PALMER v. EVENHEAT KILN, INC

Filing 47

ORDER denying 43 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 6/13/2012. (sps)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Delaney Palmer,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
Evenheat Kiln, Inc.,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10-1163

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER OF COURT
The factual and procedural details of this products liability action are well known to the
parties and I need not repeat them in detail here. Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to
Preclude Evidence, Testimony, and/or Expert Testimony Concerning Plaintiff’s Alleged Cocaine
Use and Brief in support thereof. (Docket Nos. 43, 44). Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion.
(Docket No. 46). After a careful review of the submissions by the parties, Plaintiff’s Motion in
Limine is denied.
Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. In turn, relevant evidence may be excluded if its
“probative value is substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Rule 403 authorizes a district court in
its broad discretion to exclude collateral matters that are likely to confuse the issues.” United
States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 (3d Cir. 1991). The inquiries under Rules 401 and 403 are

1

fact-intensive, and context-specific. Sprint v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008). A court should
be wary of excluding evidence in limine under Rule 403 because “[a] court cannot fairly
ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record
relevant to the putatively objectionable evidence.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 859 (3d Cir. 1999). “[W]hen the trial judge is in doubt, Rule 403 requires admission.”
Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1244 (3d Cir. 2002).
The burden of establishing the admissibility and relevance of evidence rests on the
proponent. See, e.g., Phillips v. Potter, Civ. A. No. 7-815, 2009 WL 2588830, at *1 (W.D. Pa.,
Aug. 19, 2009).
Through its Motion, Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence related to a November 12, 2009
drug screening of Plaintiff in which he tested positive for cocaine. The drug test occurred
approximately two months prior to the alleged electric shock injury that gave rise to Plaintiff’s
claims in this case. Plaintiff claims that evidence of Plaintiff’s alleged cocaine use has minimal
probative value and that any probative value is substantially outweighed by the high danger of
unfair prejudice. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
In short, I agree with Defendant that the evidence of the positive drug screen in this case
is highly relevant to a central disputed issue in this case – i.e., whether the Plaintiff sustained
the claimed electric shock. For example, the evidence is relevant to whether Plaintiff’s creatine
phosphokinase (“CPK”) levels were elevated at the time of the alleged incident due to electric
shock or to an alternative cause such as Plaintiff’s alleged cocaine use. The evidence is also
relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility and supports Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff had a motive to
fabricate or exaggerate a work-related injury because he faced discipline, including possible
termination, at work for failing the drug screen.
Although evidence of a Plaintiff’s drug use may be prejudicial, the danger of such
prejudice simply does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the results of Plaintiff’s
drug screen under the facts and circumstances of this case. While I am mindful of Plaintiff’s
2

disagreement with the strength of Defendant’s expert testimony and other concerns about
prejudice, Plaintiff may address these concerns through other effective means such as crossexamination of witnesses at trial; Plaintiff’s own competing witnesses and/or evidence at trial;
and, if desired, appropriate limiting language in the jury instructions.
AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2012, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence, Testimony, and/or Expert
Testimony Concerning Plaintiff’s Alleged Cocaine Use (Docket No. 43) is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

3