YOUNG v. BEARD et al
Filing
117
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 82 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by DORINA VARNER, LOUIS S. FOLINO, MOODY, JEFFREY BEARD, JEFFREY MARTIN, P. WALKER, LORINDA WINFIELD, DAVID GRAINEY, ANTHONY GUMBEREVIC. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 9/17/2013. (MJL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEONARD G. YOUNG, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY BEARD; et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 10-0284
) United States Magistrate Judge
) Cynthia Reed Eddy
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Leonard G. Young, Jr., a prisoner of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), commenced this action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Louis Folino, Superintendent of the State Correctional
Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”), Jeffrey Martin, Deputy Superintendent, Major Lorinda
Winfield, Captain Anthony Gumbarevic,1 and Correctional Officer Moody, all in their individual
and official capacities.2 Plaintiff claims Defendants violated rights guaranteed him by the First,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution during a period from
September 20, 2009 to October 18, 2009 in which he was confined in the Restricted Housing
Unit (RHU) at SCI-Greene.
For the reasons to follow, after careful review of the pleadings, motions, responses, briefs
in support and in opposition to summary judgment, and the video and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties, including five DVD recordings of the incidents of September 20 and
21, 2009, Exhibits 1-5, Appendix to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’
Appendix”) (ECF No. 85-1), the Court finds Defendants did not provide constitutionally
1
Incorrectly spelled “Gumberevic” in the Amended Complaint.
Secretary of the DOC, Jeffrey Beard, and others were initially named in the Complaint, but were
subsequently dismissed from the case.
2
1
inadequate conditions of confinement, refuse to provide necessary medical treatment, use
excessive force or subject Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment in subduing Plaintiff and
confining him in a restraint chair for some fourteen hours, or in using various other restrictive
measures during the period in question. Summary judgment will be granted, therefore, in favor
of Defendants. 3
II. Factual Averments and Procedural History
A. The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35)
On August 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a handwritten Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35)
concerning events from September 20 through October 18, 2009 at SCI-Greene. The Amended
Complaint sets forth the following averments, verbatim, against all defendants because they
either participated directly or refused to stop the alleged unconstitutional conduct:
1. To be held in a cell without no running water, mattress, clothing,
hygiene products and only a suicide smock and blanket for 30 days 10
w/o a blanket. 2. United States mail held and destroyed for 30 days. 3.
Denied law library and exercise outside of cell. 4. Held in a restraint
chair for 14 hours being denied exercise and medical treatment for 9
hours while naked in a psychiatric cell with the air conditioning on full
blast. 5. Denied showers and proper cell cleaning materials for 39
days. 6. Sensory deprivation by covering my cell windows with wool
blanket and a mobile shield so I can’t see out and no one can see in
while housing lights were kept on for 30 days. 7. Destruction of / and
withholding of legal work hindering Due process and access to the
courts. 8. Denial of meals and medical attention when i missed 21
meals in a row and had to drink toilet water to stay alive. 9. CO#1
3
Under the Federal Magistrate Judges Act, a Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction over a civil action may be
conferred by consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (upon consent, “a full-time United States
magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the
entry of judgment in the case”). Consent of all parties gives the Magistrate Judge full “authority over
dispositive motions, conduct of trial, and entry of final judgment, all without district court review.” Roell
v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003); In re Search of Scranton Hous. Auth., 487 F.Supp.2d 530, 535
(M.D.Pa. 2007). Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed an election form stating that the party
“voluntarily consents to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all further proceedings in
the case, including trial and entry of a final judgment, with direct review by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit if an appeal is filed.” (ECF Nos. 70, 71).
2
Moody opened my cell door after threats of harm. 10. CO#1 Moody
yanked handcuffed hands through the cell door tray slot causing
sever[e] pain. 11. On September 29, 2009 PRC (Major Winfield,
Deputy Jeffrey Martin) denied me medical care for not eating for more
than 17 meals after I told him that I haven’t ate in all most 6 days.
They refused to call medical.
Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 35, at 3 of 7), at ¶¶ 1-11.
Plaintiff claims the foregoing conduct subjected him to deliberate indifference to medical
and physical needs, was cruel and unusual punishment, denied him due process and access to the
courts, and deprived him of various rights protected by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff further alleges that he
unsuccessfully followed the requisite grievance procedure.
