WORKMAN v. ASTRUE
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 8 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 10 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/12/11. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PAULA L. WORKMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 10-907
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND
NOW,
this
/;?~y
of
September,
2011,
upon due
consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the
Commissioner
of
application
for
Social
Security
disability
("Commissioner")
insurance
benefits
denying
her
("DIB")
and
supplemental security income ("SST") under Title II and Title XVI,
respectively, of the Social Security Act
("Act"),
IT IS ORDERED
that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
10) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment
(Document No.8)
be,
and the same hereby is,
denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an
obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and
may reject
or discount
reasons for doing so.
OIilhA072
(Rev. 8/82)
Cir. 1999) .
any evidence
if
Plummer v. Apfel,
the ALJ explains
the
186 F.3d 422,
(3d
429
Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by
substantial
findings
I
evidence
even
differently.
2001).
if
a
I
it
reviewing
would have
Fargnoli v.
Moreover l
I
decided
Massanari l
disability
presence of impairments
court
is
not
is
bound
the
factual
247 F.3d 34 1
by
38
those
inquiry
(3d Cir.
determined merely by
the
but by the effect that those impairments
have upon an individual1s ability to perform substantial gainful
activity.
Jones v. Sullivan l 954 F.2d 125 1 129 (3d Cir. 1991).
These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of
the ALJ/s decision here because the record contains substantial
evidence to support the ALJ/s findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on February 71
2007 1 alleging she was disabled since December 29 1
mental problems
I
2006 1 due to
emphysema, a cracked right wrist l knee problems
and liver problems.
Plaintiff's applications were denied.
At
plaintiff/s request l an ALJ held a hearing on April 211 2008, at
which plaintiff appeared represented by counsel.
On June 3, 2008
1
the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff/s request for review on June
18 1
2010 I
making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
The instant action followed.
Plaintiff was 36 years old on her alleged onset date of
disability and is classified as a younger individual under the
regulations.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1563(c)
I
416.963(c).
Plaintiff has
a high school education through a general equivalency degree.
addition,
she
has
past
relevant
work
experience
as
In
an
administrative assistant l administrative clerkl waitress and bank
'IlI.A072
{Rev. 8/82)
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teller, but she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at
any time since her alleged onset date of disability.
After
reviewing
plaintiff's
medical
records
and
hearing
testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing,
the ALJ
concluded
that
meaning of the Act.
plaintiff
is
not
disabled within
the
The ALJ found that plaintiff suffers from the
severe impairments of status post dislocation of the right elbow
and right ulnar styloid fracture, a torn lateral meniscus in the
right knee,
gastroesophageal reflux disease,
bipolar disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder and personality disorder, but those
impairments, alone or in combination,
do not meet or equal the
criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1
of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix
111).
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional
capacity to perform a range of light work with a number of other
limitations.
Plaintiff
is
limited
to
occasional
climbing,
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling and bending.
In addition, plaintiff is limited to simple, routine, repetitive
tasks, no more than occasional interaction with co-workers and no
interaction
with
the
general
public
(collectively,
the
"RFC
Finding") .
As a result of these limitations,
the ALJ determined that
plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work.
based upon the vocational expert's testimony,
However,
the ALJ concluded
that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience and
residual
functional
capacity enable her
~A072
{Rev. 8/82)
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to make a
vocational
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national
economy,
such
housekeeping cleaner.
as
a
garment
sorter,
folder
and
Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff
is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (1) (A), 1382c(a) (3) (A).
The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant
"is
not
only
unable
to
do
[her]
previous
work
but
cannot,
considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy .... "
42 U.S.C. §§423 (d) (2) (A), 1382c(a) (3) (B).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate
a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant is disabled.
The ALJ must determine:
(1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activitYi (2)
if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3)
if so, whether
her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1;
(4)
if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work;
and
(5)
if so,
whether the
claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national
economy,
residual
in light of her age,
functional
416.920(a) (4).
education,
capacity.
20
C.F.R.
§§404.1520(a) (4),
If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled
at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary_
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
work experience and
- 4
Id.
In this case,
plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at
steps 3 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
At step 3,
plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that her wrist
impairment
does
not
meet
or
equal
listing
1.07.
Further,
plaintiff claims the ALJ's step 5 finding that she retains the
residual functional capacity to perform work that exists in the
national economy is not supported by substantial evidence.
The
court finds that these arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ's findings at step 3 of
the
sequential
evaluation process.
At
step
3,
the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of
the
listed
impairments.
Burnett
v.
Commissioner
of
Social
Security Administration,. 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
The
listings describe impairments that prevent an adult, regardless of
age,
education or work experience,
activity.
from performing any gainful
20 C.F.R. §§404.1525(a), 416.925(a) i Knepp v. Apfel,
204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000).
