YOUNG v. HALLIGAN

Filing 40

ORDER denying 38 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on 5/3/2019. (dm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
v.

Plaintiff

REKHA HALLIGAN, et al.,
Defendants

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Case No. 1:18-cv-169 Erie
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION [ECF No. 38]

Presently pending before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Plaintiff,
Christopher Young. ECF No. 38. In his underlying Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the lone
defendant, Dr. Rehka Halligan, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of
necessary medical care. Plaintiff also asserted a medical malpractice claim under Pennsylvania
state law.
On August 22, 2018, Halligan filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 14. Despite requesting
and receiving several extensions of time in which to reply, Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion.
Instead, Plaintiff belatedly filed a proposed Amended Complaint without seeking leave of Court.
ECF No. 29. On March 29, 2019, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
(“Memorandum Order”) [ECF No. 34] dismissing Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for
failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for failure to file a Certificate of Merit.
ECF No. 34. In reaching its decision, the Court considered Plaintiff’s claims as presented in both
the original Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint.

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Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Memorandum Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The purpose of such a motion is “to correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). As such, the movant must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an
intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52
F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a
request for a district court to rethink a decision it has already rightly or wrongly made, Williams
v. Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998), relitigate issues already resolved by the
court, or advance additional arguments which could have been made by the movant before
judgment. Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, litigants must “evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear
error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Waye
v. First Citizen’s Nat’l Bank, 846 F.Supp. 310, 314 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (internal quotation
omitted).
With respect to his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff contends that the Memorandum
Order contains factual and legal errors that must be corrected in order to prevent manifest
injustice. Plaintiff has failed, however, to identify any specific factual or legal errors; rather, he
simply conveys his dissatisfaction with the Court’s conclusion. Courts routinely reject requests
for reconsideration based on mere disagreements between a litigant and the court. Williams, 32
F.Supp.2d at 238 (motions for reconsideration should not be used “to retry issues the court

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already decided”); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Such motions are not to
be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case.”).
Nor may litigants use a motion for reconsideration to “put forward arguments which [the
movant] . . . could have made but neglected to make before judgment.” Burdyn v. Old Forge
Borough, 2019 WL 1118555, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing sources omitted). As noted
above, Plaintiff was given several opportunities to respond to Halligan’s motion to dismiss and
failed to do so. Each of the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration could have
been presented at that time.
Even if the Court were to consider the substance of Plaintiff’s motion, his primary
argument – that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2005), compels a different result – lacks merit. In Greeno, the plaintiff-inmate
presented himself to his prison’s medical staff with severe heartburn and frequent vomiting. Id.
at 653. The nurse who initially treated the plaintiff’s condition provided him with nothing more
than Maalox and ibuprofen, the latter of which was actually more likely to exacerbate his
symptoms than relieve them. Id. Medical personnel repeatedly ignored the inmate’s requests for
a bland diet or a visit to a specialist. Id. In the end, the plaintiff received almost no treatment for
his condition – aside from “five or six bottles of Maalox weekly” – until an endoscopy ultimately
revealed an ulcer. Id. at 655.
Reversing the district court’s dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that, although the
inmate had technically received “some” treatment, the defendants’ “obdurate refusal” to offer
anything stronger than Maalox in response to the inmate’s serious complaints violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. In addition to refusing to order or authorize any testing, at least one prison
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physician imposed “an emphatic ban on treatment” for the plaintiff by issuing a written directive
stating that he was to receive “no gastroscopy” and “no pain medications.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Characterizing the plaintiff’s treatment as “gratuitous cruelty,” the Court concluded
that the defendants’ “dogged[] persist[ance] in a course of treatment known to be ineffective”
amounted to deliberate indifference. Id.
Unlike in Greeno, Plaintiff’s pleadings reveal that the prison authorized several visits to
outside specialists prior to Plaintiff’s interactions with Halligan. The results of those consults –
including an endoscopy, a colonoscopy, an ultrasound, a CAT scan, and several EKGs – revealed
that Plaintiff suffers from, in effect, mild esophagitis, erosive reflux, and gastritis. Based on that
diagnosis, Halligan (and other medical personnel) exercised their professional judgment and
provided Plaintiff with medications such as zantac, omeprazole, protonix, pepsid, Carafate,
mytabs, mygas, and Mylanta. Although Plaintiff complains that those treatments were
ineffective, it is evident that he received a level of care far exceeding that offered to the plaintiff
in Greeno. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Court’s decision was clearly
erroneous or manifestly unjust.
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of his medical malpractice claim based on his
failure to file a timely Certificate of Merit. As there is no remaining basis for federal jurisdiction
in this action, however, the Court may properly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting a district court to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it has “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction”). The Court explicitly dismissed Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim
without prejudice for the precise purpose of permitting him an opportunity to obtain a Certificate
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of Merit and refile his claim in state court. See Lundy v. Monroe Cty. Corr. Facility, 2017 WL
9362913, *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2018) (“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, a party can seek relief from a
non pros dismissing a case under Rule 1042.3 by coming into compliance with the rule, showing
that there is a meritorious malpractice cause of action, and providing a reasonable explanation or
legitimate excuse for the earlier non-compliance.”) (citing Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269 (Pa.
2006); Pa. R. Civ. P. 3051)). This is the precise relief Plaintiff is seeking in his motion. As
such, his request for reconsideration as to that claim is denied as moot.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No. 38] is
DENIED.

/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo_______
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: May 3, 2019

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