B. Voluntary Dismissal and Reinstatement of Complaint
Plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of his Amended Complaint, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) (ECF No. 46), which United States District Judge Nora Barry Fischer
granted on December 6, 2010. (ECF No. 47). As provided in Rule 41, the dismissal was without
prejudice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(B); In re Bath and Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 535 F.3d
161, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (with one exception not applicable here, a timely notice of voluntary
dismissal is without prejudice). By Text Order of September 6, 2011, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Reopen (ECF No. 48). Defendants thereafter filed an Answer to
the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 51) in which, hamstrung by the generality and lack of
specificity in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, id. at 2 of 6, they denied its averments somewhat
generally, stating:
Consequently, and for the sake of judicial economy, only responses of
a more general nature are provided herein. Defendants submit that this is
permissible pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Accordingly, the Defendants generally deny that they violated any of
Plaintiff’s legal rights, whether under federal or state statutory or
constitutional law. They deny that they violated Plaintiff’s First, Eighth and/or
Fourteenth Amendment rights in any manner whatsoever. They more
specifically deny: that they denied Plaintiff humane conditions of
confinement; that they interfered with his First Amendment rights with regard
to their treatment of his legal and/or regular mail; that they denied him
adequate medical treatment; that they subjected him to unlawful retaliation; or
that they used excessive force upon him.
Defendants’ Answer to Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 51) at 3 of 6.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 59) on November 7, 2011.
Having received consent to full and final jurisdiction by both sides, and following response and
briefing, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 73) on May 22, 2012
denying Plaintiff’s motion. The discussion therein provides a convenient background for
Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the Memorandum Opinion and
Order provides:
On August 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint concerning
events that occurred from September 20 through October 18, 2009 at the State
Correctional Institution at Greene. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on
September 20, 2009, his cell door was inadvertently opened after he
repeatedly hit his call button. Instead of securing his cell door or waiting for
staff to secure it, Plaintiff exited his cell and climbed onto the law library roof.
After refusing several orders to come down, Plaintiff eventually complied and
was restrained. A strip search was conducted and he was placed in a restraint
chair. Plaintiff complains that he was kept in the restraint chair for an
inappropriate period of time when he was not medically cleared for such a
length of time.
On September 22, 2009, Plaintiff’s door was again opened in error and
he was instructed to secure his door. Before staff could secure his cell door,
Plaintiff exited and proceeded to assault Sgt. Chapman. Plaintiff was placed
back in his cell and thereafter, had to be extracted. He claims that he then was
placed in a psychiatric evaluation cell for nine hours while he was naked and
the air conditioning was turned up full blast. Defendants admit that the door
was opened accidentally both times and that altercations took place afterward.
4
Defendants deny any inappropriate treatment of Plaintiff in response to the
altercations.
Plaintiff further alleges that, from September 20 through October 18,
2009, he was held in a cell with no clothing, cleaning supplies, personal
hygiene supplies, and was denied showers, outside yard exercise, and his legal
property. He claims that during this time, he was denied a blanket, a mattress,
his cell lacked running water, and he experienced sensory perception
deprivation due to Defendants shielding the cell door and keeping his cell in
constant illumination. Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied twenty-one
consecutive meals during this period and was not given medical attention.
Plaintiff admits that food loaf was offered during this period, but claims a
food allergy to food loaf.
Defendants admit that the lights were kept on in Plaintiff's cell and that
his cell door was covered. Defendants further admit that Plaintiff was placed
on some cell restrictions based on his behavior but deny that he was
improperly or unlawfully denied clothing, cleaning supplies, medical
treatment, showers, outside yard exercise, or a blanket. Defendants admit that
Plaintiff was on food loaf restriction but deny that he was denied twenty-one
meals. Defendants further deny that the water to Plaintiff's cell was
improperly turned off.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants denied Plaintiff his legal work
and use of the law library for more than 29 days. Defendants deny that legal
work was improperly or unlawfully denied to Plaintiff and claim that all of his
property was returned.
Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 73), at 2-4 of 15; Young v. Beard, 2012 WL
1865596, *1-*2 (W.D.Pa. 2012).
