GUERRA v. NEW PRIME, INC., et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend/Correct ad damnum clause; denying 26 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 7/20/12. (mh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALICIA A. GUERRA,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW PRIME, INC., and
CHRISTOPHER L. COPPOLA,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11-CV-00020
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court are the following:
(1) Plaintiff’s MOTION TO AMEND THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S
AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 24); and
(2) Defendants’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 26).
The motions are fully briefed (Doc. Nos. 25, 27, 33, 34); and the parties have developed their
respective positions by submitting concise statements of material fact and numerous exhibits
(Doc. Nos. 28, 29, 32). The motions are ripe for disposition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of March 11, 2009 a tractor trailer, operated and driven by Defendant
Christopher L. Coppola (“Coppola”), an employee of Defendant New Prime, Inc. (“New
Prime”), collided with the rear end of a vehicle being operated by Plaintiff Alicia A. Guerra
(“Plaintiff”), on Interstate 70 in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that she
sustained various serious injuries as a result of the accident.
On December 8, 2010 Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint in the Court of
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Coppola and New Prime (collectively
“Defendants”), removed the case to this Court in January 2011. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint in Civil Action. (Doc No. 9). The Amended Complaint alleges that the
accident was a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, and recklessness of
Coppola, who at the time of the accident was acting within the course and scope of his
employment by New Prime.
On March 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Ad Damnum Clause of her
Amended Complaint to include a request for punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges that discovery
has revealed evidence which shows that Defendants acted with a conscious disregard of the
rights of Plaintiff, and that such action warrants the imposition of punitive damages. Defendants
oppose Plaintiff’s motion and argue that the Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient
facts to support a claim for punitive damages and that the evidence Plaintiff obtained through
discovery does not warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
On April 4, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which
they request the Court to: (a) grant summary judgment to both Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims
for punitive damages; and (b) grant summary judgment to Defendant New Prime on Plaintiff’s
claims for negligent hiring, retention, monitoring, training, and supervision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party may amend its pleading by motion
to the Court, and that the Court should freely grant such motions “when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, it is within the district court’s discretion to grant or deny a motion
to amend, and a court could justify denial of a motion to amend on grounds of undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, or futility. Id. “In inquiring as to when [an] amendment would
be futile, the Court applies the same standard used in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Schneider v. Arc of Montgomery
Cnty., 497 F.Supp.2d 651, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2007). In other words, the court must examine the
record to determine whether the record supports the amendment being requested.
In Pennsylvania, the ad damnum clause of a complaint may be amended to include a
claim for punitive damages, provided that the complaint demonstrates a basis for such damages.
Dept. of Transp. v. Pennsylvania Industries for the Blind and Handicapped, 886 A.2d 706, 715
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). Such an amendment is allowed because “[t]he right to punitive damages
is a mere incident to a cause of action – an element which the jury may consider in making its
determination – and not the subject of an action in itself.” Daley v. John Wanamaker, Inc., 317
Pa. Super. 348, 360 (1985) (quoting Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 276 (1959)).
Similarly, under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must
examine the record to determine whether summary judgment should be granted or denied.
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment Inc., 860 F.2d 1227,
1233 (3d Cir. 1988). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could render a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
257; McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Furthermore, “[i]n determining
whether a genuine issue of fact exists, a court must resolve all factual doubts and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Burke v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 605
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F.Supp.2d 647, 650 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364
F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004)).
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction of this Court in the case at bar is based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The underlying claims are based on Pennsylvania law; therefore,
Pennsylvania substantive law will determine whether punitive damages will be permitted in this
case. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Burke, 605 F.Supp.2d at 651, n. 2 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
A. General Principles Regarding Claims For Punitive Damages
In Hutchinson v. Luddy, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the standard for an
award of punitive damages:
The standard governing the award of punitive damages in Pennsylvania is settled.
Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. As the name
suggests, punitive damages are penal in nature and are proper only in cases where the
defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish a tortfeasor for outrageous
conduct and to deter him or other[s] like him from similar conduct. Additionally, this
Court has stressed that, when assessing the propriety of the imposition of punitive
damages, [t]he state of mind of the actor is vital. The act, or failure to act, must be
intentional, reckless or malicious.
….
Thus, in Pennsylvania, a punitive damages claim must be supported by evidence
sufficient to establish that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of
harm to which plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as the case
may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.
