
a likelihood of success on the merits and that they likely face irreparable harm in the absence of
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the injunction. See Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000); Hohe v.
Casey, 686 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). The burden of introducing evidence to support a
preliminary injunction is on the moving party with respect to the first two factors; however, the
same is not true of the second two factors. Neo Gen Screening, 69 Fed.App’x at 554.
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are
further underscored by statue. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to
enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and
is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or
the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
The statute further instructs that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity … in tailoring any preliminary relief.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(2).
Moreover, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at
preserving the status quo but … at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is
particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions
should be issued only sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, a
request for any form of mandatory prospective relief in the prison context “must always be
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viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is specially called for in dealing with the
complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520
(8th Cir. 1995).

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
It is Plaintiff’s burden to produce evidence to support a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim (Neo Gen Screening, 69 Fed.App’x at 554), and this he cannot do. Because
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is not related to the alleged constitutional violations of the
underlying complaint, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that there is any likelihood of success on the
merits. See Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (for preliminary injunctive
relief to be granted, there must be “a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“Devose’s motion is based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely
different from the claim raised and the relief requested in his inadequate medical treatment
lawsuit. Although these new assertions might support additional claims against the same prison
officials, they cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction in this lawsuit.”); Banks v.
Good, 2011 WL 2437061 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2011); Report and Recommendation adopted, 2011
WL 2418699 (W.D. Pa. June 14. 2011); Spencer v. Stapler, 2006 WL 2052704, at *9 (D.Ariz.
July 21, 2006) (“Plaintiff’s motion [for injunctive relief] concerns events that are unrelated to the
subject of his complaint and that concerns conduct of persons other than the defendants.
Plaintiff’s request will therefore be denied.”); Westbank Yellow Pages v. BRI, Inc., 96 WL
255912, at *1 (E.D. La. May 13, 1996) (“A preliminary injunction is not an appropriate vehicle
for trying to obtain relief that is not even sought in the underlying action.”).
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Furthermore, this Court is loath to interfere with the daily management decisions of
prison administrators regarding housing status and cellmate assignments as the federal courts are
not over-seers of the day-to-day operations of prisons. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006)
(prison officials should be afforded deference in the execution of policies that are needed to
maintain institutional security); Wolfe v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (prison officials
require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an
extraordinarily difficult undertaking.”).
Finally, granting this injunctive relief would effectively have the federal courts making
ad hoc, and individual, decisions concerning the treatment of a single prisoner, and could harm
both the Defendants and the public’s interest. In the prison context, the Defendants’ interest and
the public’s interest in penological order could be adversely affected if the court were to dictate
the treatment of a single inmate, one inmate out of hundreds in the system. Therefore,
consideration of “whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the
nonmoving party; and … whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,”
Gerardo v. Pellulo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994), also weigh heavily against Plaintiff in this
case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied. An
appropriate Order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS PETOFF,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD YEANEY, et al,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 16-79ERIE

Magistrate Judge Baxter

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2016;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief [at
ECF No. 36] is DENIED.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge

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