Based on the record before the Court at that time, the Court dismissed the First
Amendment/ Right of Access to courts claim because Plaintiff failed to identify any underlying
legal action he was unable to pursue as a result of Defendants' alleged actions. See Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002) (to state a claim for denial of access to courts, Plaintiff
must identify (1) a non-frivolous, underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation;
and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a
future suit).
5
Regarding his Eighth Amendment claims, the Court found Plaintiff failed to show he was
entitled to summary judgment with regard to his cell amenity related conditions of confinement
claims; that Defendants only used the restraint chair after Plaintiff repeatedly refused to obey
orders after escaping from his cell when his door was inadvertently opened; that the
circumstances presented showed Defendants acted in response to Plaintiff's actions in repeatedly
creating confrontations and agitated situations; that force was applied only for reasonably short
periods necessary to subdue Plaintiff and he did not sustain any significant injuries; and that
Plaintiff did not clearly show that the force applied was excessive. Young v. Beard, 2012 WL
1865596 at*4-*6 (numerous citations omitted).
Finally, as to his claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, this Court
found that Plaintiff produced no expert testimony or other evidence “whatsoever to substantiate
the existence of any serious medical need,” or that Defendants “ignored a critical or escalating
medical situation [such] that their actions posed a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at *8.
D. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 82)
Following denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court solicited pro
bono counsel for Mr. Young, and on December 7, 2012, current counsel entered their
appearances (ECF No. 80, 89) and offered their able services to assist him in preparation of his
response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 82) which was filed on
January 14, 2013.
The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for a court appointed expert in the field of forensic
psychiatry and psychiatry within correctional institutions, Order of May 8, 2013 (ECF No. 100),
and later denied Plaintiff’s request to stay the proceedings until such time as the United States
Department of Justice investigation completed its investigation of the Pennsylvania State
6
Correctional Institutions’ use of solitary confinement on prisoners with mental illness and issued
its final report. Order of Court of June 11, 2013 (ECF No. 113) (“The Department of Justice
Report . . . has no probative value to the sole remaining claim in this case, namely that a
particular fourteen hour restraint in a restrictive movement chair on a particular day of his
confinement at SCI-Greene amounted to excessive force prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.”).
Thereafter, summary judgment briefing was completed and Defendants’ motion is now
ready for disposition. Unless otherwise indicated, the following historical facts are not disputed,
although competing inferences arising therefrom and conclusions drawn by the parties are widely
at odds.
Context is everything. In assessing the conduct and states of mind of Defendants in
September and October of 2009, it is important to know what Corrections Officers and Officials
at SCI-Greene knew about Mr. Young and his incarceration history. Although Plaintiff maintains
that his history with the DOC is irrelevant and immaterial, he does not dispute Defendants’
assertion that “Leonard G. Young, Jr. is one of the most dangerous inmates in the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections,” that between March 20, 2006 and October 18, 2009 Mr. Young had
“accumulated 100 misconducts, with approximately 21 for assaults, including with weapons,”
and 233 misconducts as of December 10, 2012. Defendants’ Concise Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts (“DCS”) (ECF No. 84), at ¶¶1-2. Plaintiff has Disciplinary Custody incarceration
time until 2045, and he has been a fixture in RHU since March 3, 2007. Id. at ¶3. Mr. Young’s
violent history includes assaulting a Corrections Officer at SCI-Forest. Id. at ¶5.
In light of his penchant for mayhem, Mr. Young was single celled, placed on numerous
security-related movement restrictions (e.g., handcuffed and shackled at all times when out of his
7
cell, such as for exercise or for medical treatment), and at times was required to wear a spit
shield. Id. at ¶6. This remarkable history is relevant and material in assessing the objective basis
for the conduct and subjective intent of Corrections Officers and Officials at SCI-Greene in
September and October of 2009.
