COLLINS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 16

OPINION and ORDER denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 12/20/2017. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TESSA COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 16-225

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9 and
11). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 10, 12 and 15). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 9) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 11).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her applications for supplemental security income and child’s insurance
benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed her applications alleging disability
began on December 1, 2002. (ECF No. 7-5, pp. 2, 25). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
David F. Brash, held a hearing on December 15, 2014. (ECF No. 7-4, pp. 32-67). On April 15,
2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 11-26).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9 and 11). The
issues are now ripe for review.

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. §706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the

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impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 2

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in determining her RFC. (ECF No. 10, pp. 14-16). To
that end, Plaintiff first specifically argues that the ALJ erred in failing “to take into account that
plaintiff’s level of mental functioning is occurring in the context of a supported living
environment.” (ECF No. 10, p. 4). I disagree. The ALJ went through the entire record, including
medical and non-medical evidence, as well as, testimony from Plaintiff and her father
describing, in detail, Plaintiff’s ability to function and in what context. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 11-26).
Simply because the ALJ did not lay out the context in the way that Plaintiff prefers does not
mean that the ALJ did not adequately and properly consider the same. After a review of the
record, I find that ALJ properly considered the context of Plaintiff’s supported living environment.
Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
2 RFC

refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a).

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Additionally, Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred in failing to adequately explain the
weight given to the opinion evidence of Dr. Wright. (ECF No. 10, pp. 8-10). As Plaintiff points
out, the ALJ gave Dr. Wright’s opinion great weight. (ECF No. 7-2, p. 23). Plaintiff, however,
suggests that the ALJ did not adequately “explain why he did not adopt her opinion that Plaintiff
requires supervision for most tasks.” (ECF No. 10, p. 8).

Plaintiff, therefore, concludes that I

am unable to conduct a meaningful review. Id. at pp. 8-11. After a review of the record, I
disagree.
An ALJ must provide sufficient explanation of his or her final determination to provide a
reviewing court with the benefit of the factual basis underlying the ultimate disability finding.
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). To that end, an ALJ must set forth the
reasons for crediting or discrediting relevant or pertinent medical evidence. Burnett v. Comm’er
of SS, 220 F.3d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 2000). “Although the ALJ ‘may properly accept some parts
of the medical evidence and reject other parts ... (s)he must consider all of the evidence and
give some reason for discounting the evidence (s)he rejects.’” See Lanza v. Astrue, No. 08-301,
2009 WL 1147911, at *7 (W.D. Pa. April 28, 2009), quoting Colon v. Barnhart, 424 F.Supp.2d
805, 812 (E.D. Pa 2006). “’In the absence of such an indication, the reviewing court cannot tell
if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.’” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121122, quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). Without the same, a reviewing
court cannot make a proper determination of whether the ALJ’s decision is based on substantial
evidence. Id.
Here, the ALJ properly took into account Dr. Wright’s opinion and adequately explained
Dr. Wright’s note regarding supervision. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Wright “stated the
claimant needed supervision for most tasks, but concluded she had only mild difficulty
understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, and only moderate difficulty
making judgments on simple, work-related decision (Exhibit 7F).” (ECF No. 7-2, p. 17). The
ALJ then went on to give great weight to Dr. Wright’s opinion that Plaintiff had mild difficulty in

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understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, and moderate difficulty in
making judgments on simple, work-related decisions. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-24). Based on the
same, I find the ALJ provided the necessary explanation necessary for me to perform a proper
and meaningful review and I find no error in this regard. Consequently, I find no merit to this
argument.
Plaintiff next argues that because the ALJ found she has certain severe impairments
(specific learning disorder in math and specific learning disorder in reading), he was required to
make an accommodation for those impairments in her RFC.3 (ECF No. 10, pp. 11-14; No. 15,
p. 3).

I disagree.

“[S]uch a presumption would conflict with the regulatory scheme for

determining whether a claimant is disabled, under which the determination of whether a
claimant is severely impaired precedes a separate determination of whether the claimant,
despite his severe impairment, retains the [residual functional capacity] to perform substantial
gainful activity.” Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, just because an
impairment is found to be severe does not mean necessarily that it erodes a plaintiff’s RFC.
Franklin v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-02532-PAB, Civ No. 10-cv-2532, 2012 WL 1059995, at *3 (D.
Colo. Mar. 28, 2012) (“Simply because plaintiff established a ‘severe impairment’ which only
‘requires a de minimis showing of impairment,’ does not necessarily require that the ALJ
conclude that the impairment materially erodes plaintiff's RFC.”).

Therefore, I find no merit to

this argument.
Moreover, in this case, I find the ALJ discussed and thoroughly considered Plaintiff’s
learning disorders in math and reading. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 11-26). In fact, the RFC formulated
by the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions
and performing simple, routine tasks; she is limited to only occasional and superficial interaction
with coworkers and the public, but with no transactional interaction such as sales or negotiation;
3In

this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels with exceptions. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 19-24).

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and she is limited to a low-stress work environment, which means no production rate pace work,
but, rather, goal oriented work with only occasional and routine change in work setting.” (ECF
No. 7-2,p. 19). Thus, I find the ALJ properly reviewed the same and that the RFC is based on
substantial evidence. Therefore, remand on this basis is not warranted.
Plaintiff concludes by arguing that the ALJ did not adequately discharge his duty to
determine whether Plaintiff could perform the work of a hospital cleaner, dishwasher, or
housekeeping cleaner given her learning disorders in math and reading. (ECF No. 10, pp. 1416; No. 15, pp. 3-6). In other words, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to ask the
vocational expert hypothetical questions that accurately reflect Plaintiff’s impairments. Again,
after a review of the record, I disagree. An ALJ is required to accept only that testimony from
the vocational expert which accurately reflects a plaintiff’s impairments. See, Podedworny v.
Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987).
Based on my review of the record and analysis above, I find there is substantial evidence that
the ALJ’s hypothetical questions accurately reflected Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 7-2, pp.
15-25).

To be clear, the ALJ crafted the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert that

represented the RFC. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 63-64). Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion,
the vocational expert (“VE”) testified that she reviewed the exhibits in this file in preparation for
her testimony.

(ECF No. 7-2, p. 62). Additionally, I note that Plaintiff was represented by

counsel at the hearing and her counsel did not pose any further limiting hypothetical questions
to the VE or question the VE about the reading and/or math requirements of the stated
positions. Thus, I find no error in this regard. Consequently, remand is not warranted on this
basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.

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IN IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TESSA COLLINS,

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Plaintiff,
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,4
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-225

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 20th day of December, 2017, it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9) is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 11) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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Nancy A. Berryhill became acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017, replacing
Carolyn W. Colvin.

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