JACKSON v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ET AL

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM OPINION that 71 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by O'BRIEN, GILARA, MARTUCCI, HACHERL, CONSTANZO, HICKS, OBERLANDER, DICKEY, ROBINSON, HAGGERTY, MCNAUGHTON, CARTER, CLARK will be granted. An appropriate Order follows. Signed by Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 1/28/19. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RHONSHAWN JACKSON,
Plaintiff
v.
CAPTAIN CARTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 16-133 Erie
District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Rhonshawn Jackson, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Frackville”)1, initiated this civil rights action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 5, 2016, by filing a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended
complaint on May 18, 2016 [ECF No. 6], and this action was then transferred to this Court on
June 7, 2016. On August 29, 2016, this case was assigned to District Judge Kim R. Gibson as
presiding judge, and to the undersigned, as the referred Magistrate Judge.
On November 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint [ECF No. 26], which
is now the operative pleading in this case. Named as Defendants in the second amended
complaint are SCI-Forest corrections officers Carter, Hacherl, Haggerty, Dickey, McNaughton,
Constanzo, and Gilara; Mr. Oberlander, Deputy Facility Manager at SCI-Forest; SCI-Albion
corrections officers O’Brien, Martucci, Hicks, and Robinson; and SCI-Albion Superintendent
Clark.
1
At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion,
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Albion”), after having previously been incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at
Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Forest”).

On September 26, 2017, District Judge Gibson issued a Memorandum Order [ECF No.
40] adopting this Court’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 36] and dismissing a number
of Plaintiff’s claims. In addition, Defendants Martucci, Hicks, Robinson, and Clark were
terminated from this case. The only claims left in this case are: (1) conspiracy and First
Amendment claims against all remaining Defendants, based upon alleged retaliation against
Plaintiff for filing grievances; (2) Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Haggerty,
Gilara, and Carter, alleging that said Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff from violence at the
hands of other inmates; and (3) claims of harassment and interference with legal mail against all
remaining Defendants.
On September 14, 2018, the undersigned was sworn in as a United States District Judge,
and this action was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned, as presiding judge, on
September 17, 2018. Now pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment [ECF No. 71] asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to all claims remaining in this case. Plaintiff has since filed a brief in opposition to
Defendants’ motion [ECF No. 78]. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("PLRA") provides:
no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prisons, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
Id.2

2
It is not a plaintiff's burden to affirmatively plead exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) ("...failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate

2

The requirement that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies applies to all inmate
suits regarding prison life, including those that involve general circumstances as well as
particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347
(3d Cir. 2002) (for history of exhaustion requirement). Administrative exhaustion must be
completed prior to the filing of an action. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all the available
remedies. Grimsley v. Rodriquez, 113 F.3d 1246 (Table), 1997 WL 2356136 (Unpublished
Opinion) (10th Cir. May 8, 1997).3 The exhaustion requirement is not a technicality, rather it is
federal law which federal district courts are required to follow. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73
(3d Cir. 2000) (by using language "no action shall be brought," Congress has "clearly required
exhaustion").4
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that “[t]here is no
question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA.” Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
1850, 1856 (2016), quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006), accord Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 211 (2007). “And that mandatory language means a court may not excuse a failure to
exhaust, even to take [] [special] circumstances into account.” Ross at 1856.

exhaustion in their complaints"). Instead, the failure to exhaust must be asserted and proven by the defendants. Ray
v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
3
Importantly, a plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not deprive the district court of subject
matter jurisdiction. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) ("...[W]e agree with the clear majority of
courts that §1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that failure to comply with the section would deprive
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.").
4
There is no "futility" exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement. Banks v. Roberts, 251 Fed. Appx. 774,
776 (3d Cir. 2007) citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71 ("[Plaintiff's] argument fails under this Court's bright line rule that
'completely precludes a futility exception to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement.'"). See also Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Indeed, as we held in Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies
even where the relief sought-monetary damages-cannot be granted by the administrative process.").

3

Because the PLRA is a statutory exhaustion provision, “Congress sets the rules – and
courts have a role in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to. For that reason,
mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes,
foreclosing judicial discretion.” Id. at 1857. Accordingly, exhaustion is required regardless of the
availability of the requested relief, and regardless of the nature of the underlying claim, whether
it arises from excessive force, or a violation of the constitution. Id., citing Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 741 (2001); Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91. Additionally,
exhaustion must be “proper,” which “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other
critical procedural rules.” Woodford, at 90. This serves to protect “administrative agency
authority” over the matter, giving an agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes …
before it is haled into federal court,” and “discourages ‘disregard of [the agency’s] procedures.”
Id. at 89, quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145.
1.

The Administrative Process Available to State Inmates

So then, no analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the
administrative process available to state inmates. "Compliance with prison grievance procedures,
therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.' The level of detail necessary
in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and
claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries
of proper exhaustion." Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.
The DC-ADM 804 grievance system, available to state prisoners, consists of three
separate stages. First, the prisoner is required to timely submit a written grievance for review by
the facility manager or the regional grievance coordinator within fifteen days of the incident,
who responds in writing within ten business days. Second, the inmate must timely submit a

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written appeal to intermediate review within ten working days, and again the inmate receives a
written response within ten working days. Finally, the inmate must submit a timely appeal to the
Central Office Review Committee within fifteen working days, and the inmate will receive a
final determination in writing within thirty days. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2
(3d Cir. 1997), aff'd. 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
2.

