PRICE v. CAMERON et al

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 79 Motion to Reopen Case filed by WILLIAM PRICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge on 2/24/2023. (spc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM PRICE,
Petitioner,
v.
KENNETH R. CAMERON, et al.,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 2:09-783

Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court1 is a motion for relief from judgment (ECF No. 79) filed by state
prisoner William Price (“Petitioner”), which he purports to bring under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this motion for
lack of jurisdiction and deny a certificate of appealability.
I.

Relevant Background
Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI)

Houtzdale, Pennsylvania.2 He is serving a sentence of 11½ to 30 years of incarceration on
convictions on charges of rape, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, incest and corruption
of minors, imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania on November
10, 2003 at Criminal Action No. 761 of 2002.
Petitioner initiated this federal habeas case in 2009 by filing a petition for a writ of habeas

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final
judgment. (ECF Nos. 23, 67.)
2
When Petitioner filed this case in 2009, he was incarcerated at SCI Cresson and the warden was
Kenneth Cameron. This facility closed in 2013. He has subsequently been incarcerated at SCI
Albion, SCI Retreat and SCI Houtzdale. The Superintendent of SCI Houtzdale is Scott Klinefelter.
It is not necessary to amend the caption of the case to reflect this information.
1

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3.) He raised many claims for relief, including several
claims attacking the Commonwealth’s use of DNA evidence to demonstrate that he was the father
of an aborted fetus that resulted from his sexual abuse of his daughter. The magistrate judge to
whom this case was assigned denied most of Petitioner’s claims (some were dismissed on
procedural grounds), including the claims related to this issue. (ECF No. 77.) Judgment was
entered in Respondents’ favor on July 25, 2017 (ECF No. 78).
Petitioner did not appeal the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Rather, he filed the pending motion on January 3, 2023 (ECF No. 79), in which he contends
that he has “new evidence” in the form of a published report by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) called “DNA Mixture Interpretation: A Scientific Foundation Review.”
Petitioner contends that this NIST study found a lack of uniform analytical methods involving
DNA analysis as well as no clear or accepted way to compare results from multiple labs, thereby
calling into question the reliability of the results of the DNA testing.
Petitioner argues that his “right to present a complete defense was substantially
compromised because he was not given access to Cellmark’s STR mix source code, which violated
his rights to Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution.” (ECF No. 79 at 4.) He requests that the Court reopen his habeas corpus proceedings
to “allow access of Cellmark’s STR source code software, and supporting software development
and related documents—including testing, design, bug reporting, change logs, and program
requirements, under an appropriate protective order.” (Id. at 5.)
II. Discussion
Because this is a federal habeas action, the Court must evaluate whether Petitioner’s
Rule 60(b) motion is actually an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. That is
2

because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified in
relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), mandates that before a state prisoner may file a second or
successive habeas petition in which he challenges a judgment of sentence that he previously
challenged in a federal habeas action, he must first obtain an order from the appropriate court of
appeals authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). See,
e.g., Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 330-31 (2010); United States v. Winkelman, 746 F.3d
134, 135 (3d Cir. 2014); In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).3
Importantly, AEDPA’s allocation of “gatekeeping” responsibilities to the courts of appeals has
divested district courts of jurisdiction over habeas applications that are second or successive. See,
e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007). Petitioner cannot avoid AEDPA’s second or
successive gatekeeping mechanism by raising habeas claims in a filing that he designates as a
Rule 60(b) motion. BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 11:42, Westlaw
(database updated May 2022) (a habeas petitioner “is not permitted to circumvent AEDPA’s
second or successive petition requirements simply by labeling the petition or motion as something
other than what it is.”).
In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the United States Supreme Court addressed
the circumstances in which the use of Rule 60(b) is “inconsistent with” AEDPA’s second or
successive petition requirements and, as a consequence, is not available to a state prisoner seeking
habeas relief. It explained that a Rule 60(b) motion must be construed as a “second or successive

Once a petitioner moves for authorization to file a second or successive petition, a three-judge
panel of the court of appeals must decide whether there is a prima facie showing that the
application satisfies § 2244’s substantive requirements, which are set forth in § 2244(b)(2). See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
3

3

habeas corpus application” when it advances one or more “claims.” 545 U.S. at 531-32 (quoting
§ 2244(b)(1) and (2)). “In most cases,” it observed, “determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion
advances one or more ‘claims’ will be relatively simple.” Id. at 532. “A motion that seeks to add
a new ground for relief…will of course qualify.” Id.
The Supreme Court further instructed that a petitioner is also advancing a habeas claim in
a Rule 60(b) motion if he “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits,
since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively
indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes,
entitled to habeas relief.” Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, a motion that seeks to present newly
discovered evidence in support of a claim that was previously denied represents a habeas claim.
Id. In contrast, a motion is a “true” Rule 60(b) motion if it challenges a procedural ruling that the
district court made that precluded a merits determination of the habeas petition, id. at 532 n.4, or
“challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” such as an argument that
the opposing party committed fraud upon the court, id. at 532.
Here, Petitioner is not asserting any ground that would qualify his motion as a true
Rule 60(b) motion. He is clearly advancing a habeas claim. That is, he is attempting to relitigate
claims and is challenging the Court’s 2017 merits disposition of those claims.
Therefore, Petitioner’s “Rule 60(b)” motion must be construed as an unauthorized second
or successive habeas. He has not indicated that he received authorization from the Court of Appeals
to file another federal habeas petition in order to attack his judgment of sentence and a search of
that court’s electronic filing system by Petitioner’s name does not show that any such permission
has been sought or granted. Because he has not done so, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
his claim.
4

Accordingly, the Court will deny his motion for relief from judgment (ECF No. 79).
III.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment

(ECF No. 79). Because jurists of reason would not find debatable the Court’s disposition of his
motion for relief from judgment, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.4
An appropriate Order follows.

Date: February 24, 2023

Cc:

/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge

WILLIAM PRICE
FP-2118
SCI Houtzdale
209 Institution Dr.
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000

AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate
review of a district court’s disposition of a habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. “When the
district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s
underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (emphasis added).
5
4