"If the impairment is equivalent
to a listed impairment, then [the claimant] is per se disabled and
no further analysis is necessary."
It
is
the
ALJ's
burden
to
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119.
identify
the
relevant
listed
impairment in the regulations that compares with the claimant's
impairment.
Id. at 120 n.2.
However, it is the claimant's burden
to present medical findings that show her impairment matches or is
equivalent to a listed impairment.
1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992).
Williams v . Sullivan, 970 F. 2d
In determining whether the claimant's
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, the ALJ must set
'!:>.A072
(Rev. 8182)
-
5
forth the reasons for his decision.
Burnett, 220 F.2d at 119.
According to plaintiff, the ALJ erred in failing to find that
she meets or equals listing 1.07 relating to fracture of an upper
extremity.
Contrary to plaintiff's position,
a
review of the
record establishes that the ALJ employed the appropriate analysis
in arriving at his step 3 finding.
The ALJ analyzed the medical
evidence of record and found that plaintiff suffers from status
post
dislocation of
fracture,
a
torn
the
right
lateral
elbow and
meniscus
gastroesophageal reflux disease,
right
in
ulnar
the
bipolar disorder,
styloid
right
knee,
generalized
anxiety disorder and personality disorder, all of which are severe
impairments.
However,
the
ALJ
determined
that
plaintiff's
impairments, even when considered in combination, do not meet or
equal any listed impairment.
The ALJ's decision indicates that he
considered listings under sections 1.00, 5.00 and 12.00, but he
found that plaintiff's conditions do not satisfy all the criteria
of any listing.
(R. 13).
The ALJ then explained his reasoning as
to why plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal any listing.
(R. 13-14).
The ALJ satisfied his burdeni however, plaintiff failed to
sustain her burden of showing that her wrist impairment meets, or
equals, listing 1.07.
Specifically, the criteria of that listing
requires a " [f]racture of an upper extremity with nonunion of a
fracture
of
the
shaft of
the
continuing surgical management,
humerus,
radius or ulna,
as defined in 1.00M,
under
directed
toward restoration of functional use of the extremity, and such
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 6
function was not restored or expected to be restored within 12
months
of
According
onset."
continuing surgical management
II
to
1.00M,
the
phrase
"under
refers to surgical procedures and
any other associated treatments related to the efforts directed
toward
the
salvage
or
restoration
of
functional
use
of
the
affected part.
In plaintiff's case, although an X-ray taken in April 2008
showed "an old nonunited fracture in the region of
ulnar styloid",
[her]
right
(R. 315), the medical evidence does not indicate
that she was under continuing surgical management or that she had
a loss of functional use of her right extremity, both of which are
required to meet or equal listing 1.07.
2008
April
plaintiff's
explained,
As the ALJ correctly
X-ray
was
otherwise
unremarkable, (R. 18, 315-16), and her orthopedic surgeon reported
in May 2008 that she had some tenderness in her ulna joint but had
otherwise recovered well.
court
finds
that
the
(R.
Accordingly,
18,
344).
step
ALJ's
342,
3
finding
is
supported
the
by
substantial evidence.
The court likewise finds that the ALJ's step 5 finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
At step 5, the Commissioner
must show there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent
with
her
age,
education,
past
work
experience
and
residual
functional capacity.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(g) (1), 416.920(g) (1).
Residual
capacity
functional
is
defined
as
that
which
an
individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
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7
her
impairments.
Fargnoli,
20
247 F.3d at 40.
functional
capacity,
claimant's
ability
physical,
C.F.R.
mental,
the
to meet
§§404.1545(a) (1),
In assessing a
ALJ
is
claimant's residual
required
certain demands
sensory and other
416.945(a) (1);
to
of
consider
jobs,
requirements.
the
such as
20
C.F.R.
§§404 .1545 (a) (4), 416.945 (a) (4) .
Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 because:
(1) he did not properly evaluate plaintiff's credibility;
(2) he
did not give appropriate weight to the opinions of two physicians
who examined plaintiff;
and (3) his hypothetical question to the
vocational
not
expert
did
properly
account
for
plaintiff's
limitations in concentration, persistence and pace.
For reasons
explained below, these arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating her
subjective
complaints
regarding
claimant's
complaints
and
her pain and
other
subj ective
supported by objective medical evidence.
limitations.
symptoms
must
A
be
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c),
416.929(c); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
An ALJ may reject the claimant's subjective testimony if he does
not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting
the testimony.
F.3d 429,
433
Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Security, 181
(3d Cir.
1999).
Here,
the ALJ properly analyzed
plaintiff's subjective complaints, and he explained why he found
her testimony not entirely credible.
