JOHNSON v. ADAMS et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on or before February 18, 2025, Petitioner Michael Roland Johnson may file a response to this Court's Memorandum and show cause why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to file them within the one-year limitations period. On or before that same date, Respondents may submit a response setting forth their position. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on 1/7/2025. (dlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL ROLAND JOHNSON,
Petitioner
V.

MELINDA ADAMS, JOSHUA
SHAPIRO, Attorney General of the
State of Pennsylvania, DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OF ERIE COUNTY,
Respondents

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Case No. 1 :22-cv-291

RICHARD A. LANZILLO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM AND SHOW CAUSE
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1)

MEMORANDUM AND SHOW CAUSE ORDER
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Michael Roland
Johnson. 1 At the time he initiated this litigation, Petitioner was incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Mercer, serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania. He has since been released. 2

It appears to the Court that Petitioner' s claims are subject to dismissal as untimely pursuant
to the limitations period set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). However, in its Answer, the Erie County District Attorney's

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.

Under § 2254, a habeas petitioner must, at the time of filing, be in custody for the conviction he
is attacking. A petitioner is considered to be in custody when he or she is "subject both to
'significant restraints on liberty ... which were not shared by the public generally,' along with
'some type of continuing governmental supervision. "' Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 717
(3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Because Petitioner appears to be on probation, he is in custody
for purposes of this petition. See Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
"being on probation meets the 'in custody ' requirement for purposes of the habeas statute.")

Office concluded that the instant petition was filed within the applicable limitations period. ECF
No. 4 at 3.
The Court is not bound by counsel ' s computation error and may raise the issue sua sponte
as long as the petitioner is given fair notice and an opportunity to respond and is not prejudiced.

Day v. McDonough , 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006); United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 16170 (3d Cir. 2005) (en bane). See also Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (2012). This
Memorandum provides Petitioner with the required notice. Pursuant to the attached order, both
parties are provided with the opportunity to set forth their positions regarding the statute of
limitations. Petitioner in particular must show cause why his claims should not be dismissed for
failure to meet the statutory deadline.
A review of the record and the criminal docket sheet for Petitioner's underlying convictions
in Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. CP-25-CR-0001370-2018 (Erie Cnty. Com. Pl.), discloses the
following relevant facts. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted ofrecklessly endangering
another person, firearms not to be carried without a license, and possessing instruments of crime.
On February 4, 2019, he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 42 to 84 months'
imprisonment, followed by 3 years' probation. He filed post-sentence motions, which were denied
on February 26, 2019. He did not file a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence.
On April 3, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction
Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S .A. § 9541 et seq. That petition was denied. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of the PCRA petition on May 1, 2020. Commonwealth v.

Johnson , 237 A.3d 428 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum); ECF No. 4-3.
Petitioner filed a second PCRA petition on May 26, 2020. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition. The Superior Court affirmed the denial on April 13,

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2021. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 237 A.3d 428 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum);
ECF No. 4-6. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Petitioner' s petitioner for allowance of
appeal on October 18, 2021. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 265 A.3d 195 (Pa. 2021).
Petitioner commenced this litigation by serving the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on October 17, 2022. ECF No. 1 at 24. In the petition, he raises three pretrial- and trialrelated claims.
The date on which AEDPA's limitations period commences is determined on a claim-byclaim basis. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113 , 118-22 (3d Cir. 2004). A state prisoner generally
must file his federal habeas claims within one year of the date his judgment of sentence became
final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A).
AEDPA also provides that " [t]he time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244( d)(2). A matter is "pending" for § 2244( d)(2) purposes "as long as the ordinary state

collateral review process is ' in continuance' .... In other words, until the application has achieved
final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures[.]" Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,
219-20 (2002).
Here, Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final on or March 28, 2019, at the
expiration of time for seeking review thereof in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(b) (notice of appeal shall be filed without 30 days of order deciding postsentence motion); ECF No. 4-6 at 8.
Petitioner filed his PCRA petition 6 days later, on April 3, 2019. The PCRA proceedings
statutorily tolled AEDPA's limitations period from that date until June 1, 2020, when the time

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expired for Petitioner to seek review of the Superior Court's May 1, 2020, decision affirming the
PCRA court's order of dismissal. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that the AEDP A limitations period tolls "during the time a prisoner has to seek review of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision whether or not review is actually sought."); Pa.R.A.P.
903(a).
However, Petitioner filed a second PCRA petition on May 26, 2020. As the Superior Court
noted, this petition was facially untimely. ECF No. 4-6 at 8. An untimely petition is not "properly
filed" for § 2244(d)(2) purposes and therefore does not toll AEDP A's statute of limitations.

Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2006). The Superior Court stopped short of
definitively finding the petition to be untimely, though, and addressed the merits of the appeal. Id.
at 9 ("[E]ven assuming that Appellant's PCRA petition was timely, we conclude that the PCRA
court did not err in denying relief.") The PCRA court also addressed the merits of the petition. For
these reasons, and because the outcome of the timeliness analysis is ultimately not affected, this
Court will consider this petition to have been properly filed. Thus, the AEDPA limitations period
was tolled until October 18, 2021, when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Petitioner's
petitioner for allowance of appeal with regard to the second PCRA petition. Lawrence v. Florida,
549 U.S. 327, 331-36 (2007) (a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the period available
to petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court following state collateral
review); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419-20 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
When the limitations period began to run again on October 19, 2021, Petitioner had 359
(365-6) days remaining in which to timely file claims in a habeas petition. Petitioner commenced
this litigation by serving the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 17, 2022, 363
days later. Accordingly, the claims in this petition are untimely by 4 days.

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For the foregoing reasons, it appears to the Court that all of Petitioner's claims are
untimely. Unless he can demonstrate in his response to the Court' s show cause order that AEDPA's
limitation period commenced for any of his claims on a date set forth in§ 2244(d)(l )(B)-(D) and/or
that equitable tolling 3 applies during the relevant time period, this Court will dismiss the claims.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 2025, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on, or before
February 18 , 2025, Petitioner Michael Roland Johnson may file a response to this Court's
Memorandum and show cause why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to file them
within the one-year limitations period. On or before that same date, Respondents may submit a
response setting forth their position.

~~Li?zrrfo{
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

The United States Supreme Court has held that AEDPA ' s statute-of-limitation period "is subject
to equitable tolling in appropriate cases." Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows both that (1) he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing . Id. at 2562 . See also United States v. Thomas, 2013 WL 1442489, *7-8 (3d Cir. Apr. 10,
2013); Ross v. Varano, 2013 WL 1363525, *9-11 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2013); Munchinski v. Wilson,
694 F.3d 308, 329-32 (3d Cir. 2012).
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