THE YORK GROUP, INC. et al v. PONTONE et al
Filing
793
MEMORANDUM OPINION on motion for reconsideration. 647 Signed by Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 10/1/2014. (mjo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THE YORK GROUP, INC., MILSO
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, and
MATTHEWS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT PONTONE, HARRY
PONTONE, BATESVILLE CASKET
COMPANY, INC., and PONTONE
CASKET COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 10-1078
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Conti, District Judge
I.
Introduction
The instant action involves a business dispute between competitors engaged in the
business of manufacturing and distributing caskets. In a memorandum opinion and order dated
March 6, 2014, the court ruled on motions for summary judgment pertaining to several different
claims and counterclaims. ECF Nos. 642-643. On April 3, 2014, defendant Batesville Casket
Company, Inc. (“Batesville”), filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to three specific
issues addressed in the memorandum opinion. ECF No. 647. Batesville’s motion for
reconsideration was accompanied by a motion for oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the
motion for reconsideration and the motion for oral argument will both be denied.
II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
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When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The plain language of Rule 54(b) provides a federal court with “general
discretionary authority to review and revise interlocutory rulings” prior to the entry of a final
judgment.1 Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991). “Because of the
interest in finality, however, courts should grant motions for reconsideration sparingly.”
Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D.Pa. 1992). “The purpose
of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). “[A] motion
for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a request for a district court to rethink a decision
[that] it has already made, rightly or wrongly.” Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236,
238 (W.D.Pa. 1998).
III.
Discussion
In support of its motion for reconsideration, Batesville merely repeats arguments that
were already considered and rejected. ECF No. 673. Having engaged in the painstaking task of
evaluating the various claims asserted in this case and preparing a comprehensive, 81-page
opinion to address them, the court will not repeat its reasons for denying Batesville’s motion for
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Since no final judgment has been entered in this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by
Batesville does not constitute “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment” within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Pellicano v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Assoc., 540 F.App’x
95, 97 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013); FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
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summary judgment with respect to the factual issues implicated by its motion for
reconsideration. It suffices to say that those issues were already discussed in the memorandum
opinion filed on March 6, 2014, and that further elaboration is unnecessary. ECF No. 642. In
order to further clarify its reasoning, however, the court will briefly explain why Batesville’s
arguments are lacking in merit.
Plaintiffs Matthews International Corporation (“Matthews”), the York Group, Inc. (“York
Group”), and Milso Industries Corporation (“Milso” and collectively with Matthews and York
Group, “plaintiffs”) allege that Batesville tortiously interfered with contractual relations existing
between Scott Pontone (“Scott”), Harry Pontone (“Harry”), and plaintiffs. ECF No. 70 ¶¶ 16673. The tortious interference claims are premised on assertions that Batesville induced Scott and
Harry to violate restrictive covenants and confidentiality obligations contained in their respective
employment contracts with plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 169. Plaintiffs maintain that Scott violated his
employment contract by improperly inducing Josephine Pesce (“Pesce”) to terminate her
employment relationship with the York Group and/or Milso in order to accept a new position
with Batesville. Id. ¶ 129. The tortious interference claims brought against Batesville are
partially based on its alleged involvement in Scott’s illicit recruitment scheme. Batesville’s
motion for summary judgment was denied with respect to those claims. ECF No. 642 at 33-35.
The parties previously agreed that, with respect to the tortious interference claims, no
difference existed between the laws of Pennsylvania and New York. ECF No. 159 at 2-3. That
concession obviated the need for a choice-of-law analysis. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d
Cir. 2006)(“If there is no conflict, then the district court sitting in diversity may refer
interchangeably to the laws of the states whose laws potentially apply.”). Relying primarily on
Cantor Fitzgerald Associates, L.P. v. Tradition North America, Inc., 749 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y.
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App. Div. 2002), Batesville argues that the court’s prior decision is contrary to “binding
precedent”2 confirming that an “unhappy” employee cannot be “solicited” by someone acting at
the behest of a competitor. ECF No. 648 at 2-3; ECF No. 673 at 2. In order to resolve
Batesville’s motion, the court will assume arguendo that the relevant legal issues are governed
by the law of New York.
Contrary to Batesville’s suggestion, Cantor Fitzgerald does not draw a bright line
between “happy” and “unhappy” employees in the context of improper “solicitations.” Cator
Fitzgerald merely held that, under the particular factual circumstances, the plaintiff could not
establish that the defendant’s alleged interference had proximately caused the employees’
breaches of their respective employment contracts. Cantor Fitzgerald, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
The relevant factual circumstances are not even apparent from the decision, which discusses the
evidentiary record in a single paragraph. Id. Nothing in Cantor Fitzgerald indicates that the
plaintiffs in this case must prove that Pesce was “happy” or “satisfied” with her prior job in order
to hold Batesville liable for inducing Scott’s alleged breach of the anti-solicitation provision
contained in his employment contract with the York Group. Furthermore, the plain language of
Scott’s employment agreement prohibited him from “attempt[ing] to solicit or induce any
employee” of the York Group or Milso “to leave either company.” ECF No. 28-3 at 4 (emphasis
added). The applicable contractual language was not limited to employees who were
subjectively “happy” or “satisfied.” By focusing solely on Pesce’s subjective apprehension
about her future employment status, Batesville conflates evidence relating to the issue of
causation with the issue of causation itself. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d
2
It is worth noting that federal courts sitting in diversity are not automatically bound by
decisions rendered by state intermediate appellate courts. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Estate
of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir.
2007).
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173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997). The court has already explained why the evidence pertaining to Pesce’s
state of mind does not entitle Batesville to a judgment as a matter of law.3 ECF No. 642 at 2124.
