TAYLOR et al v. PITTSBURGH MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC et al

Filing 281

ORDER. Plaintiffs' Motion (Doc. 258 ) for final certification is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion (Doc. 255 ) to decertify is GRANTED. The parties' related Motions (Docs. 253 , 263 & 266 ) are DENIED AS MOOT. Finally, a Telephoni c Status Conference will be held on 6/1/12 at 2:30 p.m. to discuss how this case will proceed. All participants shall contact the undersigned's Chambers on a single telephone line, and Plaintiffs' counsel shall coordinate the call. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 5/16/12. (dcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YVONNE TAYLOR, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PITTSBURGH MERCY HEALTH
SYSTEM, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 09-377
Judge Cathy Bissoon

ORDER
Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 255) to decertify this FLSA collective action will be granted,
and Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 258) to finally certify the collective action will be denied.
The parties’ Motions present issues and arguments materially analogous to the ones
presented in Kuznyetsov v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 10-948
(Ambrose, J.) and Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Civil Action No. 09-85J
(Bissoon, J.). In those cases, District Judge Ambrose and the undersigned held, in independent,
contemporaneously-filed decisions, that the plaintiff-hospital employees’ FLSA collective
actions based on automatic meal break deductions should be decertified. Although the legal
analyses in Kuznyetsov and Camesi differ slightly in some respects, the decisions are internally
consistent, and they warrant a grant of Defendants’ Motion for Decertification here.
Given this Court’s rejection, both explicit and implicit, of Plaintiffs’ arguments for final
certification in Kuznyetsov and Camesi, the undersigned does not believe that a detailed
recitation of the prior decisions’ analyses will benefit the parties. In summary:

•

Under the first prong of the Stage II certification analysis, Defendants’
purported “common policy” of automatically deducting meal breaks
cannot overcome differences in the opt-ins’ employment settings because
Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor proven that Defendants had a “policy to
violate a policy”;

•

Plaintiffs’ counsel have failed to identify opt-in member(s) who were
dissuaded from cancelling, or instructed not to cancel, deductions for meal
breaks, nor are there any allegations that employees who cancelled meal
breaks suffered retaliation;

•

Even were the Court not to adopt the “policy to violate a policy” standard,
there are far too many individualized inquiries to proceed under the
collective action vehicle;

•

Opt-ins potentially eligible for relief under the collective action definition
worked in 60 different departments, ranging from medical units,
psychiatric units, critical care units, emergency room(s), operating
room(s), child care, patient registration, housekeeping, accounting,
security, sleep lab(s), dispatch, food service, laundry and linen,
see Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 257) at 2, 13-14 (citing record evidence);

•

The implementation and/or enforcement of the meal break policy varied
from department to department, with some departments always using it,
some never using it, and others using it for some but not all employees or
shifts, see id. at 2, 12-14;

•

The ways in which employees reported time worked during meal breaks
varied from department to department, compare id. at 22 with Pls.’ Br.
(Doc. 259) at 7 (acknowledging same);

•

Questions remain as to whether, and how often, opt-in members worked
more than 40 hours per week, even counting meal breaks as time worked,
and therefore were eligible for FLSA relief, see Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 257)
at 14, 17, see also id. at 19 (named-Plaintiff Karen Camesi never worked
40-hour workweek for Defendants);

•

Factor (2) of the second stage analysis, regarding the individuality of
defenses, strongly favors decertification;

•

Individualized defenses include whether an opt-in worked for Defendants
during the relevant time frame in a non-exempt capacity, whether
Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of any work performed
during meal breaks, whether and how much opt-ins actually worked
overtime without compensation, and whether or not a particular meal
break was a “bona fide meal break”;
2

•

Factor (3) favors decertification for the same reasons as stated in Camesi,
and Plaintiffs have offered no meaningful explanation of how
individualized inquiries could be handled through representative
testimony, bifurcation or subclassification;1 and

•

Plaintiffs’ substantial reliance on Judge Ambrose’s decision in Andrako v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 788 F. Supp.2d 372, 378 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2011)
is misplaced, and that case is distinguishable for the reasons explained in
Kuznyetsov and Camesi.

While the above findings and conclusions are not exhaustive, they provide representative
examples of the overlap between the facts and arguments presented here and in Kuznyetsov
and Camesi. The undersigned does not believe that the instant case can survive the detailed
analyses in those prior decisions.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 258) for final certification is DENIED,
and Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 255) to decertify is GRANTED. Nothing in the parties’ related
Motions modifies the Court’s conclusions, and those Motions (Docs. 253, 263 & 266)
are DENIED AS MOOT. Finally, a Telephonic Status Conference will be held on June 1, 2012
at 2:30 p.m. to discuss how this case will proceed. All participants shall contact the
undersigned’s Chambers on a single telephone line, and Plaintiffs’ counsel shall coordinate the
call.2

As in Camesi, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ suggestion that, to the extent certain opt-ins’
recoveries may be limited or precluded, those opt-ins or claims should be disregarded for the
purposes of the decertification analysis. Compare Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 271) at 25-30 (arguing that
opt-ins should be excluded from collective action, in whole or in part, where they were not
employed by Defendants, where they worked less than 40 hours and/or where they did not
actually suffer meal break deductions) with Camesi v. UPMC, 2011 WL 6372873, *3 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 20, 2011) (disapproving of plaintiffs’ attempts to cast aside opt-ins or claims that presented
inconvenient facts).
2
Should Plaintiffs, like the ones in Kuznyetsov and Camesi, decide to voluntarily dismiss this
case for the purpose of appealing, their counsel may file a motion in advance of the Conference.
The motion should specify Defendants’ position regarding any such request. Should Plaintiffs
file such a motion, the Court may, as it deems appropriate, cancel or postpone the Conference.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 16, 2011

s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record

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