As two videos of the incident on September 20, 2009 and prison logs and reports
demonstrate, around 20:06 hours a Corrections Officer accidently hit a button in the RHU
Control Booth and unlatched Plaintiff’s RHU cell door when another cell was supposed to be
opened; Plaintiff immediately stepped outside of his cell, went back in to put his shoes on, came
back out of his cell and began moving around on the Pod. Id. at ¶¶7-8. Plaintiff ran up a stairwell
to a balcony walkway, and climbed onto the mini-law library roof and sat underneath the
window of B-Pod Control Center. Id. at ¶9. Although Plaintiff disputes the characterization, the
video of this incident at Exhibit 2 supports Defendants’ statement that “[w]hile on the roof,
Inmate Young taunted Corrections Officers and was yelling to incite other inmates who began
yelling, banging on doors and attempting to provoke Officers. This was a highly energized
situation.” Id.; Exhibit 2, DVD of hand-held camera footage, Defendants’ Appendix (ECF No.
85-1). While not belligerent, Plaintiff did appear quite agitated and was very vocal, and inmates
in surrounding cells were shouting and loudly talking to the guards and Plaintiff as the drama
played out.
Although he initially refused directions to get down from the roof, after several minutes
Plaintiff agreed and cooperated, to a point. After Corrections Officers hand cuffed and tethered
him and began walking him to an area to be strip searched, Plaintiff went to his knees and would
not walk further on his own power. Thereafter, Plaintiff was carried down the steps by four
Corrections Officers and through corridors until reaching the area where the strip search
8
(standard operating procedure when an inmate has left a cell and had opportunity to acquire
items and objects) was to be conducted. After the strip search, Plaintiff was assessed by a
Registered Nurse and photographs were taken; Plaintiff had no observable injuries, and this
Court observed nothing on the DVD that might have caused any injuries.
Mid or upper level officers, including defendants Martin and Gumbarevic, authorized
Plaintiff to be placed in a restraint chair, DCS (ECF No. 84), at ¶¶14-15, which Plaintiff audibly
and somewhat jocularly referred to as “my buddy.” Exhibit 2, DVD of hand-held camera
footage, Defendants’ Appendix (ECF No. 85-1). Plaintiff was lifted and placed into the restraint
chair at approximately 21:38 hours, and wheeled in the chair to a psychiatric observation cell
without incident.
While in the restraint chair and observation cell, Mr. Young was continually monitored
and was medically assessed and his limbs exercised every two hours (except on one occasion
when Plaintiff was asleep) by medical staff for one or two minutes each limb. During his
approximately fourteen hours in the restraint chair (from 21:38 hours on September 20, 2009 to
10:30 hours on September 21, 2009), Plaintiff was not in any medical distress, his limbs were
manipulated, his circulation was good in his fingers and toes, he declined the use of the urinal
and water when offered, and he was talkative, joking with staff and exhibited no distress, pain or
discomfort in the restraint chair. DCS (ECF No. 84), at ¶¶ 22-48.4 Plaintiff indicated to Nurse
Perchinsky that there will be a “next time” for him in the chair, because “that’s just how it is with
me.” Id. at ¶¶42-43.
4
According to Defendants, multiple video recordings were made of the exercise and feeding sessions
during the fourteen hour period, but the recordings have been inadvertently misplaced or disposed. The
account of Plaintiff’s time in the restraint chair is taken from the testimony and reports of Corrections
officers and officials. Plaintiff does not take issue with the missing video recordings.
9
Lt. Greco first went to the psychiatric cell to remove Plaintiff from the restraint chair, but
he found inmate Young still agitated, verbally abusive and hostile toward staff, stating “Fuck
you. I will stay in the chair. I will just act out when you let me out.” Id. at ¶¶49-50. After
consulting with Defendant Martin, the decision was made to leave Mr. Young in the chair. Id. at
¶ 51. Plaintiff does not contest these historical facts and accounts, but maintains that his agitation
and aggressiveness are irrelevant and immaterial because “there was no proper basis for Plaintiff
to be restrained in the Restraint Chair to begin with.” Plaintiff’s Response to DCS (ECF No.
105), at ¶¶ 49-51.
At around 10:30 hours the next day, September 21st, Plaintiff appeared to have calmed
down and seemed ready to cooperate, and he was removed from the restraint chair. This activity
was videotaped, and was uneventful. Plaintiff was transported to I-Unit Strip search area, and
upon arrival of a Registered Nurse, he was removed from the restraint chair, photographed and
examined, and was found to be under no signs of physical distress, although Plaintiff stated he
was in significant discomfort and that his limbs were unsteady. Plaintiff also denied he had any
injuries to report. Mr. Young was thereafter returned to his RHU cell without additional incident
and filmed for several minutes following the return to his cell; he was given a security smock
and blankets, but no mattress as he was under restriction because he had used his mattress in the
past to block his windows.