Batesville contends that the record contains no “admissible” evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could infer that Batesville personnel tortiously interfered with the
performance of Harry’s contractual obligations. ECF No. 648 at 4-7; ECF No. 673 at 3-4. In
making this argument, however, Batesville does not appear to challenge the admissibility of the
evidence relied upon by the court as a basis for denying Batesville’s motion for summary
judgment. Instead, Batesville simply characterizes that evidence as speculative or conjectural.
Id. Inferences based solely on speculation or conjecture do not create genuine issues of material
fact for trial. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). It is also
true that the only inferences relevant to the inquiry are those flowing directly from admissible
evidence. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, “cases relying
strongly on circumstantial evidence often force the trial court to ride the thin line between
speculation and reasonable inferences.” Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 474
(3d Cir. 1985). For the reasons discussed in the earlier opinion, the record contains evidence
permitting a trier of fact to reasonably infer that Batesville interfered with Harry’s performance
of his contractual obligations. ECF No. 642 at 31-35. The position taken by Batesville at the
present time relates more to the weight of the relevant evidence than it does to the admissibility
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Batesville incorrectly asserts that the court did not address Pesce’s “unhappiness” with her prior
position. ECF No. 673 at 1. Because her “happiness” was not an element of plaintiffs’ cause of
action, the court had no particular reason to focus on it. In any event, the court adequately
discussed the evidence concerning Pesce’s state of mind to the extent that it was relevant to the
disputed factual issues. ECF No. 642 at 21-23.
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of that evidence. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l American Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir.
2004).
The final argument made by Batesville concerns the alleged lack of damages suffered by
plaintiffs as a result of the possible contractual breaches of Scott and Harry. ECF No. 648 at 710; ECF No. 673 at 4-5. In the prior opinion, the court acknowledged that several funeral home
directors had submitted declarations stating that their decisions to purchase products from
Batesville (rather than from the plaintiffs) had been attributable to factors other than actions
taken by Scott, Harry, Pesce and Joseph Redmond (“Redmond”). ECF No. 642 at 26. Batesville
essentially argues that since plaintiffs never deposed those funeral home directors during the
course of discovery, the declarations remain uncontradicted. ECF No. 648 at 7-10; ECF No. 673
at 4-5. The evidentiary record, however, cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a few
declarations. The documentary record contains uncontradicted evidence that Batesville’s sales to
several Matthews customers increased dramatically between July 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011.
BCC1_0059068. Redmond testified that Scott, Pesce, and he had been “instrumental” in
convincing some customers to purchase products from Batesville rather than from plaintiffs.
ECF No. 518-26 at 18. Furthermore, the court’s decision denying Batesville’s motion for
summary judgment was not based solely on the possibility that plaintiffs had lost customers as a
result of the alleged breaches. In the breach-of-contract context, “the amount of actual damages”
may include “any loss flowing from the breach.” Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice, 673 F.2d 70, 73
(2d Cir. 1982). Thomas Pontone testified that plaintiffs had been forced to offer some customers
higher discounts and better rebates in order to retain their business. ECF No. 518-28 at 15.
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Even if the declarations submitted by the funeral home directors were to be taken at face value,4
the evidence relating to other “losses” allegedly suffered by plaintiffs would preclude the entry
of summary judgment in Batesville’s favor. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music
Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 926 (2d Cir. 1977)(explaining that “when the existence of damage is
certain, and the only uncertainty is as to its amount, the plaintiff will not be denied a recovery of
substantial damages”).5
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Batesville’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 647) will be
denied in all respects. The accompanying motion for oral argument will also be denied.
Considerable amounts of time and resources have already been devoted to the parties’ motions
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Batesville’s “Capri tactical plan” was evidently designed to capitalize on information provided
by Scott, Pesce and Redmond about the “buying habits” of plaintiffs’ customers.
BCC1_0050399. Thomas Pontone testified that Batesville had offered funeral home directors
discounts that were slightly higher than those previously offered by plaintiffs, leading him to
believe that confidential information had been disclosed to Batesville’s sales representatives.
ECF No. 518-28 at 11-12. Consequently, the existing record could support a finding that some
customers’ buying decisions may have been influenced by the defections of Scott, Pesce and
Redmond, who were knowledgeable about the pricing practices of plaintiffs. ECF No. 642 at 26.
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Batesville asserted in its reply brief (ECF No. 673 at 5) that summary judgment is mandated
because plaintiffs did not adduce testimony from the customers who did less business with the
plaintiffs. The two decisions relied upon, however, are not directly on point. In Keehan v.
Keehan, No 96 Civ. 2481, 1997 WL 317023, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1997), the district court
did not grant the summary motion and directed further discovery to proceed. The court addressed
the affidavits presented by the movant in a footnote and noted that “plaintiffs mainly” relied on
inconsistencies in the affidavits to present a credibility issue, which alone was insufficient
because there was no other affirmative evidence. In Stewart v. American’s Servicing Co., 409 F.
App’x 595 (3d Cir. 2001), the plaintiffs had argued summary judgment should not be granted
because an affidavit submitted on behalf of the defendant was not based on personal knowledge.
The court of appeals determined that the affiant had personal knowledge about the facts asserted.
The court of appeals concluded that there was no error by the district court in granting summary
judgment because plaintiffs “did not produce any evidence rebutting the affirmations in [the]
affidavit.” Stewart, 409 F. App’x at 598 (emphasis added). Here, unlike Keehan and Stewart, the
circumstantial evidence, which was discussed in the March 6, 2014 opinion, is sufficient to
create a triable issue.
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for summary judgment. Several claims were dismissed. ECF No. 642 at 81; ECF No. 643 at 12. The remaining claims must be presented to the trier of fact.
By the court:
Dated: October 1, 2014
/s/ JOY FLOWERS CONTI
Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge
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