BUTLER v. LITTLE et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 32 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM re 28 Amended Complaint filed by GEORGE LITTLE, JAKE BEACH. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on 2/6/2024. (dlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
DERRICK BUTLER,

Plaintiff
vs.
GEORGE LITTLE, SECRETARY OF DOC;
AND JAKE BEACH, MAILROOM
SUPERVISOR AT SCI FOREST,

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Defendants

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1:22-CV-00289-RAL
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT
IN RE: ECF NO. 32

Plaintiff Derrick Butler ("Butler"), a state prisoner, has filed an Amended Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See ECF No. 28. The Defendants, employees of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"), have filed a motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 32. For the reasons discussed herein, the Defendants'
motion will DENIED. 1
I.

Standard of Review
The Defendants move to dismiss Butler's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost

v. Kozakiewicz, l F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the court accepts as true the complaint's factual allegations and views them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See US Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins , 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction ofa United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(l).

2002). See also Phillips v. Cnty. OfAllegheny , 515 F.3d 224,228 (3d Cir. 2008). In making its
determination under Rule 12(b)( 6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to
prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S . 544, 556
(2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d
ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Therefore, a complaint should only
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. " Twombly, 550 U .S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6)
standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S . at 555 . A
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U .S. 265,286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a
plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint. See California Pub.

Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal
conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U .S. at 555; McTernan v. City of

York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521 , 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). Put another
way, while the Court must view the factual allegations of the complaint as true, the Court is "not
compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions
disguised as factual allegations." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).

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Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding prose, the complaint must be held to " less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521
( 1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant' s pleadings to state a valid claim upon
which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant' s failure to cite proper legal
authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with
pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982) ; United States ex rel.

Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,555 (3d Cir. 1969).
With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to Butler' s Amended Complaint and
the Defendants ' motion.
II.

Background

A.

Factual Background

Butler' s Amended Complaint is sparse in its factual allegations. On March I , 2022,
Butler sent a "request slip" to the mail room at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 28 , 17. He asked for a list
of all legal mail he received so far that year. Id. On March 3, 2022, he was provided with a list
from the mail room. Id. Reviewing the list, Butler noticed that the prison had received mail
addressed to him from the Pennsylvania Superior Court on February 18, 2022, but the prison had
returned it to that court because it did not include the appropriate control number. Id. , 11 8-9.
Butler was not notified that the mail had been rejected. Id., 19.
B.

Procedural History

Butler initiated this action by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF
No. 1. The Court granted that motion and Butler's original complaint was docketed. See ECF
Nos. 9, 11. Butler named George Little, the Secretary of the DOC, and John/Jane Doe as
defendants. ECF No. 11 , p. 2. The Defendants moved to dismiss (ECF No. 24), and Butler was

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given leave to file an amended pleading (ECF No. 27). He did so, this time naming Defendant
Jake Beach in place of the John/Jane Doe defendants. See ECF No. 28, ~ 5. Butler' s Amended
Complaint brings one claim: that the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights in rejecting his mail from the Superior Court without providing him appropriate
notice. Id., ~ 10.
Again, Defendants Little and Beach moved to dismiss. See ECF No. 32. Butler filed a
response in opposition (ECF No. 35).
III.

Discussion and Analysis
In Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4 th 182 (3d Cir. 2021), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

held that DOC policy rejecting, without notice, all incoming mail lacking a return address
violated procedural due process rights of the inmate to whom the mail was addressed. See also
Miller v. Little, 2023 WL 252953 , at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2023). The Third Circuit held that
"prisoners retain a liberty interest in corresponding by mail, and this interest is constrained by
censorship or rejection of inmates ' mail." Pelino v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 1239050, at *2 (3d Cir.
Apr. 27, 2022) (citing Vogt, 8 F.4 th at 186)); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396
(1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). Thus,
"prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected. " Vogt, 8 F.4 1\ at 184.
Butler' s claim is similar. He alleges that his right to procedural due process was violated when
the prison rejected his mail from the Superior Court without notice. ECF No. 28, ~~ 8-9. This
allegation is sufficient to state a procedural due process claim. Vogt, 8 F.4 th at 186 (" [Vogt
alleged his right to procedural due process was violated when the prison rejected his mail
without notice. The bottom line is that his allegation was enough.").

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Defendants argue that no due process claim is stated because Butler "was aware" that the
mail from the Superior Court had been rejected and filed appropriate grievances. ECF No. 33,
p. 7. They contend that because Butler "requested his Inmate Correspondence History," and
received a response, he received notice that the Superior Court's mail had been rejected. Id. Put
another way, because Butler initiated his own investigation and subsequently learned of the
rejection, the Defendants contend he had notice of the rejected mail. Id. In essence, Defendants
argue that Butler's efforts that disclosed their failure to give notice is the equivalent of the prison
having proactively provided timely notice. This argument fundamentally misconstrues the
concept of providing notice. In Procunier, the Supreme Court "almost certainly" envisioned the
"proactive provision of notice by prison staff' when incoming prison mail is rejected. Coe v.

Zook, 202 WL 520578, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2020) (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. at 417). Our
Court of Appeals has also concluded that it is the prison's responsibility to provide notice; not
the inmate's responsibility to investigate. See Mojica Carrion v. Wetzel, 2023 WL 4534597, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2023) ("The Third Circuit agreed and held that 'prisons must notify
inmates when their incoming mail is rejected.") (citing Vogt, 8 F.4 th at 184) (emphasis added).
And in Vogt, the prisoner did conduct his own investigation, contacting the United States Postal
Service in search of another piece of mail, only to learn by happenstance of the rejected mail that
was the subject of the lawsuit. 8 F.4 th at 184. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that
Vogt was entitled to proactive notice from officials at the institution for the rejection of his mail.

Id. , at 164. Cf Coe, 2020 WL 520578 at *3.
Defendants rely upon Ingram v. Mendoza, 2022 WL 3716502 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2022) in
support of their argument that Butler's discovery of the refusal of his mail was notice sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements. See ECF No. 33 , p. 7. Ingram , however, is in apposite

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because, in that case, the prison notified the plaintiff of each instance his mail was refused. See

Ingram, 2022 WL 3716502, at *2. The same applies to Defendants' reliance on Darby v. New
Jersey Dep 't of Corr., 2022 WL 2347145 (D.N.J. June 29, 2022). See ECF No. 33 , p. 9. In
Darby, the district court rejected the plaintiffs due process claim because the prison notified the
plaintiff that his mail had been confiscated as contraband. Darby, 2022 WL 2347145, at *5.
Defendants emphasize that the notice in Darby was not provided by the prison until
approximately two weeks after the mail confiscation. See ECF No. 33, p. 9 (citing Darby, 2022
WL 2347145 at 5). They argue that this delay in providing notice is roughly the same duration
as the time it took Butler to independently discover that the prison had rejected his mail. Id.
Defendants essentially argue that Butler sustained no real injury due to Defendants' failure to
provide notice because he discovered the rejection of his mail within a reasonable time. Under

Vogt, however, the happenstance of an inmate's di scovery of the prison's actions does not excuse
the due process violation attendant its failure to provide notice.
IV.

Copclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss will be DENIED.2 An

appropriate order will be filed separately.
DATED this 6th day of February 2024.

RICHARD A. LANZ£ 0
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Defendants also argue that Butler's "access-to-courts" claim should be dismissed. See ECF No. 33 , pp. 3-6. Butler's
original Complaint arguably included this claim. See ECF No. 11. The Amended Complaint, however, raises no such
claim . Accordingly, ass uming Butler previously raised an access-to-courts claim, he has since abandoned it.

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