SCUTELLA v. COUSINS 3RD et al

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM OPINION that 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JAMES COUSINS 3RD, GOOZDICH, ROBERT WILLIAMS will be granted and the case will be closed. An appropriate Order follows. Signed by Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on 5/13/19. (lrw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JHEN SCUTELLA,

)
)
)
v.
)
)
PATROLMAN JAMES COUSINS 3RD, )
et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
Plaintiff

C.A. No. 17-222 Erie

District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Relevant Procedural History

On August 15, 2017, Plaintiff Jhen Scutella initiated this civil rights action by filing a pro
se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Patrolman James Cousins 3rd
(“Cousins”), Patrolman Robert Williams (“Williams”), and Lt. Goozdich (“Goozdich”), all of
whom are officers with the City of Erie Police Department.1 In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts
numerous claims stemming from the seizure of his vehicle on October 14, 2014, and subsequent
criminal charges that were filed and prosecuted against him. In particular, Plaintiff alleges claims
of retaliation, unreasonable search and seizure, violation of due process, conspiracy, malicious
prosecution, and a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

1
Attorney Timothy McNair subsequently entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiff on May 8, 2018, but did not
amend the original pro se complaint, which remains the operative pleading in this case.

1

This case was initially assigned to United States District Judge Arthur J. Schwab, as
presiding judge, and was referred to the undersigned, who was then a United States Magistrate
Judge, for all pretrial proceedings. On September 14, 2018, the undersigned was sworn in as a
United States District Judge, and this action was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned, as
presiding judge, on September 21, 2018.
Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No.
42], in which Defendants’ assert, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, unreasonable
search and seizure, violation of due process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff has failed to establish
his claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy as a matter of law. Plaintiff has filed a brief
in opposition to Defendants’ motion [ECF No. 64], in which he appears to have withdrawn all
claims other than his malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, acknowledging that the
withdrawn claims “are barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations.” (Id. at p. 4). Thus,
the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants with regard to such claims and
will only consider the viability of the malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims at this stage.
This matter is now ripe for disposition.
B.

Relevant Factual History2

On the evening of October 14, 2014, Plaintiff drove his friend, Chaz Mathis (“Chaz”), to
Hunter’s Tavern (“Hunter’s”) in Plaintiff’s white 2006 Dodge Ram truck. (ECF No. 42-1, at ¶¶

2
The factual history set forth herein has been gleaned from Defendants’ concise statement in support of motion for
summary judgment [ECF No. 42-1], to the extent the facts set forth therein are unopposed and/or amply supported
by the evidence of record.

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2-3). At Hunter’s, Plaintiff and Chaz met up with Chaz’s two cousins, Shannon and Shanique
Mathis. (Id. at ¶ 4). The four left Hunter’s in Plaintiff’s white truck and traveled to Country Fair
located on the corner of West 18th and Sassafras Streets, where Plaintiff and Chaz were observed
roughhousing in the parking lot while Plaintiff was pumping gas. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-9). Although
Plaintiff claims that he and Chaz were just engaging in “horse-play,” the skirmish caused a
concerned Country Fair employee to call the police. (Id. at ¶ 10). After the skirmish, Plaintiff and
his three passengers got back into the vehicle and proceeded west on 18th Street, at which time
officer dispatch informed officers in the area that a large white truck left the Country Fair
parking lot. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13).
While sitting in his police car in a nearby parking lot at the corner of 18th and Cherry
Streets, Defendant Cousins observed a large white truck driving west on 18th Street and began
following the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16-17). Plaintiff turned north on Poplar Street and parked his
vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff and his three passengers then exited the vehicle at the same time,
and Plaintiff walked northbound down the sidewalk and through an alleyway with “[Chaz’] girl
cousin,” who had returned to the vehicle to retrieve her coat. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26). Defendant
Cousins followed Plaintiff and one passenger into the alleyway, but could only locate the female
passenger, not the Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). After searching yards for Plaintiff, Defendant
Cousins returned to Plaintiff’s vehicle. (ECF No. 49-4, Cousins deposition transcript, at p. 24).
In the meantime, Officer Deluca responded to the dispatch call and immediately
recognized Plaintiff’s vehicle. (ECF No. 42-1, at ¶ 29). Both Defendant Cousins and Officer
Deluca conducted a plain view observation of the vehicle and reported observing marijuana in
the front of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31). As a result, Defendant Cousins called to have the
vehicle towed. (Id. at ¶ 32). At this time, Plaintiff was at Luigi’s Bar and Grill on the corner of
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West 18th and Liberty Streets, less than one block away (Id. at ¶ 34, 36). Plaintiff recalls looking
through the door of Luigi’s and noticing that his vehicle was gone. (Id. at ¶ 38). Plaintiff then
recalls walking to his son’s mother’s home to retrieve his son’s phone and to ask for a ride back
to his father’s house. (Id. at ¶ 40). On the ride to his father’s house Plaintiff called the police to
report his vehicle stolen. (Id. at ¶ 41).
When Defendant Cousins returned to the police station after having Plaintiff’s vehicle
towed, he was informed that Plaintiff had just reported his vehicle stolen. (Id. at ¶ 43). Defendant
Williams was made aware that Plaintiff’s vehicle had been towed and then proceeded to
Plaintiff’s home to interview Plaintiff regarding his stolen vehicle report. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45).
During the interview, Plaintiff completed and signed an affidavit of vehicle theft, on which he
erroneously indicated that he was in Reno’s Place at 18th and Walnut Streets at the time of the
alleged theft. (ECF No. 44-2, at p. 2). The next day, Plaintiff voluntarily went to the police
station to provide a statement about his stolen vehicle and submitted to a videotaped interview.
(ECF No. 42-1, at ¶¶ 47-48). After the interview Plaintiff was informed that his vehicle had been
towed and that his three passengers had been arrested “with marijuana.” (Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52; ECF
No. 49-1, Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, at p. 10 (internal p. 54)).3
On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with possession of marijuana and disorderly
conduct. (ECF No. 42-1, at ¶ 58; ECF No. 46-1, at p. 3). The charges were later reduced to
disorderly conduct, to which Plaintiff pleaded guilty. (Id. at ¶ 60). On or about October 31, 2014,
Plaintiff was also charged with false reports and unsworn falsification to authorities stemming
3
The Court is deeply troubled by the fact that Defendant Williams knowingly failed to inform Plaintiff that his car
had been impounded when he interviewed Plaintiff on the night Plaintiff reported the vehicle stolen. By failing to so
inform Plaintiff, Defendant Williams tacitly encouraged Plaintiff to pursue his stolen vehicle claim, which
ultimately led to the criminal charges being challenged in this case. Such behavior borders on entrapment.