Analysis

In support of their argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to
all claims against them, Defendants have submitted the Declaration of Michael Bell (“Bell
Declaration”), Grievance Officer in the DOC Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals (“SOIGA”), who declares the following, in pertinent part:
11.

I reviewed the grievance appeal records of inmate Rhonshawn
Jackson, Inmate Number GW-4530.
*

*

*

14.

My review of the Grievance History shows that Grievance Number
572199 was the only grievance Inmate Jackson followed to Final
Review.

15.

In Grievance Number 572199, Inmate Jackson alleged that his
assigned cell was subject to random searches on June 14, 2015 or
June 15, 2015. Inmate Jackson alleged this was a violation of 6.3.1
Facility Security Manual and the Department Code of Ethics. He
also alleged he was the subject of harassment or evil motive and
intent. No particular person is expressly named in this Grievance
and the only relief demanded in this Grievance is that a fill
investigation be done on what Inmate Jackson labels the “2nd
random cell search.”

16.

In the Initial Review Response, Lieut. Dickey denied the
Grievance noting that Jackson was the subject of a random cell
search on June 14, 2015…. The Grievance Officer found no
evidence to support any wrongdoing on the part of the staff and,
therefore, the Grievance was denied and deemed frivolous.

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17.

Inmate Jackson appealed the Initial Review in a timely manner,
alleging “Officer Dickey’s report is inaccurate.” Apart from a
reference to “Officer Dickey,” no other staff member or individual
is identified in the appeal....

18.

In the Facility Manager’s appeal response, Superintendent
Overmyer found no violations of DC ADM 804 occurred ….

19.

Thereafter, Inmate Jackson filed an Appeal to Final Review,
demanding a thorough investigation be done into the cell searches
because the decisions of Lt. Dickey and Superintendent Overmyer
purportedly were inaccurate and incomplete.

20.

In the Final Appeal Decision, Chief Grievance Officer, Dorina
Varner, upheld the denial of the grievance and found the searches
to which Inmate Jackson was subjected were proper.…

21.

Grievance 572199 was the only Grievance [SOIGA] received from
Inmate Jackson relative to the pending action.

(ECF No. 75-5, Declaration of Michael Bell, at ¶¶ 11, 14-21).
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff does not deny the accuracy of the grievance record, as
summarized in the Bell Declaration, nor does he argue that he did, in fact, exhaust his
administrative remedies with regard to any of the grievances underlying the claims in this case.
Instead, he argues that “none of the grievance responses … pertaining to the grievances filed by
plaintiff concerning the issues in his complaint are in accordance with the defendants own policy
due to these responses not having the Grievance Coordinator’s initials and date on them … per
the defendants own DC-ADM 804 policy.” (ECF No. 78, at p. 4). In other words, Plaintiff is
essentially arguing that Defendants grievance responses were procedurally defective
and, thus, “obstructed” Plaintiff’s ability to exhaust his administrative remedies. To illustrate his
point, Plaintiff references Defendant Dickey’s responses to Grievance Nos. 572199 [ECF No.
80-13], 574517 [ECF No. 80-43], and 576291 [ECF No. 80-50].
The Third Circuit has recognized a "reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an

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inmate's] failure to exhaust as the [PLRA] requires." Davis v. Warman, 49 Fed. Appx. 365, 368
(3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust will only be excused "under certain limited
circumstances," Harris v. Armstrong, 149 Fed. Appx. 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005), and an inmate can
defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by showing "he was misled or that there was some
extraordinary reason he was prevented from complying with the statutory mandate." Davis, 49
Fed. Appx. at 368. This he has failed to do. Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct in asserting
that Defendant Dickey’s initial review responses as to the referenced grievances were not
approved in accordance with DOC policy, it is apparent from the record that this alleged
procedural defect did not, in any way, hinder or obstruct Plaintiff from filing timely appeals from
the first two of these grievances (See ECF No. 75-7 at pp. 3-4 and ECF No. 74-8 at pp. 5-6,
respectively), while Plaintiff had no reason to file an appeal from the third, as it was upheld (See
ECF No. 80-50). Moreover, the type of procedural defects highlighted by Plaintiff are not of the
type that would have misled Plaintiff or prevented him from complying with the exhaustion
requirements. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.
As to the only grievance that was appealed to final review, Grievance No. 572199, it is
apparent that Plaintiff failed to identify any of the Defendants in this case as to the underlying
claim of retaliation and conspiracy.5 The Third Circuit Court has consistently recognized that “a
Pennsylvania inmate’s failure to properly identify a defendant constitute[s] a failure to properly
exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA.” Williams v. Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corrections, 146 Fed. Appx. 554, 557 (3d Cir. 2005), citing Spruill, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.
2004). See also Rosa-Diaz v. Dow, 683 Fed. Appx. 103, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding lack of

5
Although Plaintiff did identify Defendant Dickey in his appeals to the Superintendent and to final review, it is
apparent that Defendant Dickey was not involved in the underlying claim of retaliation and conspiracy, but was only
implicated in the context of his Initial Review Response.

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exhaustion and procedural default where inmate failed to name particular defendant in
grievance).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with regard to any of his remaining claims in this case, and summary judgment will be
entered in favor of Defendants, accordingly.
An appropriate Order follows.

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