The following day, September 22nd, at approximately 07:40 hours, a Corrections Officer
accidently hit a button in the RHU Control Booth and unlatched Young’s RHU cell door while a
team of Corrections Officers had assembled outside an adjacent cell door, waiting to escort the
inmate in that cell. Mr. Young immediately pushed his door completely open, left his cell and
began to enter the Pod, and lunged for Corrections Officer Biagini who was standing at the
10
adjacent cell door. Plaintiff asserts that he fell out of his cell, and did not try or intend to leave
his cell, nor did he lunge at Officer Biagini. Whether lunging or falling, the record shows that a
scuffle took place, which quickly ended with Plaintiff on the ground and the Corrections Officers
controlling him, applying cuffs and a tether, lifting and returning him to his cell.
Once in his cell, Plaintiff refused to place his hands in the serving slot to allow the
Corrections Officers to uncuff him. When Plaintiff continued to refuse to be uncuffed, a seven
man extraction team (six Corrections Officers and one RN) was authorized and assembled. In the
meantime, Plaintiff managed to break his tether. Lt. Grego sought authorization for the use of
“OC spray,” which was denied. DCS (ECF No. 84), at ¶¶ 78-83. When the extraction team
arrived at Young’s cell, Young indicated that he would comply with Lt. Grego’s orders. Id. at ¶
84. Young was ordered to move his handcuffed arms from the front of his body to his back and
place his handcuffs in the wicket for tethering, which he did. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86. A spit mask and
shackles were applied for transport. Id. at ¶ 87. Once tethered, Plaintiff was removed from the
cell. Young was given an order to stand up which he refused to obey and he was carried to the
area to be strip searched.
Following the strip search, Young continued passive resistance and when he was brought
to a standing position, his head struck the wall. Id. at ¶ 89. RN McAnany evaluated Young for
injuries and took photographs, noting he observed no injuries. Id. at ¶ 90. Young refused to walk
so he was carried to the Restraint Chair and secured for transport to his cell, where his handcuffs
were removed without incident. Id. at ¶ 91.
III.
Standards for Motions for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted
if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
11
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When applying this standard, the court must examine
the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery
Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)).
A party claiming that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion
either by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion
only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
Moreover, a “party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot
be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2).
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of
evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); UPMC Health Sys. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). The
burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial. Williams v. Bor. of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–461 (3d Cir. 1989) (nonmovant must present affirmative evidence - more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary
judgment).
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The non-moving party cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal
memoranda, or oral argument, but must “put up or shut up.” Berckeley Inv. Group., Ltd. v.
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey
Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and show
specific facts by affidavit or by information contained in the filed documents (i.e., depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions) to meet his burden of proving elements essential to
his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.
2001). The non-moving party “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh
the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are
any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The inquiry, then, involves determining "'whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097,
1111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
“After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue
of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d
895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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IV.
Legal Discussion
A. Use of Restraint Chair
Although Plaintiff complains of his treatment and conditions throughout the SeptemberOctober, 2009 period, his paramount claim is that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by subjecting him to a prolonged period of strict mechanical restraint in the restraint chair
on September 20-21, 2009. Plaintiff summarizes his position in his Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
It should come as no surprise that housing a man in isolation for six
years will render him unstable, particularly when that man had a history of
mental illness dating back to his childhood, before his incarceration ever
began. Corrections institutions house difficult inmates. Corrections
institutions house inmates with complicated mental illnesses. A corrections
official does not have carte blanche to retaliate against an inmate because he
is known to be difficult. Further there is complete video evidence of the
incident at issue. Plaintiff urges the Court to review the video at Defendant’s
Appx. 2 in its entirety, as it speaks for itself. Plaintiff had been secured,
subdued for over fifteen (15) minutes before Captain Gumbarevic ordered the
Restraint Chair. His order was purely punitive and in violation of the 8th
Amendment and DOC policy. There is no justification for use of the restraint
chair here at all, much less for 14 hours.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and
there is no constitutional justification for the retaliatory and prolonged use of
physical restraints. Plaintiff Leonard G. Young, Jr. was restrained for 14 hours
in a Restraint Chair, not because he posed an immediate threat of harm to
himself, other inmates or corrections officers, but in retaliation for his
reputation as a difficult inmate. The Department of Corrections created this
situation, isolating Plaintiff from virtually all contact and stimuli for seven
straight years of solitary confinement, and dramatically exacerbating
Plaintiff’s mental illness. As Plaintiff decompensated through prolonged
isolation, he became less and less capable of conforming his conduct to the
rules and expectations of the Department of Corrections, and thereby acting
out and earning himself even more time in isolation. Defendants have taken
advantage of, and retaliated against Plaintiff for, a situation they created. Their
conduct is not constitutionally sanctioned, and should not be tolerated.
