PIERCE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 3/27/2019. (dpo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL K. PIERCE,
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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-45-E
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of March, 2019, upon consideration of the parties=
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income benefits
under Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.,, finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 48
F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993); Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial
evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh
the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1
Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in formulating his
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) because he failed to consider evidence of multiple
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impairments and mischaracterized and ignored relevant medical evidence and limiting effects.
In the alternative, he argues that the case should be remanded to the Commissioner on the basis
of new evidence pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court disagrees and finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled and that
remand is not warranted on the basis of the proffered new evidence.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed adequately to consider various diagnoses he had
received from his treating physicians, such as fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease,
depression, chronic pain, and “other impairments disorders” at Step Two and subsequent steps of
the sequential review. (Doc. No. 14 at 13). The problem is that by “other impairments,”
Plaintiff seems to suggest that the ALJ should have discussed every observation made by every
doctor in the record. (Doc. No. 14 at 14 n.16). By and large, though, the ALJ appears to have
considered these various conditions in his finding that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of
“spine disorder, joint disfunction, and anxiety disorder.” (R. 27). Indeed, he discussed
Plaintiff’s back pain, knee pain, joint pain, reduced range of motion, degenerative lumbar
changes, interpersonal problems, etc. in explaining why he found these impairments to be severe.
It seems, therefore, that the broader severe impairments found by the ALJ were meant to
encompass the more specific findings made in various parts of the record. In any event, it is not
relevant whether the ALJ specifically listed all of these diagnoses as severe impairments at Step
Two, since Plaintiff’s claim was not denied at that step. See Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229
Fed. Appx. 140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); Bradley v. Barnhart, 175 Fed. Appx. 87, 90 (7th Cir.
2006).
Of course, in assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations and
restrictions imposed by all of a claimant’s impairments, even those not found to be severe at Step
Two. See S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A.), at *5 (July 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(2). However, the relevant issue is not what diagnoses or symptoms Plaintiff has, it is
whether those conditions “caused functional limitations that precluded him from engaging in any
substantial gainful activity.” Walker v. Barnhart, 172 Fed. Appx. 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff does not suggest what additional restrictions should have been included in the RFC to
account for conditions like his fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, depression, and chronic
pain disorder that had not already been included. The ALJ expressly balanced Plaintiff’s pain
symptoms in finding him to be limited to light work, as well as his radiological findings, physical
examinations, and treatment history. (R. 31). This would appear to account for the various
medical findings and diagnoses discussed by Plaintiff. Indeed, no doctor opined as to or found
any additional functional limitations stemming from these various conditions, and Plaintiff
himself, for example, failed to articulate any significant difference in work-related limitations
caused by his depression as opposed to those caused by his anxiety. (R. 56).
In short, the ALJ does not appear to have rejected or ignored any of the medical
conditions that Plaintiff alleges were not addressed. He simply appears to have grouped them
into broader categories and considered all of the findings in formulating the RFC. Particularly in
light of the fact that an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record as long as the
reviewing court can determine the basis for the decision, see Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
42 (3d Cir. 2001); Tisoit v. Barnhart, 127 Fed. Appx. 572, 575 (3d Cir. 2005), the Court finds no
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issue in how the ALJ constructed his decision, and looking at the decision as a whole, the Court
finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501,
505 (3d Cir. 2004).
As noted, Plaintiff alternatively argues that the case should be remanded to the
Commissioner for further consideration in light of new evidence – specifically physical therapy
records from March 3, 2016 (the day after the ALJ issued his decision) to April 8, 2016; records
from Heath Fallin, M.D., and CT imaging records from June 23, 2016; and treatment notes and
opinion from James R. Macielak, M.D., from between April 2016 and November 2017. The
Appeals Council declined to consider this evidence in reviewing the ALJ’s decision (R. 4),
which Plaintiff contends was in error.
It is well-established that evidence that was not before the ALJ cannot be considered by a
district court in its determination of whether or not the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001); Chandler v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Court cannot
rely on any records not submitted to the ALJ in making its determination here. As discussed
herein, based on the record before the ALJ at the time he issued his decision, substantial
evidence supported his finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.
However, a district court can remand a case on the basis of new evidence under sentence
six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(g) provides, in relevant part:
[The court] may at any time order additional evidence to be taken
before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a
showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there
is good cause for failure to incorporate such evidence into the
record in a prior proceeding.
To remand a case based on new evidence which has not been presented to the ALJ, the Court
must determine that the following criteria have been met: First, the evidence must be new and
not merely cumulative of what is in the record. Second, the evidence must be material. This
means that it must be relevant and probative, and there must be a reasonable possibility that the
new evidence would have changed the outcome of the determination. Third, the plaintiff must
demonstrate good cause for not having incorporated the new evidence into the administrative
record. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594; Szubak v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 745
F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984). Plaintiff cannot meet this burden.
Because the records at issue were not included in the record before the ALJ, and, indeed,
did not exist until after he issued his decision, they are new and not merely cumulative of what is
in the record. However, all of these records clearly postdate the ALJ’s decision and are therefore
not material, since they do not relate to the relevant time period. See Szubak, 745 F.2d at 833
(“An implicit materiality requirement is that the new evidence relate to the time period for which
benefits were denied, and that it not concern evidence of a later-acquired disability or of the
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (document No. 13) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(document No. 15) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:
Counsel of record
subsequent deterioration of [a] previously non-disabling condition.”); Rainey v. Astrue, Civ. No.
11-125-E, 2012 WL 3779167, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2012).
The Court does note that the earliest of these new records, Plaintiff’s physical therapy
records from Meadville Medical Center, are from very shortly after the issuance of the ALJ’s
decision. However, they in no way pertain to the time period before the decision. Indeed,
Plaintiff expressly indicated that he had not received physical therapy during the relevant time
period (R. 50), so the fact that he did so shortly thereafter is not reflective of continuing
treatment. Moreover, nothing in these records suggests any additional functional limitations that
should have been included in the RFC.
The other new evidence presented by Plaintiff is from well after the relevant time period.
The CT imaging result, for example, is from over three months after the date the ALJ issued his
decision. Moreover, that record states that the disc herniation and other degenerative changes
had worsened when compared to Plaintiff’s November 29, 2015 MRI. (Doc. No. 13, Ex. A at
14). This shows that the later medical imaging was reflecting a condition that has been changing
over time and that it did not reflect Plaintiff’s physical condition from just a short time earlier.
As such, there is no basis for relating this imaging, or for that matter the other records from later
in 2016, to the relevant time period. Dr. Macielak’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s functional
limitations is from over a year and a half after the ALJ’s decision, and nothing in the opinion
indicates that it was meant to refer back to the relevant time frame. Indeed, while Dr. Macielak
says he began treating with Plaintiff in January of 2016, there are no treatment records until after
the relevant period.
It is possible that Plaintiff’s condition has deteriorated since the time of the ALJ’s
decision, but that does not warrant a new evidence remand. See Szubak, 745 F.2d at 833. If
Plaintiff believes that his condition has significantly worsened since March 2, 2016, his remedy
is to file a new application for that new time frame.
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated herein, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.
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