CARTER v. BAUMCRATZ et al

Filing 51

ORDER denying 45 Motion to Compel discoverydiscovery; denying 47 Motion to Compel discoverydiscovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on February 15, 2019. (jbh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RALPH J. CARTER,
Plaintiff
vs.
ADAM BAUMCRATZ, ET AL.,
Defendants

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Case No. 1:18-cv-00096 (Erie)

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY [ECF No. 45; ECF No. 47]

Presently before the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery. ECF No. 45; ECF No. 47.
The Defendants, per order of this Court, have responded in opposition. ECF No. 49, ECF No.
50. For the reasons that follow, the motions are DENIED.1
I.

Legal Standards
In addressing discovery, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) provides, in relevant part,

as follows:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
(1)

Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense-including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any documents or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know
of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).

(2)

Limitations on Frequency and Extent.

Inasmuch as Plaintiff Carter’s motions to compel were only directed to the DOC Defendants, the motion is
DENIED as moot as it pertains to Defendant Sutherland.
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(C)

When Required. On motion or on its own, the court
must limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if
it determines that:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive;
the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the
action; or
the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs
of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources,
the importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation, and the importance
of the discovery in resolving the
issues.

Issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under the rules rest in the sound
discretion of the Court, Wisniewski v. Johns–Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987), and
any decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of an
abuse of discretion. Marroquin–Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
Although the scope of relevance in discovery is broader than that allowed for evidentiary
purposes, it is not without its limits. Stabilus v. Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, P.A.,
144 F.R.D. 258, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citations omitted). Courts will not permit discovery where
a request is made in bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject matter of the
action, or relates to confidential or privileged information. Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp.
255, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1982). However, the burden is on the objecting party to demonstrate in
specific terms why a discovery request is improper. Hicks v. Big Brothers/Big Sisters of

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America, 168 F.R.D. 528, 529 (E.D. Pa.1996); Goodman, 553 F. Supp. at 258. The party
objecting must show that the requested materials do not fall “within the broad scope of relevance
... or else are of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would
outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure....” Burke v. New York City
Police Dep’t, 115 F.R.D. 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
II.

Analysis
Plaintiff Carter requested Defendants provide him with “any and all psychological reports

compiled on Ralph Carter #MV-1754. This request includes, but is not limited to, psych
evaluations, pre and post the incident that took pace on February 27, 2017, at SCI-Forest and a
description of any psychological medication prescribed to Mr. Carter.” ECF No. 45 at 1-2.
Defendants declined to produce these records based on security, confidentiality and relevance.
Defendants explain that:
[M]ental health records are not provided to inmates because they
are private and confidential. In addition to presenting a
safety/security risk to the inmate and mental health staff; the
release of the mental health records enables the inmate to
manipulate his mental health treatment and diagnosis.
ECF No. 49 at ¶ 3. The Court agrees that the security concerns related to the production of any
mental health records are justified. As has been previously explained:
With respect to the mental health records, were they made
available to inmates or the public, DOC professionals would tend
to refrain from entering candid opinions and evaluations.
Consequently, decision-makers would not have the benefit of
honest observations from professionals in the field.” Moreover, “if
an inmate knows how DOC staff will evaluate him and how
particular behaviors are likely to be interpreted, he is capable of
manipulating the resulting determination,” which could lead to
inaccurate assessments, improper institutional placements, and
possible premature release from custody.

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Banks v. Beard, 2013 WL 3773837, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2013) (citations omitted). Given
the global security and safety concerns associated with the production of this information, there
is no need for the Court to conduct an in camera review of the requested materials. Defendants
have met their burden and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel mental health records is denied.
Next, Plaintiff takes issue with the Defendants’ responses to other interrogatories,
specifically the delay in submitting responses to his inquires. Defendants represent that the
interrogatories in question have now been responded to and, in fact, have been re-sent to the
Plaintiff contemporaneously with the filing of their Response to the Motion to Compel. See ECF
No. 49 at 3; ECF No. 49-1, at 1-25. Out of an abundance of caution however, the Court will
send a copy of the Defendants’ responses along with a copy of the instant order to the Plaintiff at
his address of record. Given this, the Motion to Compel as it relates to Plaintiff’s interrogatories
is also DENIED.
So ordered.

/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
United States Magistrate Judge
Entered this 15th day of February, 2019.

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