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 104), at
1-2.
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Plaintiff may well be correct that isolation from contact with others and sensory stimuli
for “seven straight years of solitary confinement . . . dramatically exacerbate[ed his] mental
illness.” Assuming this to be the case, however, the record before this Court, in light of wellestablished prisoner civil rights precedent under section 1983, shows that Defendants acted
professionally and reasonably on September 20-21, 2009 in handling Plaintiff’s out-of-cell
experience, transporting and searching him, and placing him in the restraint chair for some
fourteen hours until he had calmed sufficiently to allow him to be returned safely to his cell and
uncuffed.
B. Eighth Amendment
The well-established Eighth Amendment precedent was succinctly summarized by
United States District Judge Sylvia H. Rambo in Zimmerman v. Schaffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226
(M.D.Pa. 2009):
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment,
which includes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by prison
officials. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 345-46 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). The Eighth
Amendment both restrains prison officials from applying excessive force
against inmates, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), and it
imposes affirmative duties on prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). Here,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated the Eighth Amendment both by
applying excessive force and by failing to provide humane conditions of
confinement. These two standards will be set forth in turn.
1. Excessive Force
The relevant inquiry in evaluating a claim of excessive force by prison
guards is whether the force used was applied in good faith to maintain or
restore discipline, or instead sadistically or maliciously to cause harm.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. The latter use of force violates the Eighth
Amendment. Id. In Whitley, the Supreme Court set forth a number of factors
that must be considered in evaluating the use of force by prison officials.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. These include the extent of any injury to the
prisoner, as well as “the need for application of force, the relationship between
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that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Id.; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 . . . ; Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d
318, 328 ([3d Cir.] 2009); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).
Deference is given to prison officials' adoption of policies to restore order and
discipline. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
“Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is not appropriate ‘if it
appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.’”
Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 . . . , quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322.
Most recently in Giles v. Kearney, the Third Circuit reversed a district court
grant of summary judgment on a prisoner's claim of excessive force where
there was a genuine dispute of fact as to the necessity for the force, and a
reasonable trier of fact could have concluded, based on the prisoner's
testimony that he had been struck by prison guards even after he had ceased
resisting, that the force used was excessive. 571 F.3d at 326-27.
2. Conditions of confinement
Conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment
where those conditions result in a serious deprivation of “the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities” under contemporary standards of
decency. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. To prevail on a conditions of confinement
claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the prison conditions pose a substantial
risk of harm; and (2) that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that
risk. Farmer . . . , 511 U.S. 825, 834 . . .; see also Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d
703 (3d Cir. 1997); . . . . An officer who is deliberately indifferent must be
both aware of the facts from which the inference of a substantial risk of
serious harm could be drawn, and the officer must actually draw that
inference. . . .
Zimmerman, 654 F.Supp.2d at 247-48 (parallel and certain other citations omitted).
C. Mechanical Restraints
As District Judge Rambo also explained, often there is no clear demarcation between
using force to subdue an inmate and the use of mechanical restraints, and parties may sometimes
dispute whether the use of mechanical restraints falls into, and should be analyzed in the
framework of, the category of conditions of confinement or of use of excessive force. Id. at 248.
