CHURCH v. BERRYHILL

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 4/6/18. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRITTANY LYNNN CHURCH

)
)

No. 17-159

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL
OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits, based on mental
and physical impairments, including affective and personality disorders, asthma, and obesity.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Before the Court are the parties’
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be
denied, and Defendant’s granted.
OPINION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3)7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
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findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or
substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
II.

THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly account for a hemangioma on her right
hand, which was surgically removed in 2014. In particular, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ
relied on the opinion of state agency reviewer Dr. Mortimer, who made only passing reference to
Plaintiff’s hand issue, and whose opinion predated the surgery to remove the hemangioma.
Accordingly, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ’s decision is not properly supported.
The ALJ arrived at an RFC that included light work with, inter alia, the following
limitation: “cannot perform work requiring constant handling, fingering, and feeling.” In so
doing, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged numbness and limited use of her right hand. He also
noted that during the period at issue, records reflected that Plaintiff demonstrated intact sensory,
reflex, and motor function in all extremities. During a post-operative office visit in June 2014,

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the record reflects “full range of motion” and decreased sensation in two fingers. In September
of 2014, Dr. Hood reported that Plaintiff was doing “quite well,” with excellent finger range of
motion and dysthesias at the tips of two fingers. Elsewhere, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff
dressed and bathed without difficulty, and performed household tasks such as laundry, dishes,
cleaning, vacuuming, dusting, shopping, and preparing meals. At the hearing, while represented
by counsel, Plaintiff testified that she is able to do things like button clothing, write with a pen,
and use a knife and fork. She stated that “after doing it for so long,” however, she gets pain and
numbness in the hand. This occurs, she said, three or four times per month. With a limitation on
less than constant bilateral handling, the vocational expert (“VE”) testified to several jobs
existing in the economy. With less than frequent handling, fingering, and feeling, the VE could
not cite to other jobs.
As Plaintiff argues, rarely can a decision be made regarding a claimant’s RFC without a
physician’s functional capacity assessment. Terner v. Colvin, No. 14-1603, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106713, *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2015). As Plaintiff acknowledged, however, our Court
of Appeals has made clear that “rarely” does not mean “never”: “There is no legal requirement
that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
determining an RFC. Surveying the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ's
duties.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). It is axiomatic that the
ultimate determination of disability rests with the ALJ. See, e.g., Chandler v. Commissioner of
Soc. Sec., 667 F. 3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2011).
As my sister Court has explained, cases emphasizing the importance of medical opinion
typically involve the ALJ’s rejection of medical opinion based on the ALJ’s lay assessment of
other evidence. Woodman v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-151, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30405, at *12

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(M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2018). “In contrast, when an ALJ fashions a residual functional capacity
determination on a sparse factual record or in the absence of any competent medical opinion
evidence, courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ's exercise of
independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ carefully considered the limited record before him relating to
Plaintiff’s hand, and his conclusion that she could perform less than frequent handling, fingering,
and feeling was based on that record. The ALJ was entitled to reach that conclusion, and his
decision was supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate. As discussed supra, applicable standards preclude this Court from independently
assessing the evidence. In sum, the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, and Defendant’s
granted. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
___________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

Dated: April 6, 2016

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRITTANY LYNNN CHURCH

)
)

No. 17-159

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of April, 2018, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant’s
GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
___________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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