SIMMONS v. WARDEN BISHOP

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 14 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM re 7 Amended Complaint filed by WARDEN BISHOP. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on 2/5/2024. (dlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
TURAHN SIMMONS,

Plaintiff
vs.
WARDEN BISHOP OF VENANGO
COUNTY PRISON,

Defendant

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l :22-CV-00027-RAL
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STA TES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
ECF NO. 14

Introduction
PlaintiffTurahn Simmons alleges that before he was transferred from the Venango

County Prison to the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Defendant Warden Bishop
informed him that his personal property I would be "handled with care" and sent on to his
daughter, Alyssa Black, of Erie, Pennsylvania. See ECF No. 7, 18 (Amended Complaint). The
personal property was never received. Simmons has now sued Warden Bishop and the Venango
County Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Defendants violated his rights to due process
and further asserting that Warden Bishop's actions amounted to negligence. Id., 112. Warden
Bishop has filed a motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 14. Simmons has filed a response in
opposition (ECF No. 27). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be GRANTED. 2

Simmons alleges that his personal property included a laptop, cell phone, ·'cool pad," "solid gold lion head medallion,
26-inch gold rope, 36-inch solid gold rosary with diamonds, 2 Cuban link necklaces, 7 solid gold rings, l diamond
bracelet, 2 diamond earrings, 2 watches, I solid gold watch, I solid gold bracelet, all of my ID/debit card, plus other
personal property." ECF No. 7, � 8.
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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction ofa United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c)( l ).

II.

Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual
allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See US.

Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383,388 (3d Cir. 2002). The "court[] generally
consider(s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of
public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim" when considering the motion to
dismiss. Lum v. Bank ofAm., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat

FactorySec. Litig., 114F.3d 1410, 1426(3dCir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)( 6), the court is not opining on whether the
plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual
allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. " Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
(rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 78
(1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. " Id. (citing Papas an v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a

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plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub.

Employee Rel. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal
conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of

York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). Put another
way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations
contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is "not compelled to accept unwarranted
inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations."

Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187,2 11 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line
of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must "tak[ e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify
allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth. " Finally, "where there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief."

Burtch v. Mi/berg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212,221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121 , 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Simmons is proceeding prose, the complaint must be held to " less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a prose litigant's pleadings to state a valid
claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant' s failure to cite

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proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982);

United Stares ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,555 (3d Cir. 1969).
III.

Discussion and Analysis
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must a1lege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution [or] laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). Simmons has named Warden Bishop and the Venango County Jail as defendants.
The claim against the latter is facially invalid because a jail or prison is not a person subject to
liability under§ 1983 . See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012); Crawford v. McMillan,
660 Fed. Appx 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding Lackawanna County Prison is not an entity
subject to suit under§ 1983). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Simmons' claims against the
Venango County Jail with prejudice.
Warden Bishop is a person subject to suit under§ 1983. Simmons claims Warden Bishop
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. To the extent he alleges that Bishop
acted negligently,3 "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of any
official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Therefore, Simmons cannot sustain a constitutional claim based on
allegations that Bishop acted negligently in handling or losing his personal property. See e.g. ,

Morgan v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 76224928 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020).

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The Complaint alleges: " Defendant, Warden Bishop .. . violated due process and also showed negligence in this
matter." ECF No . 12, ,r 12.

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To the extent Simmons contends that Warden Bishop intentionally deprived him of his
property, his claim also fails because the prison grievance system and Pennsylvania law provide
him with adequate state remedies . " [A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a
state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaning post-deprivation remedy for the loss is
available." Spencer v. Bush, 543 Fed. Appx. 209, 2013 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S . 517, 533)); Shakur v. Coelho, 421 Fed. Appx. 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful
deprivation of property).
Because the Venango County Prison is not subject to suit under§ 1983, and the
availability of adequate state law remedies precludes Simmons' Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim against Warden Bishop, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss and
dismiss Simmons' complaint.
IV.

Leave to Amend
A district court should generally provide a pro se plaintiff like Simmons with leave to

amend unless amending would be inequitable or futile . See Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp. , 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Also, "in civil rights cases, district courts must offer
amendment-irrespective of whether it is requested- when dismissing a case for failure to state
a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. " Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc. , 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, further amendment would be futile.
Accordingly, the Court will deny leave to amend and dismiss Simmons' claims with prejudice.
To the extent the Complaint can be construed as asserting claims under state law, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

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V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No.

14] and dismiss his federal constitutional claims with prejudice.
A separate order follows.
DA TED this 5th day of February 2024.

BY THE COURT:

~z/4C

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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