GLOVER v. WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A. et al

Filing 462

ORDER granting 461 Motion to Supplement.Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 7/25/12. (slh)

Case 2:08-cv-00990-DWA-RCM Document 461-4 Filed 06/29112 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Mary E. Glover, individually and on behalf
of other similarly situated former and
current homeowners in Pennsylvania,
Plaintiffs,

2:08-CV -00990-DWA-RCM

v.
Wells Fargo Horne Mortgage, Goldman
Sachs Mortgage Company, Mark 1. Udren,
Udren Law Offices, P.c.,
Defendants.

SUPPLEMENTAL FED. R. CIV. P. 54(8) ORDER
The Plaintiffs and Defendant Mark J. Udren and Udren Law Offices, P.c., have applied
for a Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b) final certification order expressly directing the entry of final judgment
on the April 19, 2011 Order of this Court, which Order, with exceptions not applicable here,
adopted the Magistrate's March 14,2011 Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth
below, a court, under Fed.R.Civ. P. 54(b), may certity claims involving fewer than all parties as
final after making an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), this Court has considered the questions relevant to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)
determination and has determined "that there is no just reason for delay." In addition, the court
had determined that its order is final and ready for appeaL

See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F .2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975) and Elliot v. Archdiocese of New
York, 2012 WL 2099684 (3d Cir. June 12,2012). This Court's determination "that there is no

just reason for delay" is based upon a consideration of the factors identified in Allis-Chalmers
and in Elliot. In this connection, with respect to the Third Circuit's Allis-Chalmers factors, as
highlighted in Elliot, the following facts are found to exist in this case:
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Case 2:08-cv-00990-DWA-RCM Document 461-4 Filed 06/29/12 Page 2 of 4

• There are no "set-offs" at issue; (See, factor I)
• There would be no unadjudicated Udren Defendant claims remammg for
disposition by the District Court, because all such claims will either be appealed
or dismissed; (See, factor 2)
• There will be no need for further District Court review or mootness concerns
arising from future developments with respect to the Udren Defendants, Wells
Fargo or Goldman proceedings if the Plaintiffs and the Udren Defendants
proposed Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) final certification order is signed. (See, factor 3)
• The claims requested to be certified as "final" present pure questions of statutory
law, and it is exceptionally unlikely that the statutory questions would need to be
adjudicated a second time. Instead, the doctrine of stare decisis would control.
(See, factor 4) [Note: that the dismissed Udren Law firm claims - for which no
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) final certification is requested
will be voluntarily
withdrawn and re-filed in state court, to be decided in that forum];
• Finally, as to the fifth and final factor, the Plaintiffs and the Udren Defendants
have made certain representations to this Court that the Court determines are
correct and fully adopts. Those representations include that the Udren Defendants
agreed at the outset that the separation of the Udren related claims from the Wells
Fargo and Goldman claims, makes sense when considering such pragmatic factors
as "delay," "economics," "time of trial", and "expense", etc. See, the Udren's
earlier motion to sever under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17 (Documents 239 and 240) and
Plaintiffs' response thereto, (Document 243) agreeing in principle with the
laudatory goals of separating the Udren Defendants' claims from the claims of
Wells Fargo and Goldman. Plaintiffs, therefore, limited their opposition to the
proposed form of the Udren Defendants severance order which was perceived by
them to be incomplete, and/or prejudicial to the Plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs,
however, fully agree with the Udren Defendants' underlying goal to separate the
claims against the Udren Defendants from the Wells Fargo and Goldman claims.
The Parties agree that the Udren Defendants claims are on a completely different
track than the Wells Fargo claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. In
fact, the Udren Defendants have not even participated in any Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f)
conference or exchanged e-mail search terms, etc.

It is the intention of this Court by detailing its reasoning under Allis-Chalmers that it has
exceeded its understanding of the findings that are required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), as
interpreted by Elliot.

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Case 2:08-cv-00990-DWA-RCM Document 461-4 Filed 06/29/12 Page 3 of 4

.. .Allis-Chalmers sets upon the district courts a far more
significant burden, and, if a district court complies with it and sets
forth a statement of reasons for its Rule 54(b) certification, it is a
near certainty that the order will contain by virtue of that
discussion, an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay.
Elliot, at *14. In so holding, the Third Circuit has provided that the Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) term
"there is no just reason for delay" is not a talismanic phrase and that the Court may state that is
has used language that is of "indisputably similar effect."

Id., at *11, citing and quoting

Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Co/kift, 259 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Court
would likewise conclude that "there is no just reason for entry of judgment" as to the claims
identified below and, moreover, that there is "no legitimate reason for delaying entry of final
judgment." Id., at 14.
It is further noted that Plaintiffs and Mark J. Udren and the Udren Law Offices, P.C. have
consented to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) final certification.
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE, it is ordered that supplemental final
judgment be entered on the Court's April 19,2011 Order to permit Plaintiffs to take an appeal of
the dismissed claims against attorney Mark J. Udren with respect to Counts XII, XIII, XIV, XVI
and XVII.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that supplemental final judgment be entered to permit
Plaintiffs to take an appeal of the dismissed claims against the Udren Law Offices, P.e. on
Counts XII, XIII, and XIV.
The purpose of the above-referenced supplemental final judgment is to permit an
immediate appeal from the dismissal of those counts.
FINALLY, IT WAS ORDERED that the remaining counts in the Second Amended

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Case 2:08-cv-00990-DWA-RCM Document 461-4 Filed 06/29/12 Page 4 of 4

Complaint against the Udren Law Offices, P.c., Count XVI and XVII were dismissed without
prejudice. That claims were re-filed in state court as contemplated and dismissed with prejudice
by the trial judge. See Glover v. Udren, GD-II-0 18015 (Allegheny County), Document 16. An

appeal was timely filed and is pending at 938 WDA 2012 (Superior Court).

A~d67.1~

AMBROSE, J.

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