Hutchinson v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 121-122, 124 (Pa. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
The Court will apply this standard to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims for punitive
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damages will survive summary judgment. The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims for punitive
damages against Defendant Coppola and Defendant New Prime seriatim.
I. Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages Claim Against Defendant Coppola
Under Pennsylvania law, drivers have a duty to operate their vehicles at a reasonable
speed:1
Pennsylvania law provides that [n]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions having regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his [or
her] vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. In Lockhart v. List, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that the assured clear distance ahead rule simply
requires a driver to control the speed of his or her vehicle so that he or she will be able to
stop within the distance of whatever may reasonably be expected to be within the driver’s
path.
Keifer v. Reinhart Foodservices, LLC, 2012 WL 368047 at *12 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 1, 2012)
(emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
While a violation of this duty may be enough to establish a negligence claim, the
imposition of punitive damages requires more. “Punitive damages are not available in cases
involving simple negligence, but are available when the actor knows, or has reason to know …
of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds
to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.” Logue v. Logano
Trucking Co., 921 F.Supp. 1425, 1427 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff must demonstrate that, under the circumstances, Coppola knew, or
had reason to know, that travelling at an excessive speed created a high degree of risk to Plaintiff
and other drivers, and that he continued to do so in deliberate disregard or indifference to that
risk. In other words, to impose punitive damages against a driver of a tractor-trailer, “[t]he state
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The statutory standard referenced is codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3361 (1977).
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of mind of the actor [driver] is vital.” Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984).
Determination of an actor’s state of mind is generally not resolved on summary
judgment. “Since a culpable state of mind is required for an award of punitive damages, evidence
of the defendant’s knowledge or intention is highly relevant.” Hutchinson v. Penske Truck
Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 984 (Pa. Super. 2005). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained
that “a court should be reluctant grant a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the
dispositive issue requires a determination of state of mind, for in such cases “much depends upon
the credibility of witnesses testifying as to their own states of mind, and assessing credibility is a
delicate matter best left to the fact finder.”” Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1988)
(citing Watts v. Univ. of Delaware, 622 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1980); accord Diprinzio v. MBNA
America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 2039175 at *8 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 24, 2005). There are several cases
in which district courts applying Pennsylvania law have found that punitive damages claims
against the driver of a tractor trailer must be presented to a jury.
In Logue v. Logano Trucking Co., the court found that it was fair to infer from plaintiff’s
allegations that the defendant driver created a high degree of risk, and that his actions were in
deliberate disregard or indifference to that risk to other drivers, when he operated an overloaded
tractor trailer truck with improperly adjusted brakes at an excessive, unreasonable and imprudent
rate of speed so that the truck was unable to stop for a red light, resulting in injuries to the
plaintiff. Logue, 921 F.Supp. at 1427. The Court concluded that, based on these allegations, a
jury could find that the defendant driver “knowingly took a dangerous vehicle onto a public
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highway and then operated that vehicle in a dangerous manner.” Id. at 1427-28.
Courts have also held that an experienced driver of a tractor trailer could be found to have
consciously appreciated the risk he created by travelling at an excessive speed while approaching
a “blind” curve. Burke v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009). The court
in Burke concluded that, based on the defendant tractor trailer driver’s “experience and training,
a jury could find that he consciously appreciated the risk of harm that could result by travelling
twenty miles an hour over the speed limit in a tractor trailer while approaching a “blind” curve.”
Id. at 655.
In Sabo v. Suarez, 2009 WL 2365969 (M.D. Pa., July 31, 2009), the court noted that poor
visibility, the presence of various warning signs on the road, and driving in unfamiliar territory
presented a situation where the defendant tractor trailer driver appreciated the risk he created by
driving at an excessive speed. The Court reasoned that “a driver with the type of experience
[defendant] Suarez undisputedly had should have recognized the risk of driving his tractor trailer
in densely foggy, wet conditions through an unfamiliar territory.” Id. at *3. Despite defendant’s
claims that he was driving cautiously, the Court ultimately concluded that defendant “certainly
could have been more cautious, in which case no accident would have occurred.” Id.
Gregory v. Sewell, 2006 WL 2707405 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 19, 2006), involved a claim for
punitive damages against a driver of a tractor trailer under facts similar to this case. The accident
occurred at night; during hazardous weather conditions; and immediately after defendant driver
had passed a prior accident scene. On the issue of whether defendant driver’s conduct met the
threshold necessary to impose punitive damages, the Court found that “a genuine issue of
material fact remains as to whether Defendant Sewell was speeding excessively in light of the
road conditions and whether dangerous road conditions existed that ought to have alerted
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Defendant Sewell to the risk of driving as he was.” Id. at *5.