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from his stolen vehicle report. (ECF No. 42-1, at ¶ 61; ECF No. 44-1, at p. 3). After a trial by
jury, Plaintiff was found guilty of false reports to authorities. (ECF No. 42-1, at ¶ 62).
Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which vacated
Plaintiff’s sentence and remanded for further proceedings. ((Id. at ¶¶ 63-64; ECF No. 47-3). The
Superior Court found that the trial court erred when it refused to admit evidence of a prior
lawsuit Plaintiff previously filed in federal court against Defendant Cousins and Officer William
Goozdich (Defendant Goozdich’s son), which the Court found to be relevant evidence of
possible bias on the part of Defendant Cousins. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66; ECF No. 47-3, at p. 7). Upon
remand, the District Attorney filed a Motion to Nolle Prosequi the charges against Plaintiff “on
the basis of judicial economy, office resources, and the interests of justice overall,” noting that
Plaintiff “ha[d] already served at least the minimum of 6 months incarceration” on the vacated
sentence. (ECF No. 47-4, at ¶ 5). An Order granting the nolle prosequi motion was signed by the
Honorable Daniel Brabender of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, on November 16,
2017. (Id. at p. 3).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Malicious Prosecution

To establish a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show
that: “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his
favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007), citing Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to establish a malicious prosecution claim,
as a matter of law, because, inter alia, he cannot show that the underlying criminal proceeding
ended in his favor. The Court agrees.
While a grant of nolle prosequi “may be sufficient to satisfy the favorable termination
element, not all cases resolved by the filing of such a motion are deemed to have been terminated
in the plaintiff's favor.” Dayoub v. Aaron, 2013 WL 4810382, at *6 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 9, 2013),
citing DiFronzo v. Chiovero, 406 Fed. Appx. 605, 608 (3d Cir.2011) (citing Hifirty v. Shipman,
91 F.3d 573, 579–80 (3d Cir. 1996)). To the contrary, the circumstances giving rise to the final
disposition must be capable of sufficiently supporting a finding of actual innocence before it can
be said that the charges have terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d
154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must be innocent of the
crime charged in the underlying prosecution.”); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir.
2002) (when a prosecutor abandons criminal charges against the accused, it will be considered a
favorable termination “only when their final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of
the accused”)
In Donahue, the District Attorney sought to nol pros the charges against the plaintiff,
reasoning that the plaintiff was not likely to receive any additional jail time if convicted in a
retrial and, therefore, a nol pros was “in the interest of judicial economy and [would] preserve
scarce judicial resources.” Donahue, 280 F.3d at 384. In view of this reasoning, the Third Circuit
found that “[f]ar from indicating [plaintiff’s] innocence, the nol pros merely reflected an
informed and reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to how best to use … limited
resources.” Id. The same holds true here, as the reasons stated in the District Attorney’s Motion
to Nolle Prosequi are virtually identical to those provided in Donahue. Moreover, Judge
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Brabender’s Order granting the nol pros fails to support a finding of innocence, as it merely
grants the motion without further elaboration. See DiFronzo, 406 Fed.Appx. at 609 (concluding
that the criminal charges filed against the plaintiff were not terminated in his favor because the
order granting the motion seeking nolle prosequi did not indicate the plaintiff's innocence, as it
said nothing as to why the motion was filed or granted).
For these reasons, Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the favorable termination element of his
malicious prosecution claim and summary judgment will, thus, be granted in favor of Defendants
and against Plaintiff on this claim.
B.

Conspiracy

To establish a claim of conspiracy in the context of a civil rights action, the plaintiff must
show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him of a constitutional
right. Royster v. Beard, 308 Fed. Appx. 576 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff claims that
Defendants Williams and Goozdich “conspired with [Defendant] Williams to maliciously
prosecute [him]….” (ECF No. 5, Complaint, at ¶ 24). Since this Court has already determined
that Plaintiff is unable to prove the underlying claim of malicious prosecution as a matter of law,
Plaintiff is consequently unable to establish a cognizable conspiracy claim.
An appropriate Order follows.

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