GRACIANO v. ASTRUE

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 6 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; and granting 8 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as set forth more fully within. Signed by Judge Joy Flowers Conti on 2/23/2012. (cal )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHELE GRACIANO,
Plaintiff.
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Case No. 10-1529

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CONTI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Michele Graciano (“Plaintiff” or “Graciano”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g), seeking review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-83f (the “Act”). This matter comes before the court
on cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 6, 8). The record was developed at the
administrative level. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Graciano filed for DIB and SSI with the Social Security Administration on August 5,

2008, claiming an inability to work due to disability as of March 18, 2008. (R. at 90-100).1 She
was initially denied benefits on October 6, 2008. (R. at 68-77). A hearing was held on March
31, 2010, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified. (R. at 45-64). A
vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (R. at 61-63). The Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) issued his decision denying benefits to Plaintiff on April 6, 2010. (R. at 6- 21).
Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. The request
was denied on September 14, 2010, thereby making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of
the Commissioner. (R. at 1-3).
Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on November 17, 2010. (ECF No. 3).
Defendant filed an answer on January 21, 2011. (ECF No. 4). Cross-motions for summary
judgment followed. (ECF Nos. 6, 8).

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
A. General Background
Graciano was born on September 4, 1970, and was thirty-nine years old at the time of her

administrative hearing. (R. at 90-100). She lived with her fiancé and had a sixteen-year-old
daughter and a twenty-year-old son. (R. at 59, 107). Plaintiff graduated from high school, and
was enrolled in college level courses in pursuit of an associate’s degree. (R. at 52- 53). The
courses were internet-based. (R. at 52–53).
1

Citations to ECF. Nos. 5 – 5-8, the Record, hereinafter, “R. at __.”
2

Discussion will be limited to the facts as they relate only to Plaintiff’s physical impairments. In her brief,
Plaintiff did not address the ALJ’s conclusions with respect to her alleged psychological impairment; therefore, the
court will not discuss that portion of the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 7 at 5-9).

2

Plaintiff’s past relevant employment immediately prior to her disability onset date
included employment as a night monitor/counselor at a juvenile detention center and as a selfemployed babysitter. (R. at 48, 119–20). She had last worked a full-time job in 2008. (R. at
48). She attempted part-time work assisting mentally handicapped adults briefly in 2009. (R. at
48). Plaintiff claimed that she ultimately was unable to hold any job due to pain and limitations
stemming from knee and back injuries sustained while working as a night monitor/counselor in
2006. (R. at 118). Plaintiff claimed that she had difficulties walking, sitting, standing, and
lifting. (R. at 112, 115). Plaintiff stated that she required the use of a cane and brace/splint. (R.
at 113, 116). Her pain was intermittent throughout the day. (R. at 107, 109-10, 112, 114-16).
She also considered diagnosed depression as an impairment precluding her ability to work. (R.
at 112, 114).
In a self-report of functional capacity, Plaintiff stated that her daily activities included
making sure that her daughter was ready for school, making breakfast, cooking meals, caring for
her dog, shopping for groceries, clothing, and other necessities, and cleaning the house. (R. at
106-16). Plaintiff also enjoyed watching television. (R. at 107, 111). Plaintiff claimed that pain
in her knee and back limited her at times. (R. at 107, 109-10, 112-16). If she cooked, it involved
meals that were fast and easy to prepare. (R. at 107-09, 114). Her daughter often helped her
with daily chores. (R. at 108-09). Plaintiff maintained a driver’s license and was capable of
driving on her own. (R. at 110). Plaintiff paid her bills, and could handle savings and checking
accounts. (R. at 110-11). Plaintiff’s hobbies included singing and reading. (R. at 111). Plaintiff
regularly went to church. (Id.).
Plaintiff indicated that she had no difficulties getting along with family, friends,
neighbors, or other people in general. (R. at 112). Her ability to maintain attention was intact,
she could finish activities she started, she followed instructions well, and her ability to get along
3

