GRAVLEY v. TRETNIK et al

Filing 76

ORDER denying 65 Motion to Compel Discovery; denying 65 Motion for Sanctions, as more fully stated in the Order. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 12/28/2011. A copy of this Order was mailed to Plaintiff at his address of record. (dad)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEVEN GRAVLEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT TRETNIK, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 08-1125
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before this Court is Plaintiff Steven Gravely, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”), motion to compel
discovery. (Docs. 65-66). In it, he seeks this Court to compel Defendants to “reanswer
[P]laintiff’s requests for admissions, interrogatories, and productions of documents.” (Doc. 65 at
1). Beyond his generally-articulated displeasure with the content of Defendants’ initial
responses to his discovery requests, Plaintiff attaches a letter that he sent to counsel for
Defendants, in which he explicitly asks for copies of a DC-17X file relating to the period of time
relevant to this case, as well as a list of inmates housed in Plaintiff’s pod during said period of
time. (Doc. 66-1 at 1)
Generally, courts afford considerable latitude in discovery in order to ensure that
litigation proceeds with “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). The polestar of discovery is relevance.
Relevance for discovery purposes is defined broadly. See Rega v. Beard, No. 08-156, 2010 WL
2404420, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2010) (Bissoon, Mag. J.).

-1-

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party who has received evasive
or incomplete discovery responses to seek a court order compelling additional disclosure or
discovery. However, “[t]he party seeking the order to compel must demonstrate the relevance of
the information sought. The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who must demonstrate in
specific terms why a discovery request does not fall within the broad scope of discovery or is
otherwise privileged or improper.” Opinion One Mortg. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, No. 3:07-cv-1877,
2009 WL 648986, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar 11, 2009) (internal citations and quotes omitted).
Additionally, discovery may be properly limited where
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery
has had ample opportunity to obtain the information sought by
discovery in the action; or (iii) the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
Plaintiff’s general dissatisfaction aside, unless he can point to some reason why the
information contained in the responses is deficient under the discovery rules, his motion to
compel general redrafts of Defendants’ responses to his discovery requests must be denied.
However, his filings identify only two issues with any sort of specificity. These also appear to
be the only two discovery issues that Plaintiff has attempted to resolve with Defendants. See
(Doc. 66-1); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(1) (requiring parties to confer or attempt to confer
in good faith to resolve discovery disputes prior to seeking court intervention). The first is the

-2-

production of relevant DC-17X files.1 See (Doc. 66-1). These were provided as part of
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and therefore this issue is moot. (Doc. 72-7 at 1-3).
Plaintiff’s filings also indicate that he asked for the names of other inmates that were
housed on his pod when the incident took place, and that Defendants allegedly objected to this
request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not kept in a manner in which they easily could
be obtained. (Doc. 66 at 1). Given that the incident giving rise to this litigation occurred in May
of 2008, this argument is persuasive. Additionally, providing these names to Plaintiff implicates
institutional security. This Court notes the high level of deference that must be given to prison
officials with respect to the day-to-day operation of their facilities. See Tilley v. Allegheny
Cnty. Jail, No. 09-299, 2010 WL 1664900, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb.18, 2010) (internal citations
omitted). This is especially true when those operations relate to institutional security. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48
(1979). Providing the name of a potential inmate witness – especially one who appears to have
chosen not to present himself to Plaintiff, risks the safety of that inmate witness, and the security
of the institution as a whole. Given that Plaintiff clearly is aware of the names of inmates who
have been willing to involve themselves in this case, see (Doc. 40 ¶ 3); see also Decl. of Andre
Jacobs (Doc. 74-13), issues of institutional safety outweigh whatever admissible information
might be provided by the disclosure of these names. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion with respect
to this information will be denied.

1

Indeed, these files were the subject of Plaintiff’s prior motion to compel discovery, which was
denied. See (Docs. 36 and 42).
-3-

Finally, Plaintiff moves that Defendants be sanctioned. Given that Plaintiff’s motion to
compel discovery will be denied for the reasons articulated above, the undersigned concludes
that sanctions would be inappropriate at this time.
AND NOW, on this 28th day of December, 2011,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and for sanctions
(Doc. 65) is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:
s/Cathy Bissoon
CATHY BISSOON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
STEVEN GRAVLEY, JR.
901 Carlise Street
Philadephia, PA 19130

-4-