ALI v. COLVIN

Filing 13

OPINION and ORDER granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is further ordered that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 8/15/17. (sps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AZHAR HAMMOODI ALI,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:16-216

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
and
ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and
11]. Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. [ECF Nos. 10 and 12]. After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below,
Plaintiff=s Motion [ECF No. 9] is granted and Defendant’s Motion [ECF No. 11] is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff applied for SSI on or about
August 7, 2013. [ECF No. 7-5, Ex. 1D].

In her application, she alleged that she was disabled

1

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

1

due to colon issues, female problems, migraines, and heart issues, and that she had been unable
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

to work since January 25, 2013. [ECF No. 7-6, Ex. 2E].

Wayne Stanley held a hearing on June 23, 2015, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel.
[ECF No. 7-2, at 26-51]. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and testified on her own behalf, with
the aid of an interpreter. Id. A vocational expert also was present at the hearing and testified.
Id. at 45-51. In a decision dated July 31, 2015, the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and, therefore, that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. Id. at 10-21. On, July 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review. Id. at 1-3. Having exhausted all of her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed
this action.
The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. [ECF Nos. 9 and 11].
The issues are now ripe for my review.
II.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Determining
whether substantial evidence exists is “not merely a quantitative exercise.” Gilliland v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A
single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the secretary ignores, or fails to
resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.

Nor is evidence substantial if it is

overwhelmed by other evidence – particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by
2

treating physicians).”

Id.

The Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.
1979). A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or
re-weigh the evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those
findings, even if the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

The ALJ must

determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that she is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
3

Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record, may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

RFC- Migraine Headaches

At step two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments, including
headaches, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. [ECF No. 7-2, at 12]. He
further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work,
except she was limited to jobs with little independent decision making, no work with the public,
occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers, and only simple tasks, decisions, and
instructions. Id. at 15-19.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff’s headaches were “severe,”
but then failing to cite any limitations stemming from her headaches in his RFC analysis. [ECF
No. 10, at 9-13]. Plaintiff also complains that, in so doing, the ALJ inappropriately gave great
weight to the non-examining state agency physician, Dr. Nghia Van Tran, while “distorting” and/or
“ignoring” the records of Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, Dr. Erica Grazioli. Id. After careful
review of the record, including the documentary evidence, the ALJ’s opinion, and the hearing
testimony, I agree that remand is necessary on this issue.
An ALJ must base his RFC assessment on all of the relevant evidence of record. 20
C.F.R. § 416.945(a). In his opinion, the ALJ must provide sufficient explanation of his final
determination to provide the reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the
ultimate disability finding. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). That is, the ALJ’s
4

decision must allow the court to determine whether any rejection of potentially pertinent, relevant
evidence was proper. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2008); see
also Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001) (the ALJ’s decision should allow the
reviewing court the ability to determine if “significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored”).
In determining whether a claimant’s complaints of migraine-related symptoms are
credible, courts look at a number of factors, including: whether the claimant has been diagnosed
with migraines; whether the claimant has received treatment and medication; the length of the
history of complaints and treatment related to migraines; the migraines’ alleged severity and
frequency; the symptoms the claimant alleges the migraines cause; and whether the record
contains any statements from doctors questioning the alleged frequency or severity. Grimes v.
Berryhill, Civil Action No. 15-1557, 2017 WL 746798, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2017) (citing
Kulbacki v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-297, 2016 WL 2609984, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2016)). With
respect to migraines, the “ALJ must be particularly diligent in making credibility determinations . .
. because laboratory tests cannot prove their existence.”

Thomas v. Colvin, No.

1:14-cv-00274-TFM, 2015 WL 4067147, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2015). Accordingly, “when
presented with documented allegations of symptoms consistent with the claimed disorder, it is not
appropriate for an ALJ to reject a claimant’s testimony solely based on an absence of objective
evidence.” Grimes, 2017 WL 746798, at *2.
Despite this admonition, the ALJ in this case repeatedly cited the lack of objective
evidence in discrediting Plaintiff’s migraine-related claims. For example, he stated that, although
Plaintiff “complained of daily headaches in November 2013, . . . there are no objective findings
during this period of any neurological problems.” [ECF No. 7-2, at 16]. Similarly, the ALJ
remarked that, in March 2014, the neurologist Plaintiff saw for headaches noted that she had no
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neurological findings, grossly normal memory, and was alert and cooperative with a normal affect.
Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 8F). The ALJ acknowledged that, in January 2015, neurologist records still
showed continued complaints of daily headaches, but the ALJ discounted those complaints
because “an examination revealed she appeared healthy and alert, had a normal affect, and had
a normal neurological examination with normal Romberg and tandem gait testing.”

