BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 15

ORDER denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 9/24/2024. (dpo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DELAINE MARIE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 23-191-E

ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of
Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits
under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for
supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,
48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.
1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported
by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court

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may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

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Plaintiff raises a single issue on appeal: she argues her residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) is the product of legal error because the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed
to properly evaluate the opinion of consultative examiner, Tammy Connell, M.A. (Doc.
No. 8). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not conform with the applicable regulations
because the ALJ did not sufficiently consider and explain the consistency and
supportability factors relevant to evaluating this opinion. (Id.); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c,
416.920c. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds instead that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and his ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not
disabled.
The Court finds the ALJ sufficiently considered and explained the consistency and
supportability factors as they relate to his analysis of Ms. Connell’s opinion. As Plaintiff
acknowledges, for cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the regulations
have eliminated the “treating physician rule.” Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (applying to later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01,
at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). While the medical source’s treating relationship with the
claimant is still a valid and important consideration, “the two most important factors for
determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.”
82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c); 416.920c(b) and (c).
Specifically, in analyzing Ms. Connell’s opinion, the ALJ stated the following:
In addition to her treatment notes, the record contains the report of a
consultative mental status evaluation conducted on October 22, 2021 by
Tammy Connell, M.A. . . . During her mental status examination, Ms.
Connell observed no abnormalities in her appearance, speech, or thought
process. However, she noted the claimant’s affect was somewhat anxious,
her attention and concentration [were] mildly impaired due to anxiety, and
her memory was impaired. Ms. Connell then noted the claimant’s reports
that she was able to dress, bathe, and groom herself, and that she cooked,
cleaned, washed laundry, and shopped. Moreover, she stated she managed
her own money, drove, and described her relationships with friends and
family as good. Following the remainder of her examination, Ms. Connell
diagnosed the claimant with an unspecified anxiety disorder. She then
determined the claimant’s impairments resulted in moderate limitations on
her ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions and marked
limitations on her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex
instructions and make judgments on complex work-related decisions.
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Additionally, she found the claimant’s impairments resulted in mild to
moderate limitations on her ability to interact appropriately with the public,
supervisors, and coworkers, and marked limitations on her ability to
respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine
work setting. (Ex. 8F).
After careful consideration, the undersigned finds Ms. Connell’s
conclusions are not persuasive because the claimant’s lack of mental health
treatment, including her more recent refusal to start medication, as well as
her largely unremarkable mental status examination and reported activities
of daily living do not support the conclusion that she has any more than
moderate limitations stemming from her history of schizophrenia and more
recently diagnosed anxiety.
(R. 37).
Considering this, the ALJ adequately evaluated the consistency and
supportability of Ms. Connell’s decision, as he stated this opinion was not consistent with
the rest of the record, showing a lack of mental health treatment, Plaintiff’s refusal to start
medication, a largely unremarkable mental status examination, and her activities of daily
living. (Id.).
Moreover, the ALJ found this opinion was not supported by Ms.
Connell’s own exam, which revealed no abnormalities in appearance, speech, or thought
process, and resulted in a largely normal mental status examination. (Id.). Thus,
Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not inquire into and address the reasons
Plaintiff failed to seek mental health treatment or receive psychotropic medications prior
to relying on this lack of evidence to support his rejection of Ms. Connell’s opinion. (Doc.
No. 8 at 16). However, the ALJ did discuss and consider Plaintiff’s hospitalization and
treatment and the fact that she was seeing a psychiatrist. (R. 65). The record was also
clear that Plaintiff was not on any psychotropic medications and that she was diagnosed
with generalized anxiety disorder, but she was not advised to be on medication and only
therapy was recommended. (R. 35). Further, the record showed that Plaintiff reported
to her psychologist that she did not want to be on anxiety medication because the side
effects scared her. (Ex. 14F/4-6). Given that the record showed Plaintiff’s treatment
and her reasoning for not taking medications, the ALJ did not err by failing to inquire about
Plaintiff’s reasoning for not seeking mental health treatment or taking psychotropic
medications. This is especially true given the fact that Plaintiff does not argue that the
ALJ made an inaccurate inference or incorrectly summarized the record. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.
Further, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not explain what evidence he considered
in determining that Plaintiff’s record reflected “largely unremarkable mental status
examination” such that Ms. Connell’s opinion could be considered inconsistent with the
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entirety of the evidence. (Doc. No. 8 at 16-17). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by
relying upon “a vague and conclusory notion that M.A. Connell’s opinion was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s ‘largely unremarkable mental status examination’ in support of his ultimate
rejection of M.A. Connell’s opinion[,]” without specifying any specific records upon which
he was relying. (Id. at 17). However, the context of the record reveals that the ALJ was
referring to Ms. Connell’s mental status examination, which was generally normal. (Ex.
8F). While the ALJ provided no citation, it is clear from the context of his statements, as
quoted above, and his citation to Exhibit 8F, showing Ms. Connell’s exam only one
sentence earlier, that he was referring to Ms. Connell’s mental status examination. (R.
37). While there are other mental status examinations within the record, (R. 75, 87, 360,
362, 365, 371, 374, 386, 616), the context makes it clear that the ALJ was referring to Ms.
Connell’s mental status examination. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not consider the diagnostic
evidence concerning Plaintiff’s neuropsychological impairments, including her abnormal
awake and asleep 60-minute EEG and the MRI of her brain. (Doc. No. 8 at 18 (citing R.
413, 490, 499)). Plaintiff posits that the ALJ’s failure to consider this evidence, showing
the impact of Plaintiff’s chronic migraines and related neurological conditions on her
ability to work, led to a defective RFC. (Id.). The Court finds Plaintiff is mistaken that
the ALJ ignored this evidence. The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s abnormal EEG and her MRI
when explaining the Plaintiff’s testing and treatment during the relevant period and stated
the following:
[O]n July 2, 2021, [Plaintiff] obtained the requested brain MRI, which
revealed no acute intra-axial abnormality but showed an 8.5 mm right
choroidal fissure cyst and minimal chronic small vessel microvascular
ischemic change. (Ex. 9F/13).
***
Thereafter, on August 31, 2021, the claimant proceeded with another EEG,
the results of which were abnormal due to two right frontal sharp waves that
might be consistent with discharging foci in that region and tendency toward
seizure activity. However, no focal slowing or electrographic seizures
were seen and the administering provider noted that up to 10 epileptiform
discharges during a 60 minute EEG would be considered within normal
limits. (Ex. 9F/4-5).
(R. 31, 33). Plaintiff points to no findings or evidence concerning these tests that the ALJ
did not consider. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.
Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ erred by finding Ms. Connell’s opinion
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and by failing to explain which
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:

Counsel of record

activities contradicted Ms. Connell’s opinion. (Doc. No. 8 at 18-19). However,
Plaintiff overlooks that Ms. Connell herself reported on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living
within her opinion. (Ex. 8F/6-7). This shows that Plaintiff reported she is able to do
many activities, including bathing and grooming herself, laundry, cooking, driving, and
managing her own money. (Id.). The ALJ’s statement on Ms. Connell’s opinion, as
shown above, makes clear that he found Ms. Connell’s opinion unsupported by all of
Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. (R. 37). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument
does not undermine that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Given that the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial
evidence, the Plaintiff’s attack on the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert is without
merit. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating “objections
to the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to
attacks on the RFC assessment itself.”). Thus, The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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