WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
17
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 13 Motion for Summary Judgment; and remanding the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Signed by Judge Alan N. Bloch on 8/16/2011. (kmw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TED M. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil Action No. 10-1263
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
o
R D E R
AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2011, Plaintiff having filed a
complaint seeking review of the determination of the Commissioner of
Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his claim for supplemental
security income benefits and the parties having submitted cross-motions
for summary judgment, and upon consideration of the Report and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (document No. 15)
("Report and Recommendation") and Plaintiff's objections thereto
(document No. 16), and after independent review of the pleadings, the
administrative record, and the Report and Recommendation,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(document No. 13), filed in the above captioned case on April 18, 2011,
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (document No. 10), filed in the above-captioned matter on
February 18, 2011, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Specifically,
Plaintiff's Motion is granted to the extent that it seeks a remand to
the Commissioner for further evaluation as set forth below and denied in
all other respects.
Accordingly, this matter is hereby remanded to the
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Commissioner for further evaluation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. ยง
405(g) in light of this Order.
Although the Report and Recommendation thoroughly sets forth the
facts and legal standard applicable in this case, the Court does not
adopt its ultimate finding that substantial evidence supports the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").
The Court, instead,
finds that substantial evidence does not support the decision because
the record is insufficient to support the ALJ's determination as to the
weight, if any, to be assigned to Plaintiff's Global Assessment of
Functioning (\\GAF") scores, as well as to the opinion of Dr. Omar
Bhutta, M.D.
Accordingly, the Court will remand the case for further
consideration.
Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the ALJ failed to address
Plaintiff's GAF scores in determining whether Plaintiff was disabled.
Specifically, he argues that the ALJ did not address GAF scores of 50
and lower which were assigned to him by treating health care providers
from December 1, 2005 through February 16, 2007.
He asserts that these
scores support the opinion of Dr. Bhutta, his treating psychologist, as
well as Plaintiff's testimony of disabling symptoms.
The difficulty in a case like this is that GAF scores do not
directly correlate to a determination of whether an individual is or is
not disabled under the Act:
The GAF scale, which is described in the DSM-III R (and the
DSM IV), is the scale used in the multiaxial evaluation
system endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association. It
does not have a direct correlation to the severity
requirements in our mental disorders listings.
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65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65.
While under certain circumstances a GAF
score can be considered evidence of disability, standing alone, a GAF
score does not evidence an impairment seriously interfering with a
claimant's ability to work.
678
(loth
Cir. 2003).
See Lopez v. Barnhart, 78 Fed. Appx. 675,
GAF scores may indicate problems that do not
necessarily relate to the ability to hold a job.
Barnhart, 94 Fed. Appx. 817, 819
(loth
69 Fed. Appx. 775, 780 (7 th Cir. 2003);
See id.; Zachary v.
Cir. 2004); Wilkins v. Barnhart,
v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6 th Cir. 2002) i Power v. Astrue, 2009 WL
578478, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2009).
Indeed, a GAF score between 41 and 50 reflects "serious symptoms
(e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent
shopl
ing) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or
school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job)."
A GAF
score between 31 and 40 .reflects "some impairment in reality testing or
communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or
irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed
man avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child
frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing
at school)."
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4 th ed., Text Rev. 2000).
Accordingly, the mere fact that a treating mental health care provider
assigned certain GAF scores would not necessarily indicate that
Plaintiff is disabled.
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Nonetheless, a GAF score is evidence that an ALJ should consider
in determining a claimant's impairments and limitations in setting forth
the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and in fashioning a
hypothetical question to the vocational expert ("VE").
However, while a
GAF score can assist an ALJ in understanding the limitations contained
in the opinions of medical professionals, the actual number itself does
little to describe the specific functional limitations caused by the
claimant's impairments.
See Howard, 276 F.3d at 241 ("While a GAF score
may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC, it is not
essential to the RFC's accuracy.").
Here, Dr. Bhutta submitted an August 24, 2007 opinion that
Plaintiff was severely impaired in several areas.
(R. 315-20).
Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ did not ignore this report,
but rather rejected the opinion evidence.
Part of the basis for this
determination was that the August 2007 opinion was inconsistent with Dr.
Bhutta's longitudinal office notes.
The ALJ gave greater weight to
those daily reports because they were generated for the purpose of
treatment rather than merely to lend support to Plaintiff's disability
claim.
However, these daily reports contained various GAF scores
ranging from 40 to 50.
(R. 286-89).
The ALJ did not address these
scores in finding that the daily reports were inconsistent with Dr.
Bhutta's August 2007 opinion.
Despite the ambiguity of GAF scores, the ALJ could not rely on
those daily reports in rejecting Dr. Bhutta's opinion, yet fail to
discuss GAF scores in those reports that mayor may not support such
reliance.
This failure to acknowledge and discuss these scores leaves
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open the possibility of several assumptions about Plaintiff's GAF
scores.
It could be inferred that the ALJ believed that the reports
themselves indicated that the amorphous GAF scores were not evidence of
occupational impairments or limitations.
It could be that the ALJ felt
that even GAF scores as low as those assigned to Plaintiff were
inconsistent with the August 2007 opinion.
the GAF score assessments altogether.
It could be that he rejected
This ambiguity renders the Court
unable to adequately assess the weight, if any, assigned to these
assessments, and, accordingly, whether the ALJ had an adequate basis for
rejecting Dr. Bhutta's August 2007 opinion.
Further discussion is
needed to understand how the ALJ factored Plaintiff's GAF scores into
his findings.
The Court acknowledges that GAF scores, which can mean many
things, create something of a grey area in terms of disability
determination.
Further, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether
the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Bhutta's opinion could be supported by the
record.
It is the need for further explanation that mandates the remand
in this case.
Indeed, it should be noted that there is actually some
support for the proposition that a GAF score of 50 is a score which
indicates the ability to perform some substantial gainful activity.
See
Hillman v. Barnhart, 48 Fed. Appx. 26, 30 n.l (3d Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence does not
support the ALJ's decision in this case.
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The Court, therefore, does not
adopt the findings in the Report and Recommendation, but rather remands
this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Order.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf:
Counsel of record
Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell
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