JACOBS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH et al

Filing 338

ORDER on ECF No. 263 denying motion for disqualification and denying appeal of scheduling orders as moot. Signed by Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 1/29/2014. (blr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
André JACOBS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No: 08-470

v.
CITY OF PITTSBURGH et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a document (ECF No. 263) styled as a “complaint” against
the magistrate judge and an appeal of certain scheduling orders, filed by plaintiff
André Jacobs. The court interprets this document as a motion to disqualify the
magistrate judge. At the outset, the court notes that it denied a similar motion by
plaintiff to disqualify the magistrate judge (ECF No. 234).1 Plaintiff disagrees with
discovery rulings made by the magistrate judge and argues that these rulings
demonstrate partiality by the magistrate judge. Since June 26, 2013, the court has held
regular status conferences with the parties in an effort to move discovery forward. For
the reasons set forth below, the court will deny the motion to disqualify and will deny
the appeal of the scheduling orders as moot.
The statute governing judicial disqualification provides that
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

1

As the court noted in the memorandum order on the prvious motion to disqualify,
a magistrate judge may properly refer a motion to disqualify to another judge for
decision. See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H.
COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3550 (3d
ed. 2008).

1

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 455. The test for disqualification pursuant to § 455(a) is “whether a
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211,
220 (3d Cir. 2003). Section 455(b)(1) is narrower and only requires disqualification
when a judge has actual bias or personal knowledge about disputed evidentiary facts.
Id. A court’s “rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion” and “only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or
antagonism required” for disqualification. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994).
The crux of plaintiff ’s motion is his disagreement with discovery rulings made
by the magistrate judge. Plaintiff argues that these rulings demonstrate “extreme bias
against plaintiff ” and evince “a scheme to develop a false record against plaintiff.”
Plaintiff, however, did not produce any evidence of any actual bias. The unfavorable
discovery rulings are not themselves evidence of bias and would not cause a
reasonable person to question the magistrate judge’s impartiality. The court
recognizes that discovery in this case has been extremely difficult and protracted, but
these circumstances do not warrant disqualification.
Plaintiff ’s appeal of the discovery case management order (ECF No. 259) is
moot. This case management order has been superceded and discovery is ongoing.
Plaintiff also appeals a scheduling order identified as ECF No. 288. This is a
typographical error, and the court is unable to identify which order plaintiff is
appealing. Since the discovery schedule has changed, the court believes this appeal is
also moot.
2

AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 2014, upon consideration of the plaintiff ’s
motion to disqualify and appeal of scheduling orders (ECF No. 263), it is hereby
ordered that the motion is denied and plaintiff ’s appeal of scheduling orders is denied
as moot.
/s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge

3