MONROE v. MULLOOLEY et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING the 36 MOTION in Limine Concerning Plaintiff's Testimony filed by CASEY MULLOOLEY. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 09/14/2012. (jmb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AARON MONROE,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
CASEY MULLOOLEY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10-1208
Chief Magistrate Judge Lenihan
Re: ECF No. 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is the Motion Limine Concerning Plaintiff’s Testimony
filed by Defendant Casey Mullooley. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant’s motion
will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aaron Monroe’s civil action against Defendant Officer Casey Mullooley
brings claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and excessive force in
violation of Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Monroe’s original complaint, arising from alleged
mistreatment while incarcerated at Westmoreland County Detention Center, contained
seven claims against three defendants, Westmoreland County Detention Center,
Warden John Walton and Officer Casey Mullooley. (ECF No. 1-8). Defendants removed
the case to the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (ECF No.
1) and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 4). District Judge Ambrose granted this motion in part, dismissing all but the
two remaining claims against Officer Mullooley. (ECF No. 13). Defendant Mullooley
filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. (ECF No.
1

25). After this motion was denied (ECF No. 32), consent was granted to proceed before
a Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 34). The case is currently before the undersigned where
Mullooley has filed a motion in limine to exclude certain testimony from Monroe from
use at trial (ECF No. 36).

FACTS
On June 27, 2008, Plaintiff Aaron Monroe appeared in the Court of Common
Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania before Judge Richard E. McCormick, Jr.
for the purpose of entering a guilty plea to various criminal charges unrelated to this
case. (ECF No. 26-1). Judge McCormick refused to accept a plea from Monroe because
he appeared to be “under the influence [of drugs].” (ECF No. 26-1). Monroe denied this
when asked at the hearing, but has admitted to prior use of multiple drugs since. (ECF
No. 26-6, ¶ 7-8). Monroe was then taken to Westmoreland County Detention Center to
await another plea hearing. Mr. Mullooley and another officer were in charge of booking
when Monroe arrived. An altercation occurred during booking, the details of which are
disputed between the parties. Following the confrontation, Monroe was charged with
one 2nd degree felony count of Aggravated Assault and one 2nd degree misdemeanor
count of Simple Assault. Regarding the simple assault charge, the criminal information
reads:
The Actor intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused or attempted to cause
bodily injury to Casey Mulooley[sic], Corrections Officer, Westmoreland County
Prison, that is to say, the actor did strike the victim in the face with his shoulder
or elbow, causing injury to the left side of the victim’s face and then fought with
the victim and support until subdued.
(ECF No. 26-3)
2

On January 10, 2011, Monroe, voluntarily and while under oath, pleaded guilty to
the simple assault charge as stated. (ECF No. 26-5). The Aggravated assault charge
was dropped and Monroe was sentenced to 12 months probation. (ECF No. 26-4).
Monroe now alleges in his complaint that he was assaulted by Officer Mullooley
and further denies the facts established by his guilty plea. (ECF No. 1-8). He admittedly
loses consciousness after the allegedly unprovoked assault, which is his final
recollection of the incidents resulting in his assault charge and this civil suit. (ECF No. 18, ¶ 20).
ANALYSIS
Guilty Plea
Defendant argues in support of his Motion in Limine that Monroe is collaterally
estopped from testifying to any facts that conflict with those established by his guilty
plea. The Full Faith and Credit Act states that:
[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession…shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. §1738. In other words, it requires “federal courts to give the same preclusive
effect to a state-court judgment as would the courts of the State rendering the
judgment.” Minnick v. City of Duquesne, 65 F. App’x 417, 420 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287 (1984)). “The federal court, in
determining the collateral estoppel effect of a state court proceeding, should apply the
law of the state where the criminal proceeding took place….” Grier v. Scorpine, No. 04-