Construing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Coppola was
driving a tractor trailer which he knew would take longer to bring to a stop, saw emergency
lights from an accident up ahead, and continued to travel at an excessive speed, ultimately
colliding with Plaintiff’s vehicle. As shown in the cases above, this subjective knowledge of
upcoming road conditions, combined with travelling at an excessive speed, satisfies the
requirements for the imposition of punitive damages. The parties dispute the speed at which
Coppola was travelling, and whether Coppola made any attempt to brake or slow down
immediately prior to the accident. Both of these disputed facts go to the heart of whether
Coppola was indifferent to, or consciously disregarded, the risk of harm that could result from
his conduct.
A reasonable jury could find that Coppola had a subjective appreciation of the risk to
which Plaintiff was exposed, and acted in conscious disregard of the risks his conduct created.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be DENIED as to Coppola.
II. Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages Claim Against Defendant New Prime
Plaintiff may assert a direct claim for punitive damages against the trucking company if
the evidence demonstrates that Defendant New Prime possessed (1) a subjective appreciation of
the risk of harm to which Plaintiff was exposed and that (2) it acted, or failed to act, as the case
may be, in conscious disregard of that risk. Hutchinson, 582 Pa. at 124 (Pa. 2005).2
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record supports a punitive damages
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In addition, New Prime may be found liable for punitive damages by way of vicarious liability for the
actions of Defendant Coppola. Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1240 (Pa. Super. 1998). Defendant New
Prime has admitted that Coppola was acting in the course and scope of his employment with New Prime at
the time of the accident. (Doc. No. 27 at 10). When dealing with claims against an employer and employee,
“vicarious imposition of punitive damages are not to be judged under a higher standard that the already
high standard of conduct reserved for direct punitive damages claims.” Gregory v. Sewell, 2006 WL
2707405 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 19, 2006).
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claim against New Prime, as New Prime was aware of a report made by Mandy Strong, who was
designated as Coppola’s trainer and rode with Coppola until three months before the accident at
issue. On December 1, 2008, just over three months before the accident, Mandy Strong
submitted a report to New Prime which detailed Coppola’s problems with his driving habits.
Specifically, the report noted that Coppola was immature, had difficulty grasping safe driving
habits, and did not take instructions well. Thus, New Prime clearly had a subjective appreciation
of the risk of harm to which Plaintiff (and other motorists) were exposed by permitting Coppola
to operate a tractor trailer.
A reasonable jury could also conclude that New Prime was deliberately indifferent to this
risk. New Prime disregarded Mandy Strong’s report; did not notify Coppola of the report’s
findings; and ultimately terminated Mandy Strong, citing that she was critical of all of her
trainees. The subsequent trainer assigned by New Prime to Coppola provided training regarding
how to back into dock doors to pick up loads, sign for bills, deal with customers, and deal with
the shippers and receivers; but did not provide training, monitoring, or supervision of Coppola
with regard to safe driving habits. Instead, the trainer slept, or was in the sleeping berth, while
Coppola was driving. Based on these facts, a jury could conclude that the “trainer” assigned to
Coppola was an inadequate response to the risk he presented to Plaintiff by being allowed to
continue driving for New Prime.
There are several cases in which District Courts applying Pennsylvania law have found
that punitive damages claims must be presented to a jury where, considering the surrounding
circumstances, the trucking company created a high degree of risk to other travelers, and it could
be inferred that the defendant trucking company appreciated the risk inherent in entrusting a
person to continue to operate a tractor trailer for said company, and the defendant trucking
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company’s actions were recklessly indifferent to the public’s safety.
In Burke v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 647, 656 (M.D. Pa., 2009), the court
denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, finding that
“Defendant TransAm’s subjective appreciation of the risk of harm may be evidenced by
knowledge attributable to the corporation of the risk attendant when tractor-trailer drivers operate
in violation of hours of service regulations, falsify logs, and continually drive over the speed
limit.” The court concluded that “Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant TransAm engaged in a
pattern and course of conduct of permitting Defendant Wirfel [driver] to drive over his hours of
service and continue to violate speeding regulations may demonstrate a conscious disregard of
the risk of harm.” Id.