with authority figures was good. (R. at 112-13). Plaintiff could somewhat handle stress, but
handled changes in routine fairly well. (R. at 113).
B. Treatment History
On January 12, 2007, Plaintiff appeared at the office of Ann-Richie Rodriguez, M.D.,
complaining of left knee pain. (R. at 191-92). Plaintiff initially presented to Dr. Rodriguez on
December 11, 2006. (R. at 191). Plaintiff was diagnosed with a left meniscal tear. (R. at 19192). Arthroscopy was suggested. (R. at 191). At the January 12, 2007 visit, Plaintiff’s knee had
no deformities, but showed minimal effusions, medial joint line tenderness, and limited range of
motion. (Id.) A valgus stress test was positive, but Lachman’s testing and a varus stress test
produced negative results. (R. at 191). No crepitus was noted. (Id.).
Following a lack of improvement in knee pain with conservative treatment, Plaintiff was
recommended for arthroscopic partial meniscectomy for a lateral meniscus tear and degenerative
joint disease. (R. at 216). A surgeon, Michael Tranovich, M.D., performed an arthroscopic
chondroplasty and partial meniscectomy on Plaintiff’s left knee on January 22, 2007. (R. at
217). Plaintiff’s knee was observed to have significant arthritis and a tear of the lateral
meniscus. (Id.). Plaintiff tolerated the procedure well. (Id.).
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Rodriguez and David Garzarelli, M.D. on February 15, 2007
following her arthroscopy. (R. at 187-90). Three weeks after the surgery, Plaintiff was
complaining of mild pain and was walking with crutches. (R. at 189). It was noted that Plaintiff
was to begin physical therapy the following week. (Id.). Plaintiff’s left knee was restricted in
range of motion due to pain, but was stable, showed no crepitus, and showed no deformity. (Id.).
Following her surgical procedure, Plaintiff regularly followed up with Dr. Tranovich. (R.
at 207-15). Plaintiff was at times noted to experience symptoms of synovitis, mild swelling,
mild tenderness, minimal effusion, subjective discomfort and some weakness, often exacerbated
4

by activity, but with mild improvement over time. (Id.). She was to engage in physical therapy
and was provided prescription medication and injections for pain. (Id.). Despite slow
improvement in pain and limitations associated with her left knee, by June 21, 2007, Dr.
Tranovich considered Plaintiff capable of light duty or sedentary work. (R. at 207-08). Due to
reported increases in pain, by August 16, 2007, Dr. Tranovich indicated that Plaintiff may not be
able to continue working. (R. at 206).
Plaintiff completed a full course of physical therapy by October 2007. (R. at 201). She
still complained to Dr. Tranovich about pain in her left knee, which worsened with activity.
(Id.). Dr. Tranovich observed minimal synovitis, distal tenderness in the quadriceps of the knee,
and mild instability. (Id.). Plaintiff was to use a TENS unit for pain relief. (Id.). Various
injections into the left knee beginning in July 2007 and ending in September 2007 were allegedly
ineffective in alleviating Plaintiff’s pain. (R. at 201-07).
Plaintiff’s physical therapy discharge summary indicated that Plaintiff attended eightyone therapy sessions. (R. at 222). Plaintiff was noted as capable of riding a bicycle for ten
minutes and performing a left knee extension of forty pounds. (Id.). Plaintiff could perform a
leg press up to eighty pounds. (Id.). Plaintiff rated her knee pain as four on a pain scale of ten,
although the therapist had hoped to achieve greater pain relief. (Id.). Plaintiff did have nearly
full knee strength in both extension and flexion. (Id.). Plaintiff’s physical therapist felt that
Plaintiff plateaued in her recovery and would not likely see continued improvement from
physical therapy. (Id.). Plaintiff was advised to continue home exercise and consider pain
management therapy. (Id.).
Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Tranovich again on November 16, 2007 due to left knee
pain. (R. at 200). Her discomfort was exacerbated by movement. (Id.). Physical examination
found minimal swelling, diffuse tenderness, and an extraordinary pain reflex. (Id.). Plaintiff
5