Id.

Similarly, the ALJ downplayed Plaintiff’s report in March 2015 that her headaches had not
improved because “an examination again showed no neurological deficits.” Id. The ALJ also
gave great weight to non-examining state agency physician Nghia Van Tran, who concluded that
Plaintiff could perform a full range of light work, because, inter alia, her opinion was “consistent
with treating physician and neurologist notes, which fail to reveal physical examination findings
consistent with any significant physical limitations.” Id. at 18-19 (citing Exs. 1A, 7F, 8F, and 14F)
(emphasis added).2 The ALJ does not acknowledge any limitations stemming from Plaintiff’s
migraines, and none are evident in the RFC finding.
Moreover, the ALJ repeatedly made these references despite a record replete with
documentation of Plaintiff’s complaints of symptoms consistent with migraine headaches. In
addition to Plaintiff’s own testimony [ECF No. 7-2, at 34-42], the medical records reflect that
Plaintiff treated with a neurologist for her headaches from at least December 2013 and that she
was diagnosed with migraines at that time. [ECF No. 7-16, Ex. 14F]. The December 2013
Northshore Neurology records note that Plaintiff complained of having had headaches for about
2

To the extent the ALJ relies on Dr. Tran’s report in support of his headache analysis, his decision to afford
Dr. Tran’s opinion that Plaintiff was capable of a full range of light work “great weight” is troublesome for
other reasons as well. Although an ALJ may assign greater weight to a non-examining state agency
consultant than a treating physician in appropriate circumstances, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e), it is unclear
in this case whether Dr. Tran even considered Plaintiff’s headaches in reaching her conclusions. In
addition to the fact that Dr. Tran did not review any of the Northshore Neurology records documenting
Plaintiff’s treatment for migraines (because they largely post-dated her opinion), her report does not discuss
headaches or even mention them as one of Plaintiff’s identifiable impairments. See ECF No. 7-3 (Ex. 1A).
Rather, the only medically determinable physical impairments listed in the report are hypertension, gastritis
and duodenitis, and cardiac dysrhythmias. See id. at 55.

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five years and reported experiencing headaches with specific triggers such as not sleeping well or
feeling stressed on an irregular basis and lasting 1-2 days at a time. Id. at 584. Plaintiff
described her headaches as pressure and gradually building sharp pain with associated
phonophobia, sonophobia, nausea, blurred vision, and numbness. Id. She also stated she was
unable to sleep with the headaches. Id. Plaintiff treated with Northshore Neurology regularly
through the date of the hearing, during which time she continued to report frequent headaches
and associated symptoms. [ECF Nos. 7-12 (Ex. 8F), 7-16 (Ex. 14F)]. During this time period,
Plaintiff was prescribed various headache medications, including amitriptyline (Elavil) and
naproxen initially, and, later, Neurontin and Fioricet. Id. On March 11, 2015, Plaintiff’s last
appointment prior to her June 2015 hearing, she continued to report near-daily headaches that
had not improved at all since her last visit along with blurred vision and nausea. [ECF No. 7-12
(Ex. 8F)]. She stated that she did not think that the amitriptyline had helped much and that the
Neurontin had made the most difference. She said she thought she had tried Topamax in the
past, but that she experienced side effects even at a low dose. Id. Plaintiff’s doctor advised her
she could discontinue the amitriptyline, and he increased her dosage of Neurontin. Id. The
records from Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Roger Esper, D.O., and from her mental health
providers also reflect a history of migraines. [ECF Nos. 7-10 (Ex. 5F), 7-11 (Ex. 7F), 7-14 (Ex.
11F), 7-15 (Ex. 13F), 7-17 (Ex. 15F)]. There is no indication in the treatment records that
Plaintiff’s neurologist or any other treating physician ever questioned whether Plaintiff’s migraines
were as debilitating as she claimed them to be.
In short, Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical records both address the alleged history,
symptomology, severity, and frequency of the migraines as well as the medication and treatment
Plaintiff has been prescribed. To the extent the ALJ rejected this evidence solely based on an
absence of objective findings, such action was erroneous for the reasons set forth above. If the
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ALJ had additional grounds for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony and/or the medical records
regarding her headaches, he failed to explain those grounds adequately, and, consequently, I am
unable to review them here. This error is of particular concern here where the vocational expert
testified that there would be no jobs available in the economy for an individual who would miss
more than one day of work per month or need to take breaks at unscheduled times. [ECF No.
7-2, at 48]. For all of these reasons, remand is required on this issue.
C.