Where, as here, the mechanical restraint was used in a time and place somewhat removed from
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the initial altercation/event precipitating its use, and pursuant to DOC policy, and was used in
conjunction with an isolation cell in the psychiatric unit, this Court finds it most appropriate to
analyze the Eighth Amendment claim as a conditions of confinement case. See Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002) (analyzing case under conditions of confinement rubric, Court found inmate
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when
prison guards handcuffed him to hitching post for disruptive behavior, despite his having already
been subdued); Mohamad v. Barone, 494 Fed.App’x 212 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing use of
restraint chair under conditions of confinement rubric); Fuentes, 206 F. 3d 335, 345 (analyzing
use of restraint chair under conditions of confinement rubric); Whaling v. Erie County Prison,
2009 WL 5813857, *13 (W.D.Pa. 2009) (“Third Circuit has recognized that an inmate's claim
concerning his time in restraints is to be analyzed as a conditions of confinement claim. See
Blakeney v. Dauphin County Prison, 156 Fed.Appx. 520 (3d Cir. 2005); Camp v. Brennan, 54
Fed.Appx. 78 (3d Cir. 2002); Fuentes . . . .”).
D. Application and Findings
Defendants acted professionally and within constitutional parameters in subduing and
placing Plaintiff in a restraint chair for about fourteen hours on September 20-21, 2009, and
their treatment of Plaintiff did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants’ account
of the incidents is fully supported by the video recorded on the DVDs before the Court, in
addition to prison and medical staff logs and reports of relevant events.
As noted, Plaintiff’s escape from his cell on September 20th was disruptive and induced
agitation among other inmates on his Pod. Defendants managed to get Plaintiff and the situation
under control using minimal force, only what was necessary to handcuff, tether, carry, strip
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search and place Plaintiff in the restraint chair until he became less agitated and more
cooperative.
Moreover, Defendants knew Plaintiff was violence-prone and had an extensive history of
acting out, assaulting inmates and guards, and that he seemed determined to cause a ruckus and
planned on being back in the chair again, knowing he was going to act out in the future.
Plaintiff’s history and violent tendencies supply the context and inform this Court’s analysis.
Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that his incarceration was marked by “periodic episodes of
hallucinations, psychosis and lack of self-control, including throwing and smearing his own
human waste,” that he attempted to commit “suicide multiple times and in multiple correctional
institutions, including attempting to hang himself and other attempts at self-harm while
incarcerated at SCI-Greene,” and that his “urges to self-harm have increased in frequency and
severity the longer he has been housed in isolation.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 140), at 3 of 24.
From the record before the Court, Plaintiff suffered no actual harm nor any risk of
“serious” harm, considering not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that
the harm will actually occur, but any evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates
contemporary standards of decency. Moreover, there is no evidence on the record to support
Plaintiff’s position that prison officials were motivated by a desire to inflict unnecessary and
wanton pain; to the contrary, Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s antics was measured and
prudent, and did not exhibit malice, revenge or “deliberate indifference” to any risk of harm.
Gauging Defendants’ conduct against the conduct of Corrections Officers and medical
personnel in analogous cases, the use of the restraint chair and other restrictions on September
20-21, 2009 did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Mohamad, supra
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(prison officials' placement of inmate in restraint chair, naked, for 24 hours, did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment); Fuentes, supra (placement of
inmate in restraint chair for eight hours did not violate substantive due process under Eighth
Amendments standards, even if prison official overreacted in using the chair; officials did not act
with “deliberate indifference” to inmate's health where evidence showed inmate was placed in
restraint chair to “stop his disruptive behavior and maintain prison order and security”); Iverson
v. Leggett, 2013 WL 3972621, *10 (W.D.Pa. 2013) (under circumstances, Corrections Officers
did not Defendants violate inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in tight waist
restraints and handcuffs for 48–50 hours, dressed in shorts and a t-shirt and boxers in a cold cell);
McCullon v. Brouse, 2012 WL 4504504 (M.D.Pa. 2012) (collecting cases; following cell
extraction, inmate remained in restraints for approximately 24 hours, in accordance with prison
policy which directs that restraints should remain in place on the inmate until the prisoner
regains his self-control); Brown v. Beard, 2011 WL 1085890, *15 (W.D.Pa. 2011) (collecting
cases; no Eighth Amendment excessive force where inmate was placed in restraint chair for eight
hours after extraction from his cell, use of a stun gun and chemical agent; “Prisons are hostile
environments, the use of restraint chairs and the like may be the only way for prison officials to
control prisoners such as Brown who simply will not abide by the prisons rules. As long as such
measures are utilized in an humane manner, it is not for the federal courts to interfere in prison
discipline.”). Cf. Zimmerman, supra (summary judgment for defendants denied where restraint
chairs and four-point bed-post restraint system designed by the Warden were often employed by
Corrections Officers and Warden, for lengthy periods of time, against inmates who had caused
minor property damage to their cells, even after inmates were subdued).