was determined to be unfit to work, and she was to consult with a pain management specialist.
(Id.).
Plaintiff visited Dr. Tranovich on December 26, 2007, complaining of left knee and
lower back pain. (R. at 199). She stated that the back pain radiated into her thighs. (Id.). Upon
examination, Dr. Tranovich found Plaintiff’s knee exhibited minimal swelling, minimal
tenderness, no evidence of significant synovitis, and a full range of motion. (Id.). Plaintiff
completed heel-toe walking exercises with normal results, had a negative squat test, had negative
straight leg raising, had intact reflexes, showed full range of motion in the hips, and had only
mild restriction of flexion and extension. (Id.). There was moderate paravertebral spasm. (Id.).
MRI results showed no significant stenosis or herniation. (R. at 199, 221). EMG and nerve
conduction studies of Plaintiff’s left leg were normal. (R. at 199, 219-20). Plaintiff was to
continue physical therapy for her knee and conservative pain management therapy for her back.
(R. at 199).
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Tranovich on February 6, 2008. (R. at 198). Dr. Tranovich
stated that Plaintiff reported feeling better, overall, but was still significantly disabled by knee
and thigh pain. (Id.). Plaintiff’s left knee was found to have a full range of motion, there was no
point tenderness, and there was no evidence of effusion; but, there were hyperesthesias in the
knee and thigh area. (Id.). He noted that Plaintiff’s back had been in pain and that an epidural
injection was administered, which Plaintiff believed was helpful. (Id.). Plaintiff was to engage
in treatment to manage her pain. (Id.).
Plaintiff was evaluated by Edward Heres, M.D., of UPMC Pain Medicine on February 6,
2008. (R. at 168-71). Dr. Heres noted Plaintiff’s history of left knee and back pain originating
with a work-related accident in December 2006. (R. at 168). The pain emanating from
Plaintiff’s lower back allegedly traveled down her left leg as far as her left knee. (Id.). There
6

was no numbness or tingling, but the pain was constant and throbbing. (Id.). Walking and
changes in the weather exacerbated the pain. (Id.). Plaintiff’s left knee was occasionally
swollen and made walking problematic. (R. at 169). Dr. Heres indicated that other treatment
modalities such as a TENS unit and physical therapy failed. (R. at 168). Plaintiff was
maintained on naproxen3 for pain. (R. at 168).
Dr. Heres observed that Plaintiff had a steady gait, and walked without a cane, although
Plaintiff claimed to have left it at her home. (R. at 169). She did have a brace on her knee.
(Id.). Testing showed full muscle strength in both legs, normal range of motion, and intact
sensation. (R. at 169). There was some swelling and tenderness in the left knee. (Id.). An MRI
showed damage in the left knee joint. (Id.). Some tenderness around the sacroiliac joint in the
pelvis was noted. (Id.). An injection for pain at the sacroiliac joint was administered by Dr.
Heres during Plaintiff’s visit. (R. at 170). Plaintiff was referred to an orthopedic surgeon for her
continued knee pain. (Id.).
Plaintiff was evaluated by orthopedic surgeon Adolph Yates, M.D., on February 14,
2008. (R. at 175-76). Dr. Yates noted Plaintiff’s history of left knee pain and back pain
subsequent to a work-related injury. (R. at 175). Plaintiff’s left knee arthroscopy was also
noted. (Id.). Dr. Yates opined that Plaintiff’s knee condition had not improved. (R. at 176). Dr.
Yates observed that Plaintiff’s left hip moved freely, and without referred pain to the left knee.
(R. at 175). Straight leg raising was negative, strength was full, and there was no knee effusion.
(Id.). There was, however, some crepitus and some tenderness of the knee. (R. at 176). Plaintiff
exhibited full extension and flexion. (Id.). An MRI of Plaintiff’s back was unremarkable. (Id.).
An MRI of her knee showed low-grade patellofemoral chondromalacia, past anterolateral

3

Naproxen “is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) with analgesic and antipytetic properties.
Physician’s Desk Reference 2632 (63 ed. 2009).

7

meniscal tear, and presence of a non-specific cyst. (Id.). More imaging studies were ordered.
(Id.).
Upon returning to Dr. Yates on February 27, 2008, Plaintiff’s back and knee symptoms
were noted to be the same. (R. at 173-74). Following a review of Plaintiff’s new MRI’s, Dr.
Yates felt that her condition was outside of his area of expertise, and he could offer her no help.
(Id.). He observed some residual meniscus tears with subluxation and extrusion. (Id.). Bone
scans showed no fractures and only some low-grade degenerative joint disease. (Id.). He was
uncertain of the etiology of Plaintiff’s back pain. (Id.).
Vonda Wright, M.D., saw Plaintiff on April 14, 2008. (R. at 194). She noted that
Plaintiff was engaged in physical therapy and that Plaintiff continued to experience pain
anteriorly over the patella and distal quad, and in her anterior lateral meniscus. (Id.). Dr. Wright
opined that Plaintiff would not be able to return to her previous jobs with the described pain, but
that she would be fully capable of engaging in sedentary work. (Id.). Dr. Wright saw Plaintiff
again on June 6, 2008. (R. at 194). Plaintiff continued to complain of knee pain. (Id.). Plaintiff
was to continue with physical therapy. (Id.). If the therapy did not provide relief, Dr. Wright
indicated that she would prescribe medication for pain. (Id.).
Plaintiff had reinitiated physical therapy in March 2008 and continued through May
2008. (R. at 259-60). Plaintiff attended twenty therapy sessions, and was found to have attained
her maximum therapeutic benefit. (R. at 259). Plaintiff rated her knee pain as six on a pain
scale of ten. (Id.). Medial/lateral gapping tests and grind tests of the left knee were normal. (R.
at 260). Her left knee strength was nearly normal; however, her pain showed little improvement.
(R. at 259-60).
On August 8, 2008, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Tranovich for follow up on her left knee
surgery. (R. at 196). Dr. Tranovich noted Plaintiff’s complaints of anterior knee tenderness.
8