In evaluating plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ complied with
the appropriate regulations and considered all of the relevant
flii>.Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
- 8
evidence
in
the
record,
including
the
plaintiff's activities of daily living,
medical
evidence,
plaintiff's medications
and the extent of her treatment, plaintiff's own statements about
her symptoms and opinion evidence by physicians who treated and
examined her.
(3)
i
See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) (1)-(3), 416.929(c) (1)
Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
extent
to
which
plaintiff's
The ALJ then considered the
alleged
functional
limitations
reasonably could be accepted as consistent with the evidence of
record and how those limitations affect her ability to work.
C.F.R. §§404.1529(c) (4), 416.929(c) (4).
20
The ALJ determined that
the objective evidence is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegation
of
total
disability.
Accordingly,
the
ALJ
determined
that
plaintiff's testimony regarding her limitations was not entirely
credible.
(R.
18).
This court finds that the ALJ adequately
explained the basis for his credibility determination, (R. 18 22),
and
is
satisfied
that
such
determination
is
supported
by
substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not give appropriate
weight to the respective opinions of Dr. Arul and Dr. Groves.
In
making this argument, plaintiff erroneously suggests both doctors
are treating physicians, when in fact each doctor only examined
her
on
one
occasion.
To
be
clear,
Dr.
Arul
performed
an
outpatient psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff on January 5, 2007
I
(R. 255-56), and Dr. Groves met with her for only one hour when
she performed an evaluation on May 1, 2008.
(R. 328-38).
Plaintiff's primary complaint is that the ALJ did not fully
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 9
consider GAF scores assessed by these doctors.
designed by
clinicians
the American
to
functioning.
report
an
The GAF scale,
Psychiatric Association,
individual's
overall
is used by
level of mental
The GAF scale considers psychological, social and
occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental
health to illness.
The highest possible score is 100 and the
lowest is 1.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that GAF
scores
do
not
have
a
direct
correlation
to
the
severity
requirements of the Social Security mental disorder listings, and
consequently has held that a
low GAF score
is not conclusive
evidence of a mental disability.
See Gilroy v. Astrue, 351 Fed.
Appx .
Like any other evidence in a
714 ,
715
( 3 d Cir .
2009).
social security case, a GAF score may be disregarded or accorded
little weight depending upon its consistency with the record as a
whole.
In this case, the ALJ noted that Dr. Arul assessed plaintiff
with a GAF score of 40 when he evaluated her on January 5, 2007.
(R. 21).
Although the ALJ did not explicitly mention GAF scores
of 35 and 52 at the beginning and end of plaintiff s
f
partial
hospitalization program in January 2007, and of 50 at Dr. Groves'
May 2008 evaluation,
the ALJ thoroughly discussed the evidence
pertaining to plaintiff's mental health issues,
doctors'
findings
and
explained
why
he
respective assessments controlling weight.
did
including both
not
(R. 22).
give
their
As the ALJ
explained, both doctors examined plaintiff on one occasion only,
~A072
(Rev. 8182)
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and their opinions were inconsistent with other record evidence,
as well as plaintiff's activities of daily living and the fact
that she did not receive any mental health treatment from May 2007
until May 2008.
In sum, the ALJ thoroughly considered assessments
by Dr. Arul and Dr. Groves, and correctly concluded they were not
entitled to controlling weight.
Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical
question to the vocational expert limiting her,
inter alia,
to
simple, routine, repetitive tasks did not properly account for her
moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence and pace.
Contrary to plaintiff's position,
the
Third Circuit
Court of
Appeals has determined that a limitation to simple, routine tasks
sufficiently accounted for a claimant's moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence and pace.
Fed. Appx.
941,
946
Appx.
412
(3d Cir.
410,
tasks
accounted
See McDonald v. Astrue, 293
(3d Cir. 2008); Menkes v. Astrue,
for
2008)
the
262 Fed.
(restriction to simple,
claimant's
moderate
routine
limitation
in
concentration, persistence and pace) .
In
addition
to
adequately
limitation with concentration,
accounting
for
plaintiff's
persistence and pace,
the ALJ's
hypothetical otherwise incorporated all of plaintiff's functional
limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all
of
the
factors
that were the basis of
the RFC Finding.
See
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987) (an ALJ's
hypothetical
to a
vocational
expert
must
reflect
all
of
the
claimant's impairments and limitations supported by the medical
'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
- 11
evidence) .
Accordingly,
vocational
expert's
the ALJ did not err in relying on the
testimony
to
conclude
that
plaintiff
can
perform other work that exists in the national economy.
After
carefully and methodically
considering all
medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony,
of
the
the ALJ
determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
the Act.
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by
substantial
evidence
and
are
not
otherwise
erroneous.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
(J>~~
~ave D~amond
United States District Judge
cc: E. David Harr, Esq.
203 South Main Street
Greensburg, PA 15601
Christy Wiegand
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
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