RFC - Mental Impairments
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her mental impairments in

formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. [ECF No. 10 at 13-20]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that ALJ failed
to assign appropriate weight to the opinions of her treating psychiatrist, Ethan Ittner, D.O.,
including a medical source statement he filled out for the Social Security Administration in
November 2013 indicating that Plaintiff had marked restrictions in her ability to: make judgments
on simple, work-related decisions; understand and remember complex instructions; carry out
complex instructions; and make judgments on complex work-related decisions. Id. (citing ECF
No. 7-10, Ex. 5F at 326-327). The ALJ gave greater weight to the December 5, 2013 opinion of
non-examining state agency psychologist Sandra Banks who found no more than moderate
limitations and opined, inter alia, that, although Plaintiff’s ability to understand and remember
complex or detailed instructions appeared limited, she could be expected to understand, carry
out, and remember simple, one and two-step instructions. [ECF No. 7-2, at 19 (citing Ex. 1A)].
Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
The amount of weight afforded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the
ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a

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non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1).3 In addition, the ALJ generally will give more
weight to opinions from a treating physician “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ
finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give
that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians' reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient's condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir.2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.1999)). However, “where ...
the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating,
non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician's assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927[(d)](2), the opinion of a treating
physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medical
evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 403 F. App'x 679, 686 (3d Cir. 2010). Although the ALJ
may choose who to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot reject evidence for no reason or
the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
3

Although the regulations governing the evaluation of medical evidence were recently amended, the
version effective March 27, 2017, does not apply to the present claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (2017); 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c (2017).

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Here, the ALJ here gave little weight to Dr. Ittner’s November 2013 Medical Source
Statement because, inter alia, it was inconsistent with psychiatric progress notes which showed
some disturbance with mood and affect but not to a disabling degree, and was unsupported by
mental status examinations which consistently indicated that Plaintiff’s memory, attention, and
concentration were within normal limits. [ECF No. 7-2, at 19 (citing Exs. 5F, 11F, 13F, and 16F)].
After careful review, I find that the exhibits that the ALJ cited are consistent with his conclusions in
this regard. See, e.g., ECF No. 7-10, Ex. 5F at 320, 324; ECF No. 7-14, Ex. 11F at 478-521; ECF
No. 7-17, Ex. 16F at 618-621. In light of the conflicting evidence, the ALJ acted well within his
authority when he chose to give greater weight to non-examining psychologist, Sandra Banks,
who examined the medical evidence of record as of November 2013 and found that Plaintiff had
no worse than moderate limitations related to her mental health impairments. See id. ECF No.
7-2 at 19 (citing Ex. 1A). The ALJ cited record evidence to support his evaluation of Dr. Banks’s
opinions, including progress notes showing that Plaintiff experienced improvement with
treatment, and mental status examinations showing problems with mood and affect, but normal
attention and concentration. See id. (citing Exs. 5F, 11F, 16F).4 The ALJ did not discount
Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms entirely and included restrictions in his RFC finding related to
Plaintiff’s credibly-established mental health impairments, including a limitation to jobs with little

4

Although Dr. Banks’s mental RFC assessment is contained in the same report as Dr. Tran’s physical RFC
determination, it does not suffer the same flaws. Most significantly, unlike Dr. Tran (who neither mentioned
Plaintiff’s headaches nor reviewed Plaintiff’s neurology records concerning headaches), Dr. Banks
reviewed the pertinent mental health records then available to her, including Dr. Ittner’s November 2013
medical source statement, which Dr. Banks specifically discussed and discounted in her opinion. See
ECF No. 7-3 (Ex. 1A), at 58-61; see also ECF No. 7-10, Ex. 5F at 311-327 (documenting that the 2013
Stairways Behavioral Health Records, including Dr. Ittner’s statement, were provided to the SSA prior to Dr.
Banks’s review).