(Id.). Upon examination, ill tracking of the patella was minimal, range of motion was full,
instability was mild, there was neither locking nor giving way, and there were signs of only mild
synovitis. (Id.). X-rays showed minimal medial narrowing, good tracking of the patella, and
mild effusion. (Id.). Despite continued synovitis, Plaintiff was without significant mechanical
problems. (Id.). Plaintiff was prescribed anti-inflammatories, and pain medication for
occasional use. (Id.). Plaintiff was to work on strengthening her knees and reducing her weight.
(Id.). In an accompanying Worker’s Compensation Report, Dr. Tranovich indicated that
Plaintiff was limited to lifting twenty pounds, and could do intermittent walking and standing for
eight hours per day with breaks as needed. (R. at 197).
State agency evaluator Mary Diane Zelnak completed a physical residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) assessment on September 23, 2008. (R. at 239-45). Subsequent to a review of
Plaintiff’s medical record, Ms. Zelnak diagnosed Plaintiff with degenerative joint disease, mitral
valve prolapse, and multinodular goiter. (R. at 244). Plaintiff’s exertional limitations were
indicated to include only occasional lifting of twenty pounds, frequent lifting of ten pounds,
standing and walking approximately six hours of an eight-hour day, and sitting six hours. (R. at
240). Ms. Zelnak indicated that medical source statements in Plaintiff’s file did not differ
significantly from her conclusions. (R. at 243). Ms. Zelnak opined that Plaintiff’s complaints of
pain and limitation were not fully credible. (R. at 245). Plaintiff complained that she could only
walk for five minutes before requiring a rest, and that she had pain daily. (R. at 244). Ms.
Zelnak, however, noted that Plaintiff cared for her daughter, was capable of driving and
shopping, could care for herself, and cooked. (Id.). Ms. Zelnak also cited Dr. Tranovich’s
August 8, 2008 assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to work, and Dr. Wright’s April 14, 2008
assessment, as indicating that Plaintiff was not as limited as claimed. (R. at 245).

9

On March 12, 2009, Dr. Tranovich administered an injection for Plaintiff’s knee pain.
(R. at 264-65). At the time, Plaintiff’s knee had mild valgus orientation, and minimal tenderness
along the joint line, but had marked tenderness over the patellofemoral joint and some degree of
luxation. (R. at 264). There was minimal instability, but Plaintiff did exhibit some swelling and
used a cane for ambulation. (Id.).
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Tranovich on April 3, 2009. (R. at 262). Plaintiff complained of
continued pain and tenderness in the left knee, and had been increasingly symptomatic. (Id.).
Diagnostic imaging had recently revealed significant chondrosis of the patellofemoral
compartment and lateral compartment. (Id.). She, however, did not have acute meniscal or
ligamentous damage. (Id.). Dr. Tranovich suggested losing weight and strengthening Plaintiff’s
quadriceps. (Id.). He also suggested arthroscopic debridement of the areas of Plaintiff’s knee
where chondrosis was found. (Id.). That same day, Dr. Tranovich completed a Worker’s
Compensation Report indicating that Plaintiff was unable to return to work. (R. at 263).
Records indicated that Plaintiff visited her primary care physician on September 15, 2009
regarding left knee pain and back pain. (R. at 312-15). She complained of difficulty moving for
the previous three weeks, that her lower back pain was sharp, and her knee pain was constant.
(R. at 312). Her prescription pain medication ran out in April 2009. (Id.). She had not seen Dr.
Tranovich since March 2009, and wanted a second opinion about further knee surgery. (R. at
312-13). Upon examination, Plaintiff’s physician stated that her left knee was slightly larger
than the right, with medial joint line tenderness and tenderness above the kneecap. (R. at 313).
There were signs of crepitus, but not instability. (Id.). There was a full range of motion in the
left knee. (Id.). With respect to Plaintiff’s back, the physician noted tenderness on the left, but
no pain with hip flexion, and normal alignment and range of motion. (Id.). Plaintiff was
referred for a second opinion. (R. at 313).
10

