BAXTER v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON
MEMORANDUM OPINION that 29 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by ERIE COUNTY PRISON will be granted. An appropriate Order to follow. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 7/19/17. (lrw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES W. BAXTER,
ERIE COUNTY PRISON,
Civil Action No. 17-16 Erie
Magistrate Judge Baxter
United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
Relevant Procedural History
On January 20, 2017, Plaintiff Charles Baxter, an inmate at the Erie County Prison in
Erie, Pennsylvania ("ECP"), brought this pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against Defendant ECP. Plaintiff alleges that on September 3, 2016, he slipped and fell while
climbing onto the top bunk that was assigned to him, injuring his left shoulder. Plaintiff alleges
further that he reported his injury to medical staff, but has since been threatened by two officers
on his cell block, which has prevented him from obtaining medical care. Thus, Plaintiff claims a
violation of his rights under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.
On April 12, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss [ECF No. 29], arguing, inter alia,
that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff has since filed a response to
Defendant's motion essentially restating the allegations of his complaint. [ECF No. 33]. This
matter is now ripe for consideration.
The parties have consented to having a United States Magistrate Judge exercise jurisdiction over this matter. [ECF
Nos. 5, 19].
Standards of Review
Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
A court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the
facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394
F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d
Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also
McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”). A plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE § 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States
Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) does “not require heightened pleading of specifics, [the Court
does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is “required to make a ‘showing’
rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.” Smith v. Sullivan, No. 07-528, 2008
WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 19, 2008) quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
231 (3d Cir. 2008). “This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but
instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of’ the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556
The Third Circuit has expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases. To determine the
sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the court must follow three steps:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’ Second the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.’
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
“The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to
resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG,
197 F. Supp. 2d 42, 53 (D. Del. 2002) citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.
1993). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, or when the factual content does not allow the court “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The question is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the end. Rather, the question
“is whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims.” Swope v.
City of Pittsburgh, 90 F. Supp. 3d 400, 405 (W.D. Pa. 2014) citing Oatway v. Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2003).
Motion for Summary Judgment2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted
if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary
judgment against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment may be granted
when no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of
evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330; see also Andreoli
v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391
F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). When a non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial,
Although ECP did not move for summary judgment, its request that Baxter’s action be dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies will be considered under the summary-judgment standard because ECP submitted
an affidavit supporting its failure-to-exhaust argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) .
. . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
the moving party has no burden to negate the opponent’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The
moving party need not produce any evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Id. at 325. “Instead, . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—
that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Id. After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the
nonmoving party must provide facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid
summary judgment. Id. at 324. “Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be
opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere
pleadings themselves.” Id.; see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001);
Garcia v. Kimmell, 381 F. App’x 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (the non-moving party “must present more than just bare
assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.”)
(internal citation omitted).
In considering these evidentiary materials, “courts are required to view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment
motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted); see also Doe v. Cty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001) (when applying
this standard, the court must examine the factual record and make reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh
the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are
any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 255 (“only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). In determining whether the dispute is genuine,
the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only
to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. The court may consider any evidence that would be
admissible at trial in deciding the merits of a motion for summary judgment. Horta v. Sullivan,
4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
Pro se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). If the
court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read
“with measure of tolerance”). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all
allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir.
2001); see e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this court may consider facts and make inferences when
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The requirement that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies applies to all inmate
suits regarding prison life, including those that involve general circumstances as well as
particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347
(3d Cir. 2002) (for history of exhaustion requirement). Administrative exhaustion must be
completed by a prisoner prior to filing an action regardless of the relief sought. Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).3 The exhaustion requirement is not a technicality, rather it is
federal law that federal district courts must follow. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.
2000) (by using language “no action shall be brought,” Congress has “clearly required
exhaustion”).4 The PLRA also requires “proper exhaustion” meaning that a prisoner must
complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules of
that grievance system. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 87–91 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .”).
Importantly, the exhaustion requirement may not be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise
procedurally defective . . . appeal.” Id. at 83; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228–30 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“Based on our earlier discussion of the PLRA's legislative history, [. . .] Congress
Importantly, a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not deprive the district court of subject
matter jurisdiction. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (“ . . . [W]e agree with the clear majority of
courts that § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that failure to comply with the section would deprive
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
There is no futility exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement. Banks v. Roberts, 251 F. App’x 774, 776
(3d Cir. 2007) citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71 (“[Plaintiff’s] argument fails under this Court’s bright line rule that
‘completely precludes a futility exception to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement.’”); see also Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“Indeed, as we held in Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies
even where the relief sought—monetary damages—cannot be granted by the administrative process.”).
seems to have had three interrelated objectives relevant to our inquiry here: (1) to return control
of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to encourage development of an
administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the inmate grievance process; and (3) to
reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.”).
The Administrative Process Available to ECP Inmates
Determining whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies should not occur
without first outlining the administrative process available at ECP. ECP inmates should first
verbally attempt to resolve grievances through housing unit staff. (ECF No. 29-1, Affidavit of
Deputy Warden Gary Seymour, at ¶ 12). If verbal attempts fail, inmates may file a written
grievance “within fifteen . . . days after” the event the prisoner complains of. (Id.) (emphasis
removed). A written grievance “should be filed with the inmate’s counselor first on a form
provided for that purpose.” (Id.).
Prison officials will make an initial decision on a written grievance “within 20 days after”
its filing. (Id. at ¶ 14). If unsatisfied with the decision “by the Deputy Warden . . . he or she may
appeal within five . . . working days to the Warden who will attempt to resolve the matter or
assign a staff member to do so.” (Id. at ¶ 15) (emphasis removed). The Warden will decide the
appeal and “reply to the inmate within ten . . . working days. The Warden’s decision will be
final.” (Id.) (emphasis removed).
In support of its argument that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
Defendant has submitted the Affidavit of Deputy Warden Gary Seymour [ECF No. 29-1], who
declares, in pertinent part:
I have reviewed the prison records of [Plaintiff] with respect to his
commitment at the Erie County Prison beginning on or about September 3,
2016 through March 7, 2017, when he was released from the Erie County
I have reviewed all incident, information and misconduct reports and
medical and mental health records regarding [Plaintiff's] incarceration.
I have also searched for any grievances or documents which could be
considered grievances filed by [Plaintiff] during his incarceration at
I hereby certify and attest that during his incarceration at [ECP] from
September 3, 2016 through his release on March 7, 2017, [Plaintiff] did
not file any inmate grievances regarding medical care or treatment he
received, the lack of medical care or treatment he received, any threats
made by corrections officers of any rank, or any other condition of prison
life. In fact, [Plaintiff] never requested an opportunity to file a grievance
during his commitment at [ECP].
(ECF No. 29-1, Affidavit of Deputy Warden Gary Seymour, at ¶¶ 3-6) (emphasis in original).
The above declarations of Deputy Warden Seymour have not been opposed or
contradicted, in any way, by Plaintiff. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to any of the claims raised in this case, and
Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed accordingly.
An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: July 19, 2017
The docket reflects that Plaintiff was recommitted to ECP on or about April 19, 2017. [ECF No. 32].
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