PREACHER v. OVERMYER et al

Filing 114

ORDER deferring ruling on 111 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 111 Motion for TRO. Defendants are ordered to file a response to the allegations and claims specified in the Court's order on or before July 31, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on July 17, 2019. (jbh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN DALE PREACHER,
Plaintiff
vs.

MICHAEL D. OVERMYER, et al.,
Defendants

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Case No. 1:17-cv-18

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
[ECF No. 111]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff John Dale Preacher’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 111. In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that
he is being held “hostage” in the security threat group management unit (“STGMU”). ECF No.
111. He further alleges that he has experienced sexual harassment, assault, food poisoning, and
general unspecified retaliation for filing lawsuits and grievances. Id. Additionally, he states that
prison authorities refused to provide him adequate medical care/follow-ups, confiscated his legal
papers, and stole money from his inmate account. Id. He seeks an order of Court directing
prison officials to (1) remove him from the STGMU, (2) return his legal materials, (3) provide
adequate medical care, and (4) stop stealing money from his account. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion temporary restraining order (TRO). As to
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court will direct Defendants to file a response
to the motion, but before doing so, in the interests of judicial efficiency, the Court will identify in
this Order which of Plaintiff’s allegations may plausibly be the subject of preliminary injunctive
relief, and which are not. Defendants need only respond to the former.
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I.

Legal Standard
A temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunctive relief is extraordinary in

nature, and is discretionary with the trial judge. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 836 F.
Supp. 309, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In determining whether to grant a motion seeking preliminary
injunctive relief, courts in the Third Circuit must consider the following four factors: (1) the
likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; (2) the extent to which the movant is
being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the non-moving
party will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) whether granting
preliminary injunctive relief will be in the public interest. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v.
Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010).
The burden of introducing evidence to support a temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction is on the moving party with respect to the first two factors. Acierno v. New Castle
County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). An absence of either of the first two factors warrants
the denial of a request for preliminary injunctive relief. Id.; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204
F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has defined irreparable injury as
“potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following a trial.”
Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801. A court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless
“[t]he preliminary injunction [is] the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Id. The
relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for the injunctive relief is in danger of suffering the
irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264 (3d Cir. 1985).

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Further, because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable
injury pending the resolution of an underlying claims on the merits, the injury claimed in the
motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief
sought in the plaintiff’s complaint. The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has recognized that
there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the
motion for a preliminary injunction. Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010).
“In sum, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive
relief where those matters are unrelated to the underlying complaint.” Stewart v. Verano, 2015
WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. April 8. 2015).
II.

Discussion
At the outset, Plaintiff has failed to allege any grounds for a TRO. The motion states no

facts to support that he faces the type of imminent or irreparable harm that could justify relief
without the Defendants’ opportunity to respond. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO is
DENIED. Regarding Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the Court will analyze each
ground asserted by Plaintiff.
Regarding Plaintiff’s first request—that he be removed from the STGMU—his motion
does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff’s current housing in the STGMU constitutes
irreparable harm. Plaintiff baldly asserts that his confinement in the STGMU violates procedural
due process, but has provided no factual allegation in support of this assertion or stated any basis
upon which the Court can identify any legally cognizable irreparable harm associated with his
vague claim of a procedural due process violation. Although Plaintiff’s motion includes an
assertion that his life is in danger based upon his confinement in the STGMU, the only support
for this claim is that an unspecified individual or individuals are placing foreign objects in his

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food, these foreign objects are making him ill, and he is being denied proper treatment for his
illness. Even if such allegations were to be factually established, the Court would be hardpressed to order Plaintiff’s transfer from the STGMU. Such internal assignments are generally
within the purview and discretion of prison personnel. If the record were to demonstrate that
Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of these allegations, the proper equitable relief would
be to order appropriate corrective action, not a transfer from the STGMU. In any case,
Defendants should respond to the allegations regarding placement of foreign objects in Plaintiff’s
food and lack of appropriate medical care. As part of their response, Defendants should address
Plaintiff’s assertion that medical staff refuse to draw his blood to test for a “foreign substance,”
or allow him to participate in a “follow-up” with health care staff, although the Court notes that it
is a “well-established rule that mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth
Amendment claims.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F. 2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s claim that he has been sexually harassed and assaulted while in the STGMU is
based largely upon vague and conclusory allegations with little factual support. It is unclear
whether Plaintiff is asserting an ongoing threat of assault or harassment or complaining of prior
conduct, the remedy for which alleged past injuries is money damages. See Instant Air Freight,
882 F.2d at 801 (a court may not grant injunctive relief unless “[t]he preliminary injunction [is]
the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.”). Nevertheless, the Court directs
Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment and assault.
Plaintiff has stated that his legal materials and an unspecified video were confiscated and
seeks their immediate return. Even if Plaintiff were to have alleged facts sufficient to support
this broad allegation, the Court finds that the confiscation—a discrete event that occurred in the
past—has not and cannot cause Plaintiff imminent and irreparable injury. To the extent that it

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does, Plaintiff may pursue an access to courts claim pursuant to the First Amendment and section
1983; this, not a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, is the proper remedy for
such an injury. Defendants need not address these allegations in their response.
Finally, regarding Plaintiff’s claim that prison authorities stole money from his inmate
account, the remedy for this type of wrong is clearly money damages; thus an injunction will not
issue to remedy Plaintiff’s injury. See Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801 (a court may not grant
injunctive relief unless “[t]he preliminary injunction [is] the only way of protecting the plaintiff
from harm.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied as to this claim and Defendants need
not respond to the allegations regarding money taken from Plaintiff’s inmate account.
In summary, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 111] is
denied. To the extent Plaintiff’s Motion seeks a preliminary injunction, Defendants are ordered
to file a response to the allegations and claims specified above within fourteen (14) days of the
entry of this Order.

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: July 15, 2019

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