C. Administrative Hearing
Plaintiff testified that in the period following her last date of employment, she attempted
to further her education by enrolling in an associate’s degree program administered via the
internet. (R. at 52-53). As had occurred during her period of employment subsequent to her
knee and back injuries, Plaintiff’s impairments allegedly limited her ability to complete course
work. (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that she could only sit in front of the computer for approximately
an hour at a time due to her pain. (R. at 53). She then would lay down to alleviate her
discomfort. (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that she typically spent three to four hours per day lying
down due to pain. (R. at 60).
Plaintiff testified that even in her most recent job as a personal aide to mentally
handicapped adults, the rigors of the part-time job produced too much pain. (R. at 56). Plaintiff
explained that she was required to do a significant amount of walking. (R. at 56-57). Plaintiff
only worked one or two days a week, but it proved to be too arduous. (R. at 57).
Plaintiff complained that her pain was constant, and that injections and pain killers had
provided her with limited relief. (R. at 54, 61). Physical therapy was somewhat helpful in
allowing her to walk following her surgery. (R. at 58). Plaintiff, however, described requiring a
cane to ambulate, including in her home. (R. at 59). Plaintiff expressed a significant degree of
trepidation about her doctor’s suggestion that she consider another knee surgery, because it had
been such a strenuous process recovering from her first surgery. (R. at 58).
Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ asked the vocational expert whether a
hypothetical person of Plaintiff’s age, educational background, and work experience would be
eligible for a significant number of jobs in existence in the national economy if limited to
sedentary work not requiring him or her to meet the demands of a rapid production pace. (R. at
62). The vocational expert responded that such a person would be able to work in “ticket sales,”
11

with 238,000 positions available in the national economy, as a “telephone clerk,” with 93,000
positions available, or as a “gate guard,” with 106,000 positions available. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s attorney asked the vocational expert to state about how much of any given
work day an employer expects an employee to be on task. (R. at 63). The vocational expert
replied that a worker is expected to be on task for approximately ninety percent of any given
work day. (Id.). Plaintiff’s attorney then inquired whether a worker would be allowed to lay
down while on the job. (Id.). The vocational expert explained that a worker could only lay
down during brief, fifteen-minute morning and afternoon breaks, and the typical thirty-minute
lunch time. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff’s attorney questioned the vocational expert about typical
allowances for absences. (Id.). The vocational expert stated that one absence per month,
sometimes two, would be tolerated by an employer. (Id.).

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be eligible for social security benefits under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate to

the Commissioner that he or she cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).

When

reviewing a claim, the Commissioner must utilize a five-step sequential analysis to evaluate
whether a claimant has met the requirements for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a
combination of impairments that is severe; (3) whether the medical evidence of the claimant’s
impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.
12

404, Subpt. P, App’x 1; (4) whether the claimant’s impairments prevent him from performing his
past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of performing his past relevant work,
whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(a)(4); see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003).

If the claimant is

determined to be unable to resume previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
(step 5) to prove that, given claimant’s mental or physical limitations, age, education, and work
experience, he or she is able to perform substantial gainful activity in jobs available in the
national economy. Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986).
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute, and is plenary as to all legal issues. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)4, 1383(c)(3)5; Schaudeck v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Section 405(g) permits a district court to
review the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based; the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. The district court must then
determine whether substantial evidence existed in the record to support the Commissioner’s
findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support a conclusion. Ventura v.
4

Section 405(g) provides in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the [Commissioner] made after a hearing to which he was
a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action . . . brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides, or has his principal place of business. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
5

Section 1383(c)(3) provides in pertinent part:
The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing under paragraph (1)
shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the
Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

13

Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). If the Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390. When considering a case, a
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision nor reweigh the
evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision in reference to the
grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.
Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947). The
court will not affirm a determination by substituting what it considers to be a proper basis.
Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-97. “[E]ven where this court acting de novo might have reached a
different conclusion . . . so long as the agency’s factfinding is supported by substantial evidence,
reviewing courts lack power to reverse either those findings or the reasonable regulatory
interpretations that an agency manifests in the course of making such findings.” Monsour Med.
Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 90-91 (3d. Cir. 1986).