Similarly, the court in Sabo v. Suarez, 2009 WL 2365969 at *5 (M.D. Pa., July 31, 2009),
allowed a punitive damages claim to proceed against the defendant trucking company stating that
“enough information exists that Defendant BTI may have been aware the Defedant Suarez was
not suitable to operate a tractor-trailer.” The court came to its conclusion on the basis that the
court had “allowed punitive damages claims to proceed against Defendant trucking companies
who allowed a driver to operate a tractor-trailer despite their awareness of a driving record filled
with speeding, driving over hours and log falsification.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The court in Gregory v. Sewell, 2006 WL 2707405 at *13 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 19, 2006),
held that the defendant trucking company could not be held directly liable for punitive damages.
However, the court stated:
“Had defendant K.A.M. Trucking had reason to believe that
defendant Sewell was a reckless or dangerous driver whose conduct created a risk of harm to
others, it might be found liable for punitive damages.”
Similar to the defendant trucking companies in Burke and Sabo, New Prime had
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knowledge of Coppola’s alleged bad driving habits, as evidenced by Mandy Strong’s report.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant New Prime had a subjective
appreciation of the risk of permitting Defendant Coppola to drive, that it consciously disregarded
or was indifferent to that risk, and that such conduct was so outrageous as to warrant an award of
punitive damages. Therefore, summary judgment will be DENIED as to New Prime.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims of Negligent Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Training or Supervision
Against Defendant New Prime.
The Court now turns to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring,
retention, monitoring, training or supervision should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 27 at 3).
Defendant contends that these claims are immaterial, redundant, and prejudicial; and, in the
alternative, that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence or facts
of record that would support such claims. (Doc. No. 27 at 12-13, Doc. No. 34 at 10-12).
“An employer’s vicarious liability for the negligent conduct of its employee does not
preclude an injured party from asserting a companion claim for negligent entrustment.” Keifer v.
Reinhart Foodservices, LLC, 2012 WL 368047 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 1, 2012). To establish a
negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff,
the defendant breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff and the plaintiff
suffered an actual loss or damage. Martin v. Evans, 551 Pa. 496, 502 (1998). “It has long been
the law in this Commonwealth [Pennsylvania] that an employer may be liable in negligence if it
knew or should have known that an employee was dangerous, careless or incompetent and such
employment might create a situation where the employee’s conduct would harm a third person.”
Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 775 A.2d 36, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Dempsey
v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562 (1968)).
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“As a general rule, courts have dismissed claims for negligent supervision and negligent
hiring when a supervisor defendant concedes an agency relationship with the codefendant ... The
courts have recognized an exception to this rule when a plaintiff has made punitive damages
claims against the supervisor defendant.” Allen v. Fletcher, 2009 WL 1542767 at *4 (M.D. Pa.,
June 2, 2009) (quoting Fortunado v. May, 2009 WL 703393 (W.D. Pa., Mar. 16, 2009)). “An
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting, supervising, and controlling
employees.” Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 760 (M.D. Pa., 2007). (quoting R.A. ex rel.
N.A. v. First Church of Christ, 748 A.2d 692, 697 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded upon this statement, holding that “[t]o
fasten liability to an employer[,] … it must be shown that the employer knew or, in the exercise
of ordinary care, should have known of the necessity for exercising control of his employee.”
Doe, 478 F.Supp.2d at 760 (quoting Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 570 (1968)).
As discussed above, the record supports Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against
Defendant New Prime. For the same reasons, the evidence is sufficient to support the less
stringent standard for negligence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retention,
monitoring, training or supervision will not be dismissed.
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C. Conclusion.
For these reasons, the Court will: (1) grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend the ad damnum
clause of Plaintiff’s amended complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages; (2) deny
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages
against Defendant Coppola and Defendant New Prime; and (3) deny Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retention, monitoring,
training or supervision against Defendant New Prime.
An appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALICIA A. GUERRA,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW PRIME, INC., and
CHRISTOPHER L. COPPOLA,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:11-CV-00020
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 2012, in accordance with the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s MOTION TO AMEND THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 24) is GRANTED;
2.
Defendants’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No.
26) is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Court Judge
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cc:
Cynthia M. Daniel, Esquire
Email: cdanel@edgarsnyder.com
Kenneth J. Nolan, Esquire
Email: knolan@edgarsnyder.com
James M. Girman, Esquire
Email: jgirman@pionjohnston.com
John T. Pion, Esquire
Email: jpion@pionjohnston.com
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