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Even if analyzed under the excessive force rubric, as Plaintiff argues is the correct
standard, Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s behavior in September-October, 2009, conduct did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Five factors apply in determining whether a correctional
officer used excessive force: “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; (4)
the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible
officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity
of the response.” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). Consideration of these factors leads inevitably to the
same result – Defendants did not use excessive force against Plaintiff.
(1) The need for application of some quantum of force to subdue and restrain an agitated
and known-to-be violent inmate who had escaped his cell and initially refused to return, incited
his fellow inmates while the drama continued, and who remained in a highly agitated state even
after being subdued, cannot be reasonably disputed. (2) Only minimal force (i.e., the amount
necessary to accomplish the penological purposes) was used. (3) There were no significant
injuries, if any. (4) Plaintiff promised he would act out if released, and he posed a continued
threat of agitating other inmates and hurting himself should he be released, throughout the
fourteen hour period he was in the restraint chair. (5) Defendants refrained from OC spray,
punching, kicking or otherwise manhandling Plaintiff as he was subdued and restrained.
Regarding condition of confinement claims in general, prison officials must not show
deliberate indifference to a known substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, and must ensure
that inmates get enough food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and they must take reasonable
measures to assure inmates' safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 832. The record demonstrates that
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Plaintiff was not mistreated, and was offered adequate food, water and exercise during the
September 20-October 18, 2009 period of restrictive confinement. During this period, there was
no risk of any serious injury and Defendants did not exhibit deliberate indifference toward Mr.
Young. The restrictions applied during this period were reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives, and did not create nor seem designed to cause risk of any serious harm.
See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979); Trammel v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.
2003) (defendants did not disregard substantial risk to inmate's safety by placing him on
behavior action plan that “while indeed onerous, even harsh, was reasonably calculated to correct
[the inmate's] outrageous behavior.”); Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1999) (inmate
who was restrained in handcuffs and leg shackles did not suffer a serious deprivation of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, as required for Eighth Amendment claim, where,
although shackles made it more difficult for inmate to sleep and relief himself, he was not
deprived of bedding, food, or bathroom facilities, and he was checked on by a nurse and guard at
regular intervals); Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no Eighth
Amendment violation where prisoner was punished for damaging his cell by being kept in
restraints for two eight-hour periods where he was denied fresh water and use of the toilet);
LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that use of full in-cell restraints,
which make it difficult to sleep, eat, drink water, or stay warm, under existing regulations to
maintain security and safety do not reflect “deliberate indifference” or malice and sadism).
Counsel for Plaintiff vigorously argues that the Court should also “consider Plaintiff’s
well-known and established mental illness, six-year solitary confinement, and the undeniable
exacerbation of that mental illness and its symptoms as a result of Plaintiff’s prolonged isolation.
In short, this Court should consider how DOC officials, including Defendants, contributed
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toward Plaintiff’s disruptive conduct by mandating his segregation from human contact.” Brief
for Plaintiff (ECF No. 104), at 19. The Court is not unsympathetic to the effects of long term
isolation on a prisoner’s mental state, and this prisoner’s in particular. However, that is not what
this case is about.
Plaintiff filed his complaint concerning Defendants’ actions over a defined and narrow
period of time, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment requires this Court to consider
Plaintiff’s behaviors in close temporal proximity to the incidents in September and October,
2009 and Defendants’ responses and motivations for their responses (i.e., whether for punitive or
for legitimate penological reasons).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 82), and will grant judgment in their favor on all claims. A separate order
will be entered.
/s Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all counsel of record
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