V.

DISCUSSION
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had medically determinable severe impairments, i.e.,

degenerative joint disease of the left knee, chronic low back pain, and major depression. (R. at
11). As a result of her impairments, Plaintiff could only perform sedentary work not requiring
dealing with the stress of a rapid production pace. (R. at 13). Based upon the testimony of the
vocational expert, the ALJ was able to conclude that Plaintiff was capable of engaging in a
significant number of jobs in existence in the national economy despite her limitations. (R. at
16-17). As such, Plaintiff was found ineligible for disability benefits. (R. at 17).
In the present case, Plaintiff’s sole contention is that the ALJ erred in failing to find her
disabled because he improperly discredited her statements of pain and limitations, despite the
14

presence of allegedly corroborative objective medical support within the record. (ECF No. 7 at
5- 9). The court notes that in cases involving subjective complaints of pain and limitation, an
administrative law judge should accord subjective complaints the same treatment as objective
medical reports, and weigh the evidence before him or her. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220
F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). The administrative law judge needs to determine the extent to
which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of his or her disability. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1529(c)). A[I]n all cases in which pain or
other symptoms are alleged, the determination or decision rationale must contain a thorough
discussion and analysis of the objective medical and the other evidence, including the
individual's complaints of pain or other symptoms and the adjudicator's personal observations.
The rationale must include a resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole and set
forth a logical explanation of the individual's ability to work.@ Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted).
Serious consideration must be given to subjective complaints of pain where a medical
condition could reasonably produce such pain. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (3d
Cir. 1993). Moreover, there need not be objective evidence of a subjective complaint, and the
administrative law judge must explain his or her rejection of the subjective complaint. Id.;
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122. When medical evidence provides objective support for subjective
complaints of pain, an administrative law judge can only reject those complaints by providing
contrary objective medical evidence. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067-68. While pain itself, however,
may be disabling, and subjective complaints of pain may support a disability determination,
allegations of pain suffered must be consistent with the objective medical evidence on record.
Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985); Burnett, 220 F.3d at 122.

15

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s dismissal of her purported pain and need to lie down
during the day was too cursory, and failed to account for the consistent findings throughout the
record that Plaintiff experienced severe, debilitating pain. The ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary
work, but did not otherwise physically accommodate Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, if the ALJ
limited her functional capacity to reflect her credible complaints of pain and limitation, she
would be precluded from all work. (ECF No. 7 at 5-9).
With respect to Plaintiff’s physical limitations, the ALJ stated:
The claimant testified that her back and knee pain is so severe that on some days
she cannot get out of bed. She also testified that when doing her lessons on the
computer she will work about one hour, then she will go to lie down for a rest that
may last up to an hour or more.
…
Although the claimant may find it desirable to lie down for a rest or a nap after
one hour of working on lessons at her computer, since she has no fixed schedule
and can work at her own pace, there is no evidence that this practice is medically
necessary. No medical source has indicated that such rest periods must be
provided.
(R. at 14) (emphasis added). Additionally, the ALJ remarked that Plaintiff attended only one
session with a pain treatment specialist and was not on prescription pain medication at the time
of her administrative hearing. (R. at 14). Dr. Wright indicated that Plaintiff could perform
sedentary work. (R. at 15).
While the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s treatment record for her physical ailments was
not exhaustive, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence which contradicts his findings with respect to
her limitations. While certain doctors, as reflected in the record, indicated that Plaintiff could
not return to her former employment for purposes of worker’s compensation benefits, none
indicated that she could not perform work as determined by the ALJ. No doctor corroborated
Plaintiff’s allegations that she needed to rest frequently throughout the day. While physical
therapy did not provide Plaintiff with lasting relief, Plaintiff failed to seek help regularly from a
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pain management specialist. She was taking over-the-counter pain medication at the time of her
administrative hearing. Based upon this record evidence – as pointed out by the ALJ –
Plaintiff’s accounts of her pain and limitations do not appear to be as severe as alleged. As such,
the ALJ provided substantial evidence to support his determination that Plaintiff was not entirely
credible.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that substantial evidence supported the ultimate

decision by the ALJ to deny disability benefits to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment will be denied, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted,
and the decision of the ALJ will be affirmed. An appropriate order follows.
By the court,

s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
United States District Judge
Dated: February 23, 2012.

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