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independent decision making, no work with the public, occasional contact with supervisors and
coworkers, and only simple tasks, decisions, and instructions. Id. at 15-16.5
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her Global Assessment of
Functioning (AGAF@) scores in evaluating the medical opinion evidence, that argument is without
merit. Pl.’s Br. [ECF No. 10] at 16-18. Plaintiff highlights that her mental health providers
consistently assigned her a GAF score of around 50 during the course of her treatment, indicating
serious symptoms. Id. at 17 (citing Exs. 11F, 13F, 15F). These GAF scores, however, are not
dispositive.

The GAF scale is used by clinicians to report an individual=s overall level of

functioning. See Cainglit v. Barnhart, 85 F. App=x 71, 74-75 (10th Cir. 2003).6 As courts have
explained, however, a particular GAF score does not necessarily correlate to one=s ability to work.
See, e.g., id. at 75; see also Hillman v. Barnhart, 48 F. App’x 26, 30 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2002) (GAF
score of 50 indicates ability to perform some substantial gainful activity). Moreover, the ALJ did
not ignore these GAF scores in his analysis. Rather, he acknowledged the scores and explained
his decision to assign them little weight. [ECF No. 7-2, at 19]. Among other things, the ALJ
noted that the GAF findings were inconsistent with the mental status examinations and Plaintiff’s

5

To the extent Plaintiff points to other evidence supporting her position that she has additional mental
limitations related to her headaches, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s
position but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen,
881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this support is misplaced.
6

A GAF of 21-30 indicates behavior that Ais considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR
serious impairment in communication or judgment . . . OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays
in bed all day, no job, home, or friends).@ See American Psychiatric Assoc. Diagnostic and Statistical
th
Manual of Mental Disorders (4 ed., Text Rev. 2000) (ADSM-IV-TR@). A GAF of 31-40 indicates Asome
impairment in reality testing or communication . . . OR major impairment in several areas such as work or
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.@ Id. A GAF of 41-50 denotes Aserious symptoms
(e.g., suicidal ideation . . . ) . . . OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.@
Id. A GAF from 51-60 indicates Amoderate symptoms . . . OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning.@ Id. A GAF from 61-70 reflects Asome mild symptoms . . . OR some difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning . . . , but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful
relationships.@ Id.

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mental health treatment history. [ECF No. 7-2, at 19]. For these reasons, the ALJ properly
refused to give significant weight to the GAF scores at issue.
In short, I find the ALJ appropriately weighed Dr. Banks’s and Dr. Ittner’s opinions and the
other evidence of record in evaluating Plaintiff’s mental health impairments and that he supported
his findings with substantial evidence. Accordingly, I find no error in this regard requiring remand
on this issue alone. In light of my ruling regarding Plaintiff’s headaches, however, the ALJ must
revisit this issue on remand. If the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s headaches (or any other
impairments) change, he must re-assess whether Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, in
combination, create disabling limitations.
III.

CONCLUSION

Under the Social Security regulations, a federal district court reviewing the decision of the
Commissioner denying benefits has three options.

It may affirm the decision, reverse the

decision and award benefits directly to a claimant, or remand the matter to the Commissioner for
further consideration. 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (sentence four). In light of an objective review of all
evidence contained in the record, I find that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ failed to adequately address Plaintiff’s headaches as set forth more
fully herein. The case therefore is remanded for further consideration in light of this Opinion.
For these and all of the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted to the
extent set forth herein, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
appropriate Order follows.

12

An

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AZHAR HAMMOODI ALI,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:16-216

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 15th day of August, 2017, after careful consideration of the submissions of
the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order, it is ordered that
Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 9] is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks remand for further consideration, and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for
further proceedings consistent with the Opinion attached hereto.

Defendant=s Motion for

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 11] is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. Senior District Judge
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, and is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).