3

1888, 2008 WL 655865, at *5 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Anela v. City of Wildwood,
790 F.2d 1063, 1068 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Pennsylvania law views a conviction from a guilty plea as equivalent to a
conviction from a trial-by-jury “because a guilty plea constitutes an admission to all facts
alleged in the indictment.” M.B. ex rel. T.B. v. City of Philadelphia, 128 F. App’x. 217,
226 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp. v. Mitchell, 535 A.2d 581,
585 (Pa. 1987). Defendant Monroe’s guilty plea is, necessarily, an admission to each of
the following:
1. intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily
injury to Casey Mullooley, Corrections Officer, Westmoreland County Prison,
that is to say, the actor
2. struck Officer Mullooley in the face with his shoulder or elbow,
3. caused injury to the left side of the Officer Mullooley’s face, and
4. fought with Officer Mullooley and his support until he was subdued.
In Pennsylvania each of these facts, by virtue of Monroe’s guilty plea, is established and
accepted as if determined by a jury. “Operative facts necessary for criminal convictions
are admissible as conclusive facts in civil suits arising from the same events and
circumstances.” DiJoseph v. Vuotto, 968 F.Supp. 244, 247 (E.D.Pa. 1997) (citing Folino
v. Young, 568 A.2d 171, 172 (Pa. 1990)). In Pennsylvania, “it is well established that a
criminal conviction collaterally estops a defendant from denying his acts in a
subsequent civil trial.” Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996). Therefore under
Pennsylvania law, the above facts established by the record in Monroe’s guilty plea and
assault conviction are conclusive and may not be disputed.
4

Monroe argues that his testimony should be admitted because it was not
necessary to establish if Mullooley was the aggressor in the altercation, therefore
reasonable doubt exists as to what facts were established by his guilty plea. His
argument relies heavily on Linnen v. Armainis, 991 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1993). Linnen
pleaded guilty to multiple criminal charges, including drug possession, and later brought
a §1983 claim alleging Fourth Amendment violations for illegal search and seizure
against several police officers that were involved in his criminal case. Id. at 1104. The
case reached the Third Circuit on appeal after a district court concluded that Linnen’s
guilty plea precluded his claim challenging the legality of the underlying search and
seizure and granted summary judgment. Id. at 1103. The Linnen court acknowledged
that “under Pennsylvania law, a guilty plea constitutes an admission to all facts alleged
in the indictment.” Id. at 1105 (citing Mitchell, 535 A.2d at 585).The court also
determined, however, that nothing in the criminal information indicated that Linnen’s
plea admited to the legality of the search, nor was it a necessary determination to
support the charges he pled guilty to. Id. at 1105-6. Linnen and the Supreme Court
authority it relies on, Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), both address this identical
issue and hold that a defendant’s guilt on possession charges is “simply irrelevant to the
legality of the search under the fourth amendment or [his] right to compensation from
state officials under §1983.” Id. at 1105 (citing Haring, 462 U.S. at 316). Both cases turn
on these specific facts which distinguish them from the present case and issue, which
concerns facts established by the criminal information and which were explicitly
admitted by virtue of Monroe’s guilty plea. Reasonable doubt need only be applied
when determinations are not necessary to the judgment.
5

After Linnen, the Supreme Court decided another §1983 case, Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Supreme Court in Heck held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §2254.
Id. 486-87. The Supreme Court’s broad holding in Heck, now recognized as the
“favorable termination rule,” limits the Third Circuit’s opinion in Linnen. M.B. ex rel. T.B.,
128 F. App’x at 227 n.10 (3d Cir. 2005). Though Heck might not preclude similar illegal
search and seizure claims to that in Linnen, it strictly limits the Linnen court’s
discussion of §1983 claims. If Plaintiff were to succeed in this civil rights case, it would
render invalid his prior criminal conviction, specifically precluded by Heck as it would
call into question Plaintiff’s conviction for the assault for the same incident. See, Feliz v.
Kintock Grp., 297 F. App’x 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2008).
Events Subsequent to Monroe’s Loss of Consciousness
Defendant additionally argues that FED.R.EVID. 602 should preclude testimony
regarding anything that occurred after Monroe states that he was struck by Officer
Mullooley. Monroe stipulates to losing consciousness after this punch both in his
complaint (ECF No. 1-8, ¶. 18) and his deposition (ECF No. 26-6, pp. 52, 53).
FED.R.EVID. 602 requires sufficient evidence to support a finding of personal knowledge
on a matter before a witness may testify to it. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition does not
address this portion of the motion. (ECF No. 38). The request will be granted and
Plaintiff is precluded from testifying to anything that occurred while he was unconscious.
6

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from testifying
in contradiction to the criminal information established by his guilty plea to simple
assault. Plaintiff is also precluded from testifying as to anything that occurred after he
was struck by Officer Mullooley. Defendant’s Motion in Limine is granted. An Order
consